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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, legal scholars have written very little about the sub-
ject of motherhood.' There is even confusion about how to define
"mother" under the law.2 As one commentator stated: "[W]ho is a
mother no longer has a simple answer, now that genetic contribution,
gestation, and stroller pushing may each be provided by a different
woman."3 Despite this inattention and confusion, an analysis of the
areas of family, welfare, and criminal law clearly shows whom the law
rewards as a good mother.4 Judicial and legislative pronouncements
about when mothers may have custody of their children, when
mothers may or must work, and with whom mothers may live are all
1 However, other disciplines, such as history, psychology, theology, and philosophy,
have extensively explored motherhood for some time. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 9 (1978)
(arguing that "women's mothering is a central and defining feature of the social organiza-
tion of gender and is implicated in the construction and reproduction of male dominance
itself"); LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LrvEs: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988) [hereinafter GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LivEs]
(reviewing historical development of family violence); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT EN-
TITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) [hereinafter
GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED]; ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS
EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION (1976) (distinguishing the social institution of motherhood
from the individual experience of motherhood); RUDOLF SCHAFFER, MOTHERING (1977)
(exploring the psychological aspects of motherhood); JANE SWIGART, THE MYTH OF THE
BAD MOTHER: THE EMOTIONAL REALITIES OF MOTHERING (1991) (exploring the "psychology
of nurturing"); NancyJ. Chodorow & Susan Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in
FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 79 (1989).
2 One judge in a recent surrogacy opinion stated, "[W]e really have no definition of
'mother' in our law ... [M]other was presumed to be so basic that it was without need of
definition." Smith v. Jones, No. 85-532014, slip op. at 9 (Mich. Cir. CL Mar. 14, 1986).
3 Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15, 18
(1992).
4 Feminist legal scholars have begun to explore the subject of motherhood. These
writings have generally concluded that the law stereotypes mothers and fails to take into
account the different experiences of mothers. These scholars contend that the law tends
to evaluate mothers according to an idealized standard requiring mothers to be all-sacrific-
ing, chaste, and selfless nurturers regardless of their circumstances. See, e.g., MARTHA AL-
BERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER]; MARTHA At-
BERTSON FINEMAN, Preface to MOTHERS IN LAw: FEMINIST THEORYAND THE LEGAL REGULATION
OF MOTHERHOOD, at ix, x (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) [herein-
after MOTHERS IN LAw]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. REv. 95, 97-
98 (1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Motherhood and Crime]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy in the Meaning ofMotherhood, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 1, 10-16 (1993) [hereinafter
Roberts, Racism]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REv. 938,
948-51 (1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Black Motherhood]; Carol Sanger, Separating from Chil-
dren, 96 COLUm. L. REv. 375, 399-409 (1996); A Symposium on Reconstructing Motherhood, 1 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 9 (1992).
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entrenched in a legal construct of ideal motherhood. The stereotype
these laws embody is that of a self-sacrificing, nurturing, married, and
stay-at-home mother. Adherence to this stereotype, however, assumes
that mothers are equal and autonomous wage earners when the law
considers mothers' economic rights and responsibilities.
The primary way that the state imposes its conflicting definitions
of motherhood is through its criteria for determining whether a
woman has the right to raise her children and whether she has access
to the means for supporting those children. An examination of the
laws governing child placement, child support, and welfare reveals a
series of double binds and conflicting obligations for mothers, making
continued custody of children an uncertainty whenever mothers devi-
ate from the "ideal."
The way mothers behave has changed dramatically in the last
forty years.5 Much of family law is premised on the ideal construction
of the family that presumes an arrangement that is almost nonexistent
today-a mother at home with minor children and a father working
outside the home.6 The law sets standards for child placement deci-
sions, however, based on a view of a mother's proper role that has
changed little since the 1950s. Mothers are expected to be married,
to stay at home, to be available to their children around the clock, and
preferably to be both monogamous and heterosexual.
The adherence to these stereotypes, however, yields to an as-
sumption of equality when the law considers mothers' economic
rights and responsibilities. Contrary to women's actual experiences,
the law assumes mothers enjoy both an autonomy that permits them
to make choices without regard to their children's needs and an
equality of economic opportunity between mothers and fathers.
Two points guide the discussion of how the law defines "mother-
hood." First, any discussion of the legal regulation of motherhood
must acknowledge that "good" and "bad" mothers do exist.7 This Arti-
cle's exploration of the legal definitions of those categories does not
aim to eliminate them entirely, but rather, to clarify further the mean-
ing of these definitions in the law, and to test their adequacy in
5 The primary areas of change have been in patterns of work and marriage. Many
more women with young children now work outside the home than ever before, and fe-
male-headed, single parent households are at an all time high. See infra note 28.
6 Since 1987, only 10% of U.S. households follow this pattern. See CHILDREN, FAMS. &
Soc. SERVS. Comm., NATIONAL CoNF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FAMILY PoLIcy. RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR STATE ACTION 51 (Candace L. Romig ed., 1989).
7 For thoughtful discussions of both the stereotypes and the complex reality of "bad
mothers," see Marie Ashe, Postmodernism, Legal Ethics, and Representation of "Bad Mothers," in
MOTHERS IN Lmv, supra note 4, at 142; Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A
Problem of Representation, 43 HaSTINcs L.J. 1017 (1992); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child
Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEx.J. WomEN & L. 75 (1993);Jane M. Spinalk, Reflec-
tions on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1990 (1995).
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describing mothers. Do the law's current definitions of good and bad
mothers capture the complexities of women's lives? When mothers
are in some sense bad mothers and fail to provide adequate care for
their children, how can the legal system most effectively intervene?
Does the law's construct of mothers' rights versus children's rights ig-
nore the fundamental bond that exists between most mothers and
their children? Finally, does the law's tendency to blame mothers for
all harm that befalls their children undermine other policies seeking
to increase the visibility and accountability of fathers?
A second and related point is that any discussion of the legal sys-
tem's response to mothers must both acknowledge the centrality of
race and class, and recognize that some issues transcend class.
Throughout this Article, the examples of the ways that the law both
devalues and punishes mothers often focus on poor women of color.
Poor minority women frequently bear the punishment for deviating
from the stereotype of the ideal mother, whereas white middle-class
and wealthy women reap the rewards for being good mothers. In cus-
tody and child support proceedings, however, middle class women ex-
perience the same problems in their struggle to keep and support
their children that poor women face in abuse and neglect proceed-
ings, and coping with welfare law. Although the settings differ, the
law's expectation that mothers be both ideal workers and ideal care-
takers crosses class lines.
Part I of this Article explores the traditional idealized view of
motherhood that child placement statutes and court decisions reflect.
These laws include statutes and case law in custody disputes between
parents and in child protection proceedings under, civil and criminal
laws where the dispute is between the parent and the state. Part II
contrasts the legal construct of motherhood that child placement laws
embody with the legal image of mothers in child support and welfare
law.
Part III examines the impact of these conflicting images of moth-
erhood on a particular group of mothers-battered women. Battered
women illuminate the thesis of this Article in a variety of ways. Being
battered often pushes middle class women into poverty. The legal is-
sues for these mothers may often move from conflicts with their part-
ners over custody and child support disputes to struggles with the state
in welfare and child protection proceedings. Battered mothers often
fall short of the law's ideal image of motherhood, becoming subject to
civil and criminal sanctions. At the same time, being battered makes
them particularly unable to live up to the law's presumptions about
economic equality. This Part considers whether the sanctions im-
posed on battered mothers are appropriate methods of protecting
children and making mothers accountable for actions that truly en-
1998]
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danger children. Further, it explores how laws governing economic
benefits affect the choices of battered women, and whether the legal
system adequately accounts for these constraints when evaluating ma-
ternal conduct.
This Article then contextualizes theories about the law's view of
motherhood by examining how the law operates in practice where
battered women come before the courts to resolve child placement or
economic disputes. By closely examining three cases-a contested
custody and support case between two parents, a child protection pro-
ceeding where the state sought to remove a child from a mother's
care, and the criminal prosecution of a mother accused of failing to
protect her child from her partner's abuse-the Article reaches some
conclusions about the harm that flows to women and children from
the law's conflicting images of motherhood.
Finally, the Article makes some preliminary conclusions about re-
forms that may assist the legal system in responding more appropri-
ately to mothers in general and, in particular, mothers who are victims
of domestic violence. These reforms call for changes in the law's re-
sponse to both child placement decisions and policies affecting fami-
lies' financial support. Courts and child welfare bureaucracies
evaluating child abuse and neglect allegations must move away from
assumptions that mothers and their children are adversaries. In most
cases, particularly where the mother is also a victim of abuse, protect-
ing children is often best achieved by protecting their caretaker par-
ent-their mother. Policies designed to ensure financial support for
children need to re-emphasize fathers' financial responsibility to their
children and recognize mothers' limitations in shifting from chil-
drens' primary caretaker to their financial provider.
I
TiE "GOOD MoTHER" IN LAw: MOTHERS AS CARETAKERS
The legal discourse about motherhood has tended toward classifi-
cation-ascribing a set of criteria to a woman without any reference to
her life circumstances. As Martha Fineman describes it: "Mother has
been neutered in several senses. She is taken out of contexts. In pol-
icy decisions, just as she is de-gendered, Mother is also de-raced and
de-classed. Mother is treated as though she has no ethnic or cultural
community that helps to define her."'8 This tendency to "classify'
rather than consider individual circumstances is present particularly
in child placement decisions.
8 FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 4, at 67.
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A. Child Custody
One context in which the law defines the characteristics of the
good mother may be found in the contested custody case.9 The ten-
dency to stereotype and idealize women in custody law is grounded in
the history of this area of law. Through the early nineteenth century
in this country, fathers almost invariably received custody of their chil-
dren upon divorce or separation.' 0 Mothers had neither the legal nor
the economic means to raise their children unless they were married
to the fathers. The state regarded children as the father's property,
subject to his control both during the marriage and after its dissolu-
tion." Consistent with mothers' general loss of legal status and power
upon marriage,' 2 they had neither rights nor access to their children
if the mother did not live with the father. As Blackstone wrote, "[A]
mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and
respect."' 3
The rationale for the paternal right to custody evolved into the
concept of economic reciprocity-the father conferred firiancial sup-
port, inheritance rights, and other income benefits, and, in exchange,
had the right to the earnings and custody of the children.' 4 In one
nineteenth century custody case, a New York judge, applying the pa-
ternal preference, explained the connection between a father's supe-
rior economic circumstances and his paramount right to custody:
In this country, the hopes of the child in respect to its education
and future advancement, is mainly dependent upon the father; for
this he struggles and toils through life; the desire of its accomplish-
ment operating as one of the most powerful incentives to industry
and thrift. The violent abruption of this relation would not only
tend to wither these motives to action, but necessarily in time, alien-
ate the father's natural affections; and if property should be accu-
9 Child custody in this Section refers to disputes between private parties, primarily
parent versus parent. Custody disputes between parents and the state are discussed infra
Part I.B.
10 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 234-85 (1985); SUZANNE RAMos, THE CoMPL=rE BOOK OF CHILD
CUSTODY 32 (1979). For an examination of custody law in an earlier period of history, see
MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CuSToDY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-47 (1994) (examining the treatment of children during
colonial times as economic assets with "custody" granted through relationships established
in indenture contracts or apprenticeships).
11 See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 178,
181-82 (1916).
12 See WomRN AND THE LAW § 3A.02[1]-[2] (Carol H. Lefcourt et al. eds., 1996).
13 1 WIULAM BLAc sroNE, COmrmENAnis s *441.
'4 SeeJamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Moden American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038, 1064-68 (1979).
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mulated, the child under such circumstances could hardly expect to
inherit it.15
Rules that absolved fathers of the obligation to support children
placed in their mother's custody further reinforced the paternal pref-
erence based on economic superiority. 16
By the middle of the twentieth century, a maternal or "tender
years" presumption had replaced the paternal preference. 17 The pre-
sumption provided that mothers should have custody of their chil-
dren, particularly those under age five.' 8 This presumption was
grounded in the view that women's natural disposition toward nurtur-
ing made them the preferred caretakers. 19 Both the assumed biologi-
cal superiority of mothers as parents and social custom, which
assigned responsibility for parenting to mothers, justified the
doctrine.
Early defenders of this doctrine idealized maternal love. As one
court put it, "[m ] other love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of
women, and as a general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the
common offspring, and, moreover, a child needs a mother's care even
more than a father's." 20 Another judge in a Wisconsin court in 1921
15 People ex rel. Nickerson, 19 Wend. 16, 18 (N.Y. 1837).
16 See Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass. 187 (1883) (stating such a rule). This rule was
not significantly eroded until the 1920s. See Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism:
The Maternal Presumption Revisited, I HARv. WOMEN's LJ. 107, 113 (1978).
17 Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody
Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 GARDozo L. REV. 1523, 1536 (1994).
18 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 19.4, at 799 (2d ed. 1988) (indicating that, while few courts define "tender years," the
.presumption would clearly apply to a child under five years").
19 See Uviller, supra note 16, at 114. The view of mother as nurturer generally con-
fined mothers to the domestic sphere and excluded them from the world of politics. The
earliest idealized image of mother in this country did have a political dimension, however,
which dates back to the colonial period in this country. One commentator describes the
concept of the Republican Mother:
[In the early Republic, the] role of guarantor of civic virtue... could not
be assigned to a formal branch of government.... [T]he crucial role was
thought to be the mother's: the mother who trained her children, taught
them their early lessons, shaped their moral choices.... Motherhood was
discussed almost as if it were a fourth branch of government, a device that
ensured social control in the gentlest possible way .... The Republican
Mother was to encourage in her sons civic interest and participation. She
was to educate her children and guide them in the paths of morality and
virtue. But she was not to tell her male relatives for whom to vote. She was
a citizen but not really a constituent.
Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of "Civil Society" at the Founding- One Lawyer's
Anxious Vision, 72 IND. LJ. 335, 355 (1997) (quoting LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE
REPuBLic: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REvOLUTIONARY AMERICA, at xii, 199-200, 283
(1980)).
20 Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916); see also Ellis v. Johnson, 260
S.W. 1010, 1012 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924) (arguing for the maternal preference on grounds
that it is "known by all men that no other love is quite so tender, no other solicitude quite
so deep, no other devotion quite so enduring as that of a mother"). Some feminists favor
[Vol. 83:688
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theorized, "For a boy of such tender years nothing can be an adequate
substitute for mother love.., because in her alone is duty swallowed
up in desire; in her alone is service expressed in terms of love."2' Jus-
tice Fulbright of the Missouri Court of Appeals wrote in 1938: "There
is but a twilight zone between a mother's love and the atmosphere of
heaven .... "22 Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme Court gave the
ultimate tribute to mothers in 1941:
[S]he is morally[,] spiritually, and biologically best suited to care for
[the child] during infancy and adolescence. She is more sensitive
to influences that are derogatory to its health and character and has
been known to pursue it to the gutter and retrieve it after the father
had abandoned it. In deeds, springing from innate nobleness, the
mother is the peer of the father and when it comes to instinctive
and intuitional powers, she is much his superior. 23
However, this presumption only benefited women who conformed to
the ideal. In another case two years later, Justice Terrell wrote: "If she
goes and returns as a wage earner like the father, she has no more
part in [child care] than he and it necessarily follows that all things
else being equal, she has no better claim when the matter of custody is
at issue."24 Even under a system in which the maternal presumption
was the rule in all fifty states, courts generally deprived the mother of
custody if she was believed to be mentally unfit, failed to provide a
healthy home, or was guilty of adultery or abandonment.25
With the advent of the women's movement in the 1960s and
1970s, the maternal preference came under attack. By the 1980s, the
"best-interests-of-the-child" standard had replaced the maternal pref-
erence standard in most jurisdictions.26 Despite its apparent gender
reinstatement of the tender years doctrine on the grounds that women are usually the
actual caretakers of the children, and that the bias against women by the white, male
judges who decide custody cases makes such a rule necessary to give women a fair shot at
custody. See, e.g., PHYLLis CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRiAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND
CUSTODY 239-68 (1986) (discussingjudicial biases); see also Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings:
Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 154-158 (1992)
(discussing, together with the studies cited therein, male bias in decisionmaking, but favor-
ing a maternal deference standard).
21 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (Wis. 1921) (modifying the trial court's cus-
tody determination, and awarding the mother custody of her three-year-old son).
22 Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
23 Randolph v. Randolph, 1 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1941).
24 Watson v. Watson, 15 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1943).
25 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Blackburn, 168 So. 2d 898, 902 (La. CL App. 1964) (finding a
mother, shown to be adulterous, profane, and an alcoholic and substance abuser, unfit for
custody); Parker v. Parker, 158 A.2d 607, 610 (Md. 1960) (depriving an adulterous mother
of custody despite her "confession of error and avowal of repentance"); Wilson v. Wilson,
590 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Mont. 1979) (finding, on balance, that the children in question
would be better off with their father, rather than their adulterous mother, even though he
would have to employ child care).
26 See CLARK, supra note 18, § 19.4.
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neutrality, the best-interests-of-the-child standard permits judges to
decide custody cases based on their own conceptions of the "good
mother." Even its proponents recognize that the values of the judges
who apply this standard define it:
To make custody turn on the "best interests" of the child means that
a court must decide what conduct and circumstances are desirable
and what are not. The criteria for this decision, if not supplied by
the parents themselves, must derive from the judge's views of good
child rearing and good citizenship.27
Given the indeterminate nature of the standard, inconsistent applica-
tion of the standard and few predictable rules typify contemporary
custody cases.
When it comes to expectations about a mother's role, however,
some patterns do exist. Despite the fact that a vast majority of
mothers with children at home work for wages,2 8 custody law makes
clear that a working mother is less than ideal.29 Mothers who work
27 Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1135, 1156.
28 Married mothers who work outside the home and who have children between the
ages of six and seventeen years have increased from a rate of 39% in 1960 to 76% in 1995.
See BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1996, at 400 (1996). Among married mothers with children under the age of six
years, labor force participation has increased from about 19% in 1960 to 64% in 1995. See
id. These numbers reflect a substantial increase in working married mothers, but the
change has been most dramatic among middle and upper class married women because
poor single mothers have always worked. See Sanger, supra note 4, at 464 (citing AucE
KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORIK A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
viii (1982)).
29 See, e.g., Bezou v. Bezou, 436 So. 2d 592, 594 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding an
award of custody to a father who was a doctor, on the ground that, although both parties
were morally fit, the mother was a professional woman who would be "understandably busy
in the pursuit of her career" and was not a "traditional housewife available to her child at
all hours of the day"); see also Cooley v. Cooley, 411 So. 2d 750, 752-53 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(awarding custody to a father who worked twelve hours a day, reasoning in part that the
mother's housekeeping practices left "something to be desired," and that she was a young
woman trying to establish herself in a business career); In reMarriage of Estelle, 592 S.W.2d
277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming the trial court's finding that law requiring that a
mother's employment be treated as a negative parental attribute does not violate equal
protection); Masek v. Masek, 228 N.W.2d 334, 337 (S.D. 1975) (upholding the trial court's
award of custody to a full-time working father, rather than the mother who worked part-
time as a teacher, because the mother's "primary interests are in her musical career and
outside of the home and family"); McCreery v. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Va. 1977)
(upholding the trial court's award of custody to a father, observing that while both parents
work full time, the mother had a "preoccupation with the 'glamour of her work'").
Custody cases that tend to punish working women may reflect the broader public
sentiment which responds to genuine problems experienced by children of workingparents
by blaming working mothers. See, e.g., SusAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 27-29 (1991) (citing a New England Journal of Medicine study
which inflated statistics concerning infertility in women in their early thirties and which
urged women, therefore, to have children before embarking on their careers); hus KRAs-
NOW, SURRENDERING TO MOTHERHOOD (1997) (describing the joys of stay-at-home mother-
ing); see also Julia Kagan, Survey: Work in the 1980s and 1990s, WORKING WOMAN, Aug. 1993,
[Vol. 83:688
LEGAL IMAGES OF MOTIERHOOD
outside the home are increasingly at risk in custody disputes, particu-
larly when they seek financial security or independence through de-
manding careers. In a number of recent well-publicized cases,
working women lost custody in part because of long hours and
"workaholic" values,30 or because of a decision to accept a scholarship
and enroll full time in college which would require placing their child
in a day-care center.3' Single working mothers are particularly at risk
when they are in custody disputes with fathers who have remarried
"stay-at-home" wives. Courts have shown a preference for these con-
forming stepmothers.3 2
Another context in which the courts, under the best-interests-of-
the-child standard, have defined.the good mother is when a father
challenges a mother's custody because she seeks to relocate for profes-
sional or personal reasons. Trial judges have repeatedly threatened
mothers with the loss of custody of their children when they desire to
relocate to find a better job,33 to remarry,3 4 or to be closer to their
at 18, 20 (reporting that a majority of respondents to survey agreed that a woman's first
responsibility is the care of her children); Sally Quinn, Mothers at War: What Are We Doing to
Our Kids7, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 1991, at C1 (examining the problems of wartime separa-
tion of mothers and children, and concluding that women should be forbidden from go-
ing to war).
30 See Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d 621, 624-25 (D.C. 1995) (upholding trial court's deci-
sion to award custody to full-time working father after deciding that mother was more
devoted to her career, despite testimony from court-appointed psychologist that the chil-
dren were primarily attached to their mother); Richmond v. Tecklenberg, 396 S.E.2d 111
(S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (granting custody of six-year-old daughter to father because of
mother's commitments as a physician, despite father's comparable work schedule); see also
D. Kelly Weisberg, Professional Women and the Professionalization of Motherhood. Marcia Clark's
Double Bind, 6 HAsrNGs WoMEN's LJ. 295 (1995) (using prosecutor Marcia Clark's custody
battle to describe the way courts use a women's career against her).
31 See Ireland v. Smith, 547 N.W.2d 686, 688-89 (Mich. 1996) (reversing trial court's
award of custody to father, finding the trial court's speculation that there was "'no way that
a single parent, attending an academic program at an institution as prestigious as the Uni-
versity of Michigan, can do justice to their studies and to raising of an infant child,'" to be
unsupported).
32 See, e.g., Puzzuoli v. Puzzuoli, No. CA 89-310, 1990 WL 32446, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App.
Mar. 21, 1990) (affirming trial court's decision which found both parents fit, but awarded
custody to father because, in her father's care, the child would be cared for by a step-
mother, as opposed to the daycare center the mother was forced to use); Burchard v.
Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) (noting that the trial court granted custody to father
because, among other reasons, his new wife would provide in-home care for his child).
33 See, e.g., Towne v. Towne, 546 N.Y.S.2d 213, 214 (App. Div. 1989) (affirming finding
that mother's move to Florida to accept promotion from senior secretary to administrative
assistant would justify transfer of custody to father, where mother failed to demonstrate
that she could not have found comparable work in area where the current custody arrange-
ment was maintainable). But see In reMarriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480-81 (Cal. 1996)
(reversing trial court on the ground that it is unrealistic to expect former spouses to stay in
the same location, and it was improper for a court to exert pressure on them to do so).
34 See, e.g., Domingues v. Johnson, 593 A.2d 1133, 1140-41 (Md. 1991) (finding that a
mother's remarriage and relocation to another state may justify a transfer of custody to
father).
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families after divorce.8 5 As one commentator described it, when relo-
cation threatens a father's right to visit or maintain joint custody,
courts routinely burden mothers with a choice between relocation or
custody because it is "assumed that the mother alone would sacrifice
her economic and social interests to maintain her relationship with
her [child] .*36 When fathers seek to relocate, however, these same
assumptions about sacrificing such interests for the child often do not
exist.3 7
Examining the impact of economic superiority on custody deci-
sions also demonstrates the double bind that the law's view of ideal
motherhood places on women. Despite the unfavorable view of
mothers who work for wages, mothers who are the economically de-
pendent parent may have this status held against them. Several states
expressly list economic criteria as a factor that a judge either may or
must consider when determining custody.3 8 Favorable economic cir-
cumstances, or the likelihood of the availability of material advan-
tages, gives the wealthier parent an edge in custody disputes.
Even when statutes do not require or even authorize the judge to
consider economic circumstances, many judges still do so under the
guise of granting custody to the more "stable" parent 39 or the parent
35 See, e.g., Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675, 679-80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming trial court order transferring primary physical custody from mother to father if
mother relocated to be closer to her family).
36 Sanger, supra note 4, at 418. The context for Sanger's comment is a discussion of
.move away" custody cases in which she focuses on the California case of In re Marriage of
Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). In Fingert, a mother sought modification of
a custody order that required her son to live with her and attend school for three weeks a
month in northern California and fly to southern California to live with his father and
attend a different school one week a month. Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 390. Even though
the mother had primary custody for the three years following her divorce and sought a
change that appeared to be in the best interest of the child, the trial court denied the
mother's request and ordered her to move to southern California or give up custody of her
child. See id. at 391. The mother appealed, and the California Court of Appeals vacated
the trial court's order. Id. at 393. For a detailed discussion of the Fingert case, see Christine
A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA WoMEN's LJ. 15, 37-51
(1991).
37 See, e.g., Overall v. Overall, 512 N.W.2d 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming trial
court's decision granting father custody and allowing father to relocate to another state to
improve his financial situation, despite expert testimony that the mother had greatest nur-
turing potential to care for child and the father's admission that he hit the mother on one
occasion). Recognizing the need for more "rationality and consistency" in custody reloca-
tion decisions, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers has recently developed a
model statute for custody relocation. Nation's Top Divorce Lauyers Suggest Uniform Relocation
Rules, MD. FAM. L. MONTHLY, June 1997, at 22.
38 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(c) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); MicH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 722.23(3) (c) (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (c) (1991 & Supp.
1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b) (2) (1989).
39 Craig v. McBride, 639 P.2d 303, 304 (Alaska 1982) (finding father's "' relatively
more stable circumstance'" a deciding factor in trial court granting the father custody).
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providing the "best" home 40 or the more "secure" environment. 41
Given the fact that women still earn substantially less than men,42 this
preference for the economically advantaged spouse often hurts
mothers in custody cases.
The case law under the best-interests-of-the-child standard also
reveals a set of norms regarding sexual practices which, if violated,
also result in the bad mother label and the potential loss of custody.
The most typical cases involve attempts to control the sexual behavior
of a divorced or separated mother seeking to gain or maintain cus-
tody. These cases most often arise in the context of a noncustodial
father attempting to wrest custody from the custodial mother based
upon her cohabitation with a boyfriend. The court often views a
mother's new boyfriend suspiciously, perceiving him either as a possi-
ble danger to the children or as a distraction for the mother, diverting
time and attention that she should devote to the children.43 By con-
trast, a court may view a father's new girlfriend as bringing stability to
his life and as a source of child care.44
The courts have responded to a custodial mother's live-in boy-
friend in two ways. In some cases, courts have held that the mother's
cohabitation outside of marriage is itself harmful to the children, and
warrants state intervention either through a change in custody45 or
40 Perkins v. Perkins, 589 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Ark. Ct App. 1979) (awarding the father
custody, and noting that the father had an apartment big enough to allow the child his
own room, and that the father was contemplating buying a home).
41 Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) (noting that the trial court, in
awarding custody to the father, impermissibly relied on its finding that the father was "fi-
nancially" better off than the mother); Dempsey v. Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980), af/'d in part, rev'd in par4 296 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1980) (noting the trial
court's finding that the father had a "greater interest and the capacity to continue to main-
tain" the family home).
42 Women earn an average of seventy-six cents for each dollar that men earn. See Gary
Belsky, Women Worry More Than Men About Money, MONEY, June 1996, at 24, 25. Although
the "wage gap" has harrowed in the last twenty years, wages for low-income women have
remained stagnant. See Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Ending Welfare Reform as We Know It, Am.
PROSPECt, Fall 1993, at 83, 86; see also infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text (discussing
how women's role as mothers further disadvantages them economically).
43 See, e.g., Melancon v. Bergeron, 598 So. 2d 694, 697-98 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (deny-
ing a mother custody and noting the longstanding belief of Louisiana courts that "where a
parent... live[s] in open and public adultery with a paramour... the parent [is] morally
unfit to maintain custody of children").
44 See, e.g, Puzzuoli v. Puzzuoli, No. CA 89-310, 1990 WL 32446, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App.
Mar. 21, 1990) (expressing concern that the father lived with his fiance6 before marriage,
including times when his minor child had overnight visitation, yet finding that the pres-
ence of the then girlfriend, now stepmother, was a positive factor in the court's decision to
grant father custody).
45 See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424-25 (Ii. 1979) (finding that the
mother's open and continuing cohabitation with her boyfriend endangered her children's
moral development); In re Marriage of Thompson & Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill.
1983) (distinguishing jarrett and granting custody to father who had committed adultery
and cohabited with a girlfriend and his children); Melancon, 598 So. 2d at 697 (finding that
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the imposition of restrictions on the mother's behavior as a condition
to her maintaining custody.46 Evidence demonstrating similar pater-
nal extramarital conduct often does not affect the punitive response
against mothers. 47
In a second category of cases, the courts are less punitive to sexu-
ally active single mothers, requiring a demonstrated nexus between
the mother's alleged immorality and harm to the child.4 3 In others,
the courts have held that the mother's involvement in an extramarital
affair is a factor to consider in the custody decision, but that it does
not by itself justify a change. 49
Custody case law also suggests that heterosexuality is a prerequi-
site to good motherhood. Courts are fairly consistent in labeling both
mothers and fathers that actively engage in homosexual relationships
as poor moral examples for their children.50 However, consistent with
the pattern of greater judicial scrutiny of the nonmarital sexual rela-
granting mother physical custody of the children was an abuse of discretion because the
mother had lived in "open concubinage" with her boyfriend for over three years, with no
intention of getting married, while the father had remarried and could provide a stable
environment); Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1977) (affirming the trial court's
finding that, solely by reason of her adulterous cohabitation, the mother was unfit to be a
custodial parent).
46 See, e.g., Parrillo v. Parrillo, 554 A.2d 1043, 1045 (R.I. 1989) (finding that the court
could prohibit a wife from spending the night with cohabitant in her house while her
children were present).
47 See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589, 591-93 (Kan. 1978) (awarding custody
to the father because, among other reasons, the mother's fiance6 had spent the night in
her home, even though the father lived with his girlfriend in a hotel room and had allowed
his lover to stay there while the children were present); Flournoy v. Flournoy, 392 So. 2d
1096, 1098 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (awarding custody to the father even though both the
father and mother engaged in adulterous relations, reasoning that the father's affair was
more "discreet" than the mother's); Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415, 417 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that a father who moved himself and his daughter into the home of a woman with
whom he was having an adulterous relationship was not an unfit custodian).
48 See, e.g., Swain v. Swain, 406 A.2d 680, 683-84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (finding
that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by-awarding custody to a mother because
the child was not adversely affected by the mother's adulterous relationship); see also
Hosain v Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1005 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (quoting Swain with ap-
proval, stating that "[t)here [was] nothing 'repugnant' or even foreign, in a court consider-
ing adultery as [only one] factor in determining the best interest of the child").
49 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 504 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), affd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. 1994) (reversing trial court's
award of child custody to the father because of the "poor moral example" set by the
mother who had two extramarital affairs); Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Utah
1996) (holding that the trial court properly considered the mother's lack of "moral exam-
ple" in cohabiting with another person before the divorce, and affirming transfer of cus-
tody to the father); Judith R. v. Hey, 405 S.E.2d 447, 450-51 (W. Va. 1990) (overturning a
trial court order requiring a custodial mother who was cohabitating with a man to either
marry him within 30 days or lose custody to her former husband, but noting that the co-
habitation would be a factor to be considered on a petition for modification).
50 While some more recent decisions have required a demonstrated nexus between
harm to the child and the parent's sexual orientation, the majority of state courts still hint
that a parent's homosexuality is a negative factor in the best-interests-of-the-child analysis.
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tionships of mothers than that of fathers, the majority of cases discuss-
ing same sex relationships involve mothers rather than fathers.51
In recent years, appellate courts have begun to curb the broad
discretion of trial judges hearing custody cases. This development has
limited the tendency to punish mothers who do not conform to the
stereotypical married, homemaker, asexual, sacrificing mother. Un-
fortunately, the fact that appellate courts have overturned some puni-
tive trial court decisions does not significantly reduce the potential for
punishing "nonconforming" mothers. First, the broad discretion trial
judges have received under the best-interests-of-the-child standard
makes reversal of custody decisions relatively uncommon.5 2 In addi-
tion, given the costs of litigating a custody case, very few people have
the financial means to appeal an adverse decision. 53
Further, even in the rare cases where a mother does have the
resources to appeal and win, she may lose custody for several years
while the appeal is pending. For example, in Burchard v. Garay,54 the
trial court awarded custody to a father, who had refused to acknowl-
edge paternity, pay support, or visit the child until she was fifteen
months old, on the grounds that he was financially stable and had a
new wife who would provide in-home care for the child.55 Although
the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, the
appellate court did not direct the trial court to award custody to the
mother.56 Four years had elapsed since the court had transferred the
See Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States 1994-95: Case Digests, 29 FAM. L.Q. 775, 810-
11 (1996).
51 See WOMEN AND THE Lmw, supra note 12, § 7.01, at 7-3 to 7-4 n.6. Courts have trans-
ferred custody from lesbian mothers without clear evidence that the sexual orientation of
the mother has had an adverse impact on the children, solely on the theory that prejudices
in the community may hurt the children. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4814, 1996 WL
491692, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1996) (affirming trial judge's custody transfer of
an eleven-year-old girl to her father who had served eight years in prison for killing his first
wife and was presently living with his fourth wife, citing mother's lesbian relationship and
child's exposure to R-rated movies as the basis); S.E.G. v. RA.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987) (protecting children living in "a small, conservative community" from the
"possible ostracizing" that they might encounter as a result of their mother's " ' alternative
life style'"); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (holding that lesbian con-
duct is an "important consideration" in determining parent's unfitness in custody case);
Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 952 (Wyo. 1995) (stating that the trial court's decision
restricting a divorced mother's visitation with her children based upon the court's disap-
proval of the mother's lesbian lifestyle will not be overturned where the restrictions serve
the children's best interests).
52 See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MrcH. L. Rxv. 2215, 2245 (1991).
53 See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J.
PUB. L. 123, 130 (1993).
54 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986).
55 Id. at 487-88.
56 Id. at 493.
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child's custody to the father.57 The appellate court remanded the
case to the trial court to determine whether it would be "in the best
interests of the child" to change custody again.58
Finally, trial court decisions that require mothers to conform to
outmoded stereotypes-even if the decisions are successfully over-
turned or appealed-have an impact on the context in which other
mothers in the jurisdiction negotiate and bargain on custody issues.
As Carol Sanger puts it, "mothers aware of local judicial practices bar-
gain under a very dark shadow indeed."59
B. Child Protection Proceedings
1. Civil Proceedings
For many poor women, single mothers, and women of color, the
battle to retain custody of their children is often not with the chil-
dren's father, but with the state.60 Despite the different circumstances
in cases where mothers battle the state for custody of their children,
and those in which they battle the children's father, many of the char-
acteristics of the ideal mother carry forward in the adjudication of
these cases. An understanding of the historical and cultural context
in which courts hear child protection cases is critical to an analysis of
the ways thatjudges respond to the mothers who appear before them.
Britain's Elizabethan Poor Law,61 which separated the children of
the poor from their families, served as a model for early child welfare
programs in this country. Seventeenth century laws of Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, for example, specifically au-
thorized magistrates to "b [i] nd out" or indenture children of the poor
over parental objections. 62 Because the state viewed fathers as the
57 See id.
58 Id.
59 Sanger, supra note 4, at 470.
60 Despite his lack of involvement, a biological father whose paternity has been estab-
lished must always be named as a party in any custody proceeding. In child protection
cases brought by the state, very little attention is paid to ensuring the fathers' presence. In
"private" custody cases, however, the need to prove that every effort was made to give a
father notice can be a major obstacle in obtaining a custody order for some mothers. See
generally Ann Shalleck, Child Custody and Child Neglect: Parenthood in Legal Practice and Cul-
ture, in MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 4, at 308 (providing a case study of child custody
proceedings and the obstacles it presented to a single black mother). Shalleck interprets
the father's absolute right to notice and participation in private custody cases as evidencing
the laws' insistence on the father's "centrality within [the family] unit," even where he has
had no involvement of any kind. Id. at 321-22.
61 An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 1 (Eng.).
62 HOMER FoLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECrED, AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN 9
(Arno Press Inc. 1971) (1900). When unwed mothers gave birth, the children were rou-
tinely separated from their mothers upon weaning and "bound out" to a master. MARY
ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUS-
TODY IN THE UNITED STATES 24-36 (1994). The history of state intervention to separate
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legal custodians of their children, the father's behavior was the focus
for state intervention:
[A] Ithough, in general, parents are intrusted with the custody.., of
their children, yet this is done upon the natural presumption, that
the children will be properly taken care of, and will be brought up
with a due education in literature, and morals, and religion; and
that they will be treated with kindness and affection. But, whenever
this presumption is removed; whenever (for example) it is found,
that a father is guilty of gross ill-treatment or cruelty towards his in-
fant children; or that he is in constant habits of drunkenness and
blasphemy, or low and gross debauchery; or that he professes atheis-
tical or irreligious principles; or that his domestic associations are
such as tend to the corruption and contamination of his children;
or that he otherwise acts in a manner injurious to the morals or
interests of his children; in every such case, the Court of Chancery
will interfere, and deprive him of the custody of his children, and
appoint a suitable person to act as guardian, and to take care of
them, and to superintend their education.6 3
The juvenile court system in the United States was created at the
turn of the twentieth century to assist the State in its role of parens
patriae, or parent of the country.64 Almost since the moment of their
creation, juvenile courts have sparked criticism and calls for reform.6 5
black mothers from their children has an even longer history. "Black mothers' bonds with
their children have been marked by brutal disruption, beginning with the slave auction
where family members were sold to different masters and continuing in the disproportion-
ate state removal of Black children to foster care." Dorothy E. Roberts, The Unrealized Power
of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 146 (1995).
63 2JosEPH STORY, EQUrYJURISPRUDENCE § 1341, at 588-89 (12th ed. 1877) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
64 See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1970).
The concept of parens patriae was incorporated in the 1899 statute establishing the first
juvenile court in this country. It provided that "the care, custody and discipline of a child
shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents." Act of
April 21, 1899, §21, 1899 M11. Laws 137. This statute became the model for juvenile court
legislation throughout the country. Typically, ajuvenile court has limited jurisdiction over
child protection matters where the state has intervened. See Donald N. Duquette, Child
Protection Legal Process: Comparing the United States and Great Britain, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 239,
255 (1992). The court of general jurisdiction commonly has jurisdiction over private cus-
tody and visitation disputes between parents. See id. A growing consensus in favor of inte-
grating family disputes before a single court is emerging, but very few states have
implemented this policy. See Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law
Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775 (1997);
see also Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical Overview, Legal Matrix,
and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 326-27 (1972) (discussing the incorporation of
the concept of parens patriae in the early Illinois child custody statute).
65 See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILI SAvERs: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 9-
14 (1969); Leonard P. Edwards, TheJuvenile Court and the Role of theJuvenile CourtJudge, 43
Juv. & FAM. Or. J., 1992, at 1, 2, 17 (Issue No. 2).
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Lawyers, 66 child advocates,67 and most often, a complex child welfare
bureaucracy68 have assumed responsibility for investigating reports of
abuse or neglect of children and presenting these cases to the
courts.69 Efforts to protect children from abusive or neglectful care-
takers have taken many forms, from the creation of large orphanages
and foundling homes to the relocation of children from the city to the
country. Eventually, most jurisdictions settled on the present day fos-
ter care system as a way to protect children whose families apparently
could not care for them.
During the 1970s, elected officials and commentators began to
examine the child welfare system and concluded, for the most part,
that it was inadequately protecting children and their families.70 The
state too frequently, and sometimes unnecessarily, removed children
from their families and placed them in foster homes or institutions.71
Once removed, usually from their mothers, children were seldom re-
united with their mothers, and lingered in temporary care rather than
going to new homes with adoptive families.72
66 SeeAnnette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class
in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 582 (1997) (describing the heavy caseloads
and inconsistent training of lawyers appointed to parents and, in some jurisdictions, chil-
dren involved in child protection cases). "[M]others are the worst represented parties in
juvenile court... Nationally, parents frequently have no access to counsel, or courts may
only assign intermittent representation, such as in hearings to determine temporary cus-
tody or to terminate parental rights." Bernardlne Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the
State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 5 (1995).
67 Volunteer lay advocates for children in abuse and neglect cases, known as Court
Appointed Special Advocates ("CASAs"), often serve as the child's advocate, even if the
child has an attorney. For a description of this program, now operating in fifty states, see
JOHN HUBNER & JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY ELsE's CHILDREN: THE COURTS, THE KIDS, AND
THE STRuGGLE TO SAVE AMERucA's TROUBLED FAMILIES 45-46 (1996).
68 The central players in the bureaucracy are "workers." The workers receive reports
of abuse or neglect, conduct investigations, and throughout the process, make recommen-
dations that play a key role in determining whether a mother keeps her children. See infra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
69 The assignment to hear child protection cases may go to ajudge or, very often, a
lower-paid, less prestigious hearing officer. See Edwards, supra note 65, at 34 (describing
the practice in many jurisdictions of assigning juvenile cases to nonjudges to save money,
and "because judges cannot or do not want to handle all the emotional and tiring work").
70 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest, 43 HARv. EDUC.
REv. 599 (1973); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Stan-
dards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976).
71 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, MODEL CHILD
PROTECTION ACT WITH COMMENTARY 24 (Aug. 1977). Recent trends suggest that the cycle
may be swinging back, with much criticism directed toward the child welfare bureaucracy
for failing to remove children. See, e.g, Lois G. FoRER, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND THE ELDERLY IN COURT 41-42 (1991); RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF
DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILES CAN COST CHILDREN'S LIVES (1996).
72 See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 423-24
(1983) (discussing the -harm to children as a result of "foster care drift").
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As a result, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980.73 Among its major provisions, the Act requires
judges to determine whether the state has made "reasonable efforts"
both to enable children to remain safely at home before placing them
in foster care, and to reunite foster children with their biological par-
ents.74 This Act has received criticism for going too far in the oppo-
site direction, for it gives the bureaucracy a financial incentive to leave
children with their parents by conditioning federal foster care funds
on a state's compliance with the obligation to make reasonable efforts
to keep families together.75 Nevertheless, this legislation still guides
states' child welfare proceedings today.
The standards each state applies in implementing the federal
mandates on intervention and removal of children from their homes
are even less refined and particularized than the broad best-interests-
of-the-child standard judges use in private custody disputes.76 To as-
sist the courts in making the choice between parents (usually
mothers) and foster care or adoption by a third party, the statutes
generally do not explicitly impose particular standards of behavior.77
73 Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (condi-
tioning state receipt of federal funds on compliance with federal policy and procedural
standards governing placement, disposition, and review where children are in foster care
or at risk of being placed in foster care).
74 42 U.S.C. §§ 672(a) (1), 671(a)(15) (1994).
75 See HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 67, at 19. In fact, there is much evidence that,
for those children who are removed, "foster care drift" continues today. A 1995 report
found that one in ten foster children remains in state care longer than 7.4 years. See
Conna Craig, What I Need Is a Mom: The Welfare State Denies Homes to Thousands of Foster
Children, 73 POL'Y REv. 41, 45 (1995). At least 40,600 foster children have been in care for
five years or longer; another 51,300 have been in care between three and five years. See id.
"System kids, on average, live with three different families, though [ten] or more place-
ments is not uncommon." Id.; see also SALLY Miu MANT, A STUDY OF BARRIERS TO THE
PLACEMENT OF FOSTER CARE CHILDREN IN PERMANENT HOMES 11 (1995) (finding that chil-
dren remain in foster care in Baltimore City, Maryland an average of 4.5 years before adop-
tion); Jill Sheldon, 50,000 Children Are Waiting. Permanency, Planning and Termination of
Parental Rights Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 17 B.C. THIRD
WORLD LJ. 73, 73 n.5 (1997); Louise Kiernan & Sue Ellen Christian, Juvenile Court Plays the
Waiting Game, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1997, § 2, at 1 (citing a study finding that over 90% of
children who came into foster care in 1993 and 1994 had not been returned home by mid-
1996). In 1986, slightly fewer than 60% of children in foster care were either reunited with
their families or placed with a parent, relative, or other caregiver. See NATIONAL COMM'N
ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHErORIC: A NEw AMERIucAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMmIES 288
(1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIc].
76 Indeed, the standard for evaluation of the states' efforts to implement the federal
child welfare statutes has itself been held too vague for courts to enforce. See Suter v. Artist
M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
77 An impatience with the slow pace at which children move through the child wel-
fare system has encouraged legislators to develop some rules to supplement the broad
discretionary abuse and neglect standard. See 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1(1) (b) (Michie Supp. 1996); MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
119, § 51A (1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(1) (b) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 7001-1.3(10) (a) (3) (West Supp. 1997). For example, a new Connecticut
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Rather, state statutes authorize child protective agencies and courts to
intervene and remove a child upon a finding that the child is ne-
glected, abused, or in imminent danger of abuse.78
While these statutes' goal seems to be child protection, the lan-
guage of the laws permits intervention on the basis of the care-
taker's-that is, mother's-conduct rather than harm to the child.79
In addition, like the best-interests-of-the-child standard, the concepts
of "neglect" and "abuse" are somewhat vague and indeterminate.80 In
private custody cases, appellate decisions provide "rules" that set stan-
dards for parents, particularly mothers. Custody rules tend to punish
nonconforming mothers but the rules are at least challenged and eval-
uated from time to time. In child protection proceedings, however,
appellate courts rarely examine the underlying values andjudgments
that courts use to apply the standards.81 Child protective service work-
statute provides that a child under the age of one year can be put up for adoption if a
parent has not been in contact with the child for sixty days. See An Act Concerning the
Reporting, Investigation and Prosecution of Child Abuse and the Termination of Parental
Rights, Conn. Pub. Acts 246 (1996). Some states have also recently passed legislation per-
mitting removal of a child at birth if a mother abuses drugs during her pregnancy.
78 Although there is variation among standards for state intervention, the language of
state statutes generally allows intervention based on: abandonment; physical, sexual, or
emotional "abuse"; or failure to protect a child from abuse or educational or medical ne-
glect. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9) (b)
(1997) (defining a neglected child as one "who is without proper parental care or control
... necessary for his or her physical, mental, or emotional health"); MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch.
119, § 51 (Law Co-op 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-2 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912 (1991 & Supp. 1996). Some state abuse and neglect statutes have
been interpreted to reach a mother's prenatal conduct as well,justifying removal of infants
who test positive for controlled substances at birth. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 415.503(9) (A) (2) (Supp. 1997); 705 IL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3(1) (c) (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (1) (b) (Michie Supp. 1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch.
119, § 51A (1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(1)(b) (Michie 1996); OYLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 121101(4)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
79 See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalof "Neglected Children": A Search for Realis-
tic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1000-02 (1975).
80 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 (1980) (Blackmun,J., dissenting)
("The legal issues posed by the State's petition [to remove a child from the home because
of abuse or neglect] are neither simple nor easily defined. The standard is imprecise and
open to the subjective values of the judge."); see also ROBERT H. MNOOKiN & D. KELLY
WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW
456 (3d ed. 1995) (describing standards for state intervention to remove an abused or
neglected child from parental custody as "exceedingly broad and ill-defined statutory
provisions").
81 Appellate decisions have largely been limited to challenges that the statutory stan-
dards are unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., In reJ.T., 115 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (Cal. C. App.
1974) (holding that statute was not unconstitutionally vague); In re Huber, 291 S.E.2d 916,
918 (N.C. CL App. 1982), appeal dismissed, 294 S.E.2d 223 (N.C. 1982) (same); State v.
McMaster, 486 P.2d 567, 571 (Or. 1971) (same); In re K.B., 302 N.W.2d 410, 411 (S.D.
1981) (same); In re Aschauer, 611 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wash. 1980) (same). But see Roe v.
Conn., 417 F. Supp. 769, 779-80 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding that Alabama's child neglect
law violates due process and is unconstitutionally vague and an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the fundamental right to family integrity); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp.
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ers who may have little or no experience8 2 or specialized education
make most of the decisions in this arena.8 3 These workers make
largely discretionaryjudgments about bad mothering and their under-
lying assumptions are, for the most part, unexamined and unchal-
lenged. Conversations with workers reveal a deep bias about bad
mothering based on race, class, and poverty.8 4
An examination of the application of these standards in the few
existing reported appellate decisions reveals that despite the "invisibil-
ity" of the rules guiding courts' application of abuse and neglect stan-
dards, many of the characteristics of the "ideal mother" from the
custody context also exist in child protection proceedings.8 5 This is
due both to the nature of the interventions leading to juvenile court
proceedings and to the characteristics of the juvenile court itself.
10, 19, 24 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (holding Iowa's parental termination statutes were unconstitu-
tionally vague and deprived parents of both substantive and procedural due process); Davis
v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 44 (Ark. 1979) (finding Arkansas statute too vague to meet due
process requirements). Indeed, the Supreme Court did not review a case from ajuvenile
court until 1966, and it has heard very few cases since then. See HUBNER & WOLSON, supra
note 67, at 275-76 (noting that Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) was the first case in
which the Court reviewed ajuvenile court decision); FORER, supra note 71, at 21.
82 See Annie Woodiey Brown & Barbara Bailey-Etta, An Out-of-Home Care System in Cri-
sis: Implications for African American Children in the Child Welfare System, 76 CHILD WELFARE 65,
68-69 (1997) (noting the high turnover of child protective service workers); MILLEANN
supra note 75, at 41 (finding lack of knowledge and experience of workers contributes to
children's lack of permanent homes).
83 See Appell, supra note 66, at 601 (citing Sheryl Brissett-Chapman, Child Protection
Risk Assessment and African American Children: Cultural RamificationsforFamilies and Communi-
ties, 76 CHILD WELFARE 45, 60 (1997) (noting the "deprofessionalization" of the child wel-
fare bureaucracy)). Not all people in the child welfare bureaucracy described as "social
workers" or caseworkers are certified social workers. A social worker is one who engages in
social case work, social group work, community organization, administration of social work
programs, social work education, social work research, or any combination of the above in
accordance with social work principles and methods. Certified social workers must have at
least a master's degree or equivalent degree in social work, and must pass an examination
satisfactory to the State Board for Social Work. SeeJohn R. Carrieri, Social Worker's Legal
Handbook, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECr AND THE FOSTER CARE SySTEM 1997: EFFEnWE SocIAL
WORK AND THE LEGAL SYEM, THE ArroRNEY's RoLE AND REsPON SIBIrrEs, at 7, 27 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. C-175, 1997).
84 These observations are based on the author's personal experience and the experi-
ence of others. As Director of the Family Law Clinic at the University of Baltimore School
of Law, the author has observed child protective service ("CPS") workers investigating cases
of abuse and neglect in a variety of contexts over the last ten years in Baltimore. In addi-
tion, the author participated in a training program for CPS workers from local depart-
ments of social service in Maryland. The author's observations about CPS worker bias are
confirmed by other professionals working in child welfare. See, e.g., Ashe & Cahn, supra
note 7, at 97-98 (noting the tendency by child protective service caseworkers to remove
children from mothers without considering the risks associated with transferring children
from maternal care to foster care).
85 For a description of the steps in typical child protection proceedings, from the
report of abuse to the removal and placement of the child, see Appell, supra note 66, at
582.
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First, because mothers overwhelmingly are the custodians and
caretakers of children,86 they are, in most cases, the focus of the state's
intervention in cases of allegations of child abuse or neglecL8 7 As
noted, from their inception, child welfare programs focused on poor
children.88 The children of single mothers (particularly women of
color) are particularly at risk of removal.89 Living in a single-parent
household increases the risk that a child will live in poverty.90 Both
poverty and the loss of regular contact with both parents pose risks to
86 Mothers are most often the custodians of children in single parent families. The
majority (88%) of children living in single parent homes live with their mother. See
ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
MARCH 1994, at ix (1996); see also WORKING GROUP ON WELFARE REFORM, FAMILY SUPPORT,
AND INDEPENDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., BACKGROUND PAPERS ON WEL-
FARE REFORM: CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 3 (1994) (citing a similar statistic). Even
though the total number of children under the age of eighteen has stayed relatively stable,
the number of children affected by divorce, separation, and unwed parents continues to
rise. See SALUTER, supra, at viii-xii. Increasing numbers of children now face life in a single-
parent family. In 1994, 27% of children under the age of 18 lived in a female-headed family,
up from 12% in 1970. See id. In addition, even in two-parent families, multiple studies have
demonstrated both that mothers who stay at home and those that work outside the home
undertake the majority of child care responsibilities. See Becker, supra note 20, at 154-58,
and studies cited therein; see also ARLIE HocHscaiLD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 6-7 (1989) (concluding, after studying fifty working
couples, that women's progress in the workforce will be stalled unless men take more re-
sponsibility for child care and housework).
87 One attorney charged by statute with representing "custodial parents" in child pro-
tection proceedings throughout the State of Maryland estimates that 90-95% of her office's
clients are mothers. Interview with Linda KL Koban, Chief Attorney for the Child in Need
of Assistance Unit, Division of the Office of the Public Defender, State of Maryland (June
23, 1997) (notes on file with the author).
88 See FOLKS, supra note 62; Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immortaliy, Our
Helplessness, 79 GEO. LJ. 1499, 1501 (1991).
89 See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A
False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 79 (1995) (argu-
ing that the application of a best interests standard in the context of adoption increases the
likelihood that poor and minority women will lose their children in contested adoptions);
Brown & Bailey-Etta, supra note 82, at 71, 74-75 (noting that African American children
make up 42.4% of the children in foster care, disproportionate to their 15% representa-
tion in the general population); infra note 127 (noting that women of color are subjected
to heightened scrutiny); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside the Natural
Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 955, 959-61 (1991) (arguing that single
mothers are subject to state supervision and control because they deviate from social
norms); Roberts, Racism, supra note 4, at 13-15 (arguing that the state intervenes more
often in Black homes because Black mothers are more likely to be supervised by social
workers and child welfare workers, who apply culturally biased standards); Carol B. Stack,
Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfar 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 539, 541 (1983-84)
(arguing that the misunderstanding of cultural family patterns results in a disproportion-
ate number of minority children in foster placements).
90 Women head 88% of single-parent families with children. See SALUTER, supra note
86, at ix. A majority, just over 50%, of these female-headed families are poor. SeeJOEL F.
HANDLER & YEHFKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY AND WELFARE 54
(1997) (citing H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., lsT SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTrLE-
MENT PROGRAMS: 1993 GREEN BOOK 1308 (Comm. Print 1993)). Among black female-
headed families, nearly 60% are below the poverty line. NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, WHO
[Vol. 83:688
LEGAL IMAGES OF MOTHERHOOD
child welfare. 91 Many commentators have suggested, however, that in-
tervention results, at least in part, from the child welfare system's ad-
herence to the traditional idealized definition of the "good mother"
rather than from thorough investigations and documentation of child
abuse and neglect.92 As Bernardine Dohm has observed:
From the beginning, the juvenile courts and the broader social wel-
fare system intervened in the lives of destitute women to regulate
and monitor their behavior, punish them for "deviant" mothering
practices, and police the undeserving poor. Women were locked at
the center of the private sphere of the family; their sole responsibil-
ity was to produce healthy offspring and provide for the well-being
of men. Poor women, single women, and women who worked
outside the home failed, by definition, to meet this responsibility.
The legal and social welfare apparatus developed to regulate and
punish these "bad" mothers by "saving" their children.9 3
A corollary to the juvenile courts' tendency toward "mother-blam-
ing" is the lack of accountability of fathers in those courts. One long-
time child advocate recently suggested that we rename juvenile court
"mothers' court" because of the absence of fathers from child welfare
proceedings. 94 Fathers, although named as parties in child protection
proceedings if their identities are known, are rarely present.95 They
often live apart from the mother and children, maintain little or no
contact with the children, and their whereabouts are often un-
known.9 6 The failure of parents to support their children emotionally
CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN?: CHILD CARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s, at 27 fig.2-9 (Cheryl D.
Hayes et al. eds., 1990).
91 But see NANcy E. Down, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAmiUEs (1997) (arguing that
the stigma surrounding single parents as bad parents is unjustified); FNEmAN, THE
NEtrERED MOTHER, supra note 4, at 5 (arguing that the basic family unit should be seen as
mother and child rather than man and woman).
92 See, e.g., STEVEN MrNTz & SuSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SoCIAL His-
TORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 128-29 (1988) (explaining that courts punish parents
deemed to have fallen short of ideal standards); RICH, supra note 1, at 52 (noting that even
though economic forces and political oppression may account for her poverty and unem-
ployment, a mother's character is in question if she has "failed" her children).
93 Dohrn, supra note 66, at 6 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, GORDON, HEROES
OF THEm OWN LavEs, supra note 1, at 114).
94 See Susan Leviton, Founder, Advocates for Children and Youth, Remarks to Attor-
ney General and LL Governor's Family Violence Council in Baltimore, Md. (Mar. 13,
1996) (on file with author).
95 Interestingly, courts are much less vigilant in enforcing notice provisions for fathers
in child protection cases than they are in private custody disputes. See Shalleck, supra note
60, at 321-24.
96 See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 7, at 77, 79; Dohrn, supra note 66, at 5. In Maryland, it
is estimated that fathers are active participants in about 20% of child protection cases in-
volving their children. See, e.g., Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 87. A few states
have begun to make greater efforts to bring fathers into court at the initial stages of abuse
and neglect proceedings. In the Unified Family Court in Jefferson County, Kentucky, for
example, a Family Mediation Diversion Project has been implemented. A caseworker initi-
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and financially falls within most states' definitions of child neglect.97
Fathers' lack of involvement in their children's lives, however, immu-
nizes then from civil or criminal prosecution for neglect.98 It is the
behavior of mothers, not fathers, that juvenile courts scrutinize.99
Appellate courts reviewing the actions of juvenile courts also fo-
cus on mothers' lifestyles and child-rearing practices rather than on
harm to the child. After reviewing the language in judicial decisions
terminating mothers' parental rights, one commentator noted:
In making their decisions, judges often rely on the myths of good
mothers and bad mothers and in so doing, perpetuate and re-create
the myths of motherhood....
In cases terminating parental rights, however, the judges do
not feel compelled to define the nexus between the behavior or
status of the mother and harm to the child. Because they assume
that their readers have internalized the same mythology, they often
give information that appeals to the reader on a non-rational level:
once you know this one piece of information about this mother (or
these pieces of information), it is clear what the result in this case
should be. 100
Within the last few decades, courts have used a mother's over-
night male visitors and visits to "taverns,"''1 1 her "promiscuous behav-
ates pre-court mediation at the point of preparing a neglect or abuse petition. The media-
tion is structured to make real efforts to bring in any significant family or community
members, including putative fathers at an early stage. Information Sheet on the Family
Mediation Diversion Project, Jefferson Cty. Fam. Ct. (1997) (on file with author).
97 See sources cited supra note 78; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2 (Michie 1995)
("'[albused or neglected child means any child less than eighteen years of age ... [w~hose
parents or other person responsible for his care abandons such child").
98 Of course, the state may institute civil or criminal proceedings against absent fa-
thers for failure to pay child support. Despite increased efforts in this area, however, rela-
tively few fathers are held accountable even in this limited way. See ELAINE SORENSON, THE
URB. INST., NONCUSTOIAL FATHERS: CAN THEY AFFORD TO PAY MORE CHILD SUPPORT? (pre-
liminary findings rev. 1994) (finding over 80% of all noncustodial fathers either paid no
child support or spent less than 15% of their personal income on child support); see also
Editorial, Hitting Deadbeats Where It Hurts, ATLmrA J. & CONST., Mar. 18, 1995, at 22A
("Each year, 23 million children nationwide are denied $34 billion in financial support
owed by their own parents-95 percent of them fathers.").
99 See generally Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social
Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUND-
TABLE 13 (1995) (noting the existence of a double standard in judgments regarding
parenting in child protection proceedings depending on whether the parent is the mother
or father); Dohrn supra note 66, at 3 (noting that "[f]athers, step-fathers, and 'boyfriends'
... are absent during the legal and moral adjudication of mothers"); Roberts, Motherhood
and Crime, supra note 4 (exploring the way laws criminalizing certain maternal actions con-
struct the meaning of motherhood).
100 Odeana R- Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (1995).
101 In reYardiey, 149 N.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Iowa 1967); State v. Greer, 311 S.W.2d 49,51
(Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
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ior" over a period of several years,10 2 her decision to live in a
communal setting, 10 3 or her having an illegitimate child'0 4 as bases for
the removal of her children. More recently, cases have focused on the
mother's substance abuse, 0 5 mental illness,'0 6 incarceration, 107 pov-
erty,'08 or her partner's physical abuse of the caretaker mother or her
children' 0 9 as bases for removing a child, leading in many cases to
termination of the mother's parental ights. Even in cases where
mothers take steps to protect their children from abusive partners,
mothers have had their parental rights terminated on the ground that
such mothers are likely to enter into abusive relationships in the
future. n 0
While all of the above-mentioned circumstances-substance
abuse, mental illness, imprisonment, poverty, domestic violence-
have an impact on a child's welfare, judges frequently ground their
findings in these cases in stereotypical assumptions of bad mothering,
rather than in demonstrated harm to the child."' Bernardine Dohm
102 In re C, 468 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
1o See In re Anonymous, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423-24 (Fam. Ct. 1962); In re Watson, 95
N.Y.S.2d 798, 799-800 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).
104 See In re Cager, 248 A.2d 384, 387 (Md. 1968) (reversing the trial court's decision
that a child was neglected solely because of the fact that he lived with a mother who had
another illegitimate child living with her).
105 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and "Crack" Abuse, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1991) (discussing cases finding parental misconduct when parents
abuse drugs and alcohol).
106 See Paul Bernstein, Termination of Parental Rights on the Basis of Mental Disability: A
Problem in Policy and Interpretation, 22 PAC. LJ. 1155 (1991).
107 See Philip M. Genty, Protecting the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers Whose Children
Are in Foster Care: Proposed Changes to New York's Termination of Parental Rights Law, 17 FoR-
HAM Un. L.J. 1 (1989).
108 See Ross, supra note 88, at 1517-32.
109 See In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487, 490, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that the
continuing physical abuse of one parent by another, even where the child was not physi-
cally abused, would cause emotional damage to the child, and thus constitutes child ne-
glect creating an "environment injurious to the minor's welfare"); In-re S.O., 483 N.W.2d
602, 604 (Iowa 1992) (terminating a mother's parental rights for failure to protect her
children from a violent partner); In re V.B., 491 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
(same).
110 See Judge Raymond Shawcross, Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Mothers
Charged With Failure to Protect, Remarks at the 58th Annual Conference for the National
Council ofJuvenile and Family CourtJudges in Baltimore, Md. (July 9-12, 1995) (describ-
ing termination of parental rights cases in Michigan) (on file with author).
111 Appellate courts occasionally overturn trial judges' decisions that appear to be
based upon stereotypes rather than actual harm to the child. See Shapley v. Texas Dep't of
Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 250, 253-54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (reversing trial court
order terminating mother's parental rights, rejecting the trial court's assessment that the
mother presented a danger to her child, and recognizing that the mother's delay in report-
ing the father's abuse may have been because of fear of her husband); In re BettyJ.W., 371
S.E.2d 326, 332-33 (W. Va. 1988) (reversing an order terminating mother's parental rights,
recognizing the role the father's abuse played in the mother's actions as well as the ineffec-
tiveness of the social service department in providing help). As in private custody disputes,
to obtain such review, the mother must have effective legal representation. However, large
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aptly summarizes the way in which modem juvenile courts punish
mothers:
Juvenile courts are typically misogynist and culturally biased;
they developed as "mother-blaming" institutions where fathers are
absent and larger social forces are virtually invisible. Few would
deny that racism, poverty, unequal household relations, inadequate
housing, unemployment, failing schools, drugs, and other factors
affect which families are petitioned into juvenile court. Yet the legal
system conceals these conditions behind the cloak of legal objectiv-
ity. Women and children have no names in juvenile court proceed-
ings; they are referred to as "Mother" or "Minor." With judicial
caseloads of three thousand to four thousand families per judge,
parties before the court cannot be viewed as individuals. Instead,
they blur into one long and undifferentiated failure .... In this
context, juvenile court proceedings do not articulate, represent, or
acknowledge the social conditions of women's lives. 1" 2
Removal of children from an abusive or neglectful home may seem an
appropriate short-term strategy for protecting children. Studies
demonstrate, however, that there is a limited likelihood of reunifica-
tion after removal,"13 and that risks to children in foster care are sub-
stantial." 4 Given these circumstances, courts should make decisions
about removal of a child with as complete an understanding of the
mother's circumstances as possible. If she has participated in the
abuse or neglect of her children, courts should identify the contribut-
ing factors. Courts must always explore the possibility of domestic vio-
lence and develop appropriate resources and conditions for the
return of the children. If a mother's partner has abused or neglected
the children, the court should consider removal of the abusive parent
or boyfriend rather than removal of the children." 5
2. Criminal Proceedings
The criminal law also plays a significant role in defining the good
mother by regulating women's relationships with their children.
Through laws regulating a woman's behavior from pregnancy through
caseloads and limited resources often result in inadequate legal representation of mothers
in abuse and neglect cases. See supra note 66. Even when such representation exists, the
review often takes place after extended periods of separation of mother and child. See, e.g.,
In re BettyJ.W., 371 S.E.2d at 333.
112 Dohm, supra note 66, at 4-5 (citations omitted).
113 See supra note 75.
114 See BEYOND RI-JroRic, supra note 75, at 288.
115 A survey of approximately fifty child protective service workers in Maryland taken
during a training program on child maltreatment and domestic violence revealed that few,
if any, workers understood they could petition for a court order to remove the batterer
from a home where the batterer had abused minor children or threatened them with
abuse. See supra note 84.
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her child's young adulthood, criminal law consistently punishes wo-
men who deviate from what the law perceives as their "natural capac-
ity to nurture and protect."116
Much of mothers' behavior that the criminal law punishes is be-
havior which puts children at risk, and courts should both sanction
and discourage it. However, like the laws governing civil child protec-
tion proceedings, 117 criminal laws often focus on punishing a
woman's behavior when she deviates from her role as mother, rather
than on preventing harm to the child. Moreover, the criminal con-
text provides another example of the way that the law holds mothers,
as opposed to fathers, responsible for harm and violence to their
children.
a. Regulating Pregnancy
The first point at which the criminal law attempts to regulate a
mother's conduct is during pregnancy. By 1996, two hundred women
in thirty-five states had been charged with abusing an unborn child.118
Many of these prosecutions were based upon illegal drug use during
pregnancy." 9 State and federal prosecutors have criminally charged
women who use drugs during pregnancy under two theories. The
first, violation of the drug trafficking laws, has proven vulnerable to
reversal on appeal. 120 Courts have overturned convictions on the
116 Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 4, at 111. Social science research on
child abuse that informs the criminal law also reflects this view of the mother as selfless and
unquestioningly nurturing- "IT]he mother is not only expected to be most deeply and
intimately concerned with child-rearing; she is also at fault should any mischance occur in
that process. No matter who actually harms the child, mother has failed in her duty to
create a safe environment for her young." Id. (quotingJudith Martin, Maternal and Paternal
Abuse of Children: Theoretical and Research Perspectives, in THE DARK SInE OF FAMILnIS: CURRENT
FAMILY VioLmENc REsEARC H 293, 300 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983)).
117 See supra Part I.B.1.
118 See Scot Lehigh, Common Sense, or a New Way to Ban Abortion , BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
15, 1996, at DI (citing a study by the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy); see also
FALUDI, supra note 29, at 424-25 (1991) (citing cases in which pregnant women have been
criminally charged for using prescription drugs, drinking alcohol, neglecting doctors' ad-
vice, and having sex with their husbands).
119 See Lehigh, supra note 118; see also Drew Humphries et al., Mothers and Children,
Drugs and Crack. Reactions to Maternal DrugDependency, in THE CRIMINALJusricE SYSrEM AND
WOMEN: OFFENDERS, VICriMs, AND WORmRs 167-79 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the criminal-
ization of pregnancy); Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1990, § 6, at 34 (noting that prosecutors in Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, and
South Carolina have charged women for "delivering" crack to their fetuses or babies).
120 See LYNN M. PALTRow ET AL., CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN:
NATIONAL UPDATE AND OvERVIEw (American Civil Liberties Union Found. 1992) (provid-
ing a state-by-state summary of criminal prosecutions against pregnant women); see also
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992) (reversing mother's conviction for
delivering drugs to a minor because statute did not include drug use during pregnancy);
Jackson v. State, 833 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing mother's drug possession
conviction under drug trafficking statute based on evidence of cocaine found during still-
bor's autopsy).
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ground that states designed trafficking statutes to apply to the sale of
controlled substances between "born persons."121 Thus, using them
to convict pregnant women violates due process, for there was no no-
tice that such laws applied to pregnancy.
States have also pursued prosecutions of pregnant substance
abusers under criminal child abuse and neglect statutes. In such
cases, states have alleged that maternal drug use during pregnancy
imposes serious health risks on the developing fetus or wil result in
postnatal trauma, including narcotic withdrawal and physical and
mental defects. 122 The principal legal challenge to these types of
prosecutions is that states did not draft criminal child abuse statutes to
cover prenatal conduct,123 and that, consequently, a fetus is not con-
sidered an abused or neglected "child" under such statutes. 124
Whatever the result of this politically charged jurisprudential debate,
there is every indication that finding a way to punish mothers who
abuse substances during their pregnancies continues to be a popular
activity for judges125 and legislatures. 126
Although few would disagree that public policy should seek to
discourage prenatal drug use, the problem with choosing criminal
child abuse prosecutions as a method of discouragement is that it suf-
fers from the same flaws as other forms of regulation of mothers.
First, it disproportionately punishes poor women of color.127
121 Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1292.
122 See Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 50, 51 (noting
that cocaine and crack babies are often born with neurological, endocrinological, cardiac,
and respiratory defects).
123 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a mother could
not be convicted of child endangerment based on prenatal substance abuse).
124 See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (hold-
ing that a heroin-addicted baby did not satisfy the plain language of the criminal statute,
because the injury must be to a living child, not a fetus who later became a child).
125 The South Carolina Supreme Court recently upheld a conviction for prenatal drug
use, recognizing the viable fetus as a person. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-81 (S.C.
1997) (finding that a fetus is a "child" for purposes of child abuse statute, and upholding
mother's conviction for child abuse for ingesting crack during third trimester).
126 Recent legislation attempts to regulate more indirectly the conduct of pregnant
women by imposing criminal liability on persons who are obligated to report child abuse
and who fail to report fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal drug dependency. See, e.g., UTAH
CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-411 (1997) (holding any person required to report a case of suspected
fetal alcohol syndrome or drug dependency, who willfully fails to do so, guilty of a
misdemeanor).
127 Poor women of color are more likely to be prosecuted because the activities of
these mothers are generally subject to more scrutiny than the activities of white, middle
class or wealthy mothers. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Hv. L. REV. 1419 (1991). Most ma-
ternal drug use cases stem from reports from medical providers who see pregnant women
in hospitals and clinics. In public hospitals, a drug history is a routine part of a medical
examination. In private obstetricians' offices, it is rare. See Children of Substance Abusers:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Fames., Drugs and Alcoholism of the Sen. Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1989) (statement of Kary L. Moss, American
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Although many commentators who have discussed this new use of the
criminal law have focused on the conflict between~protecting the fetus
and the mother's right to privacy, Dorothy Roberts has argued persua-
sively that the real issue is that these "prosecutions [punish] poor
Black women for having babies."1 28
The second problem with criminalizing the conduct of pregnant
women is that it ignores the role of the fathers whose conduct may
also adversely affect their unborn children. 129 Fathers are virtually un-
accountable for the children they father outside of marriage unless
paternity is established.' 30 Policy initiatives attempting to make fa-
thers accountable for their children have generally tried only to get
fathers to provide their children with financial support'13 '
Furthermore, although ample evidence exists that prenatal drug
use increases avoidable risks during pregnancy, many negative effects
Civil Liberties Union); Carol Angel, Addicted Babies: Legal System's Response Unclear, L.A.
DAILYJ., Feb. 29, 1988, at 1, 24; see also IraJ. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or
Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Nor-
ida, 322 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1202 (1990) (concluding from their study that illicit drug use is
common among pregnant women regardless of race and socioeconomic status, yet black
women visiting public clinics were ten times more likely to be reported to health authori-
ties than white women seeing private obstetricians); Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors:
Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BuFF. L. Rxv.
737 (1991) (observing class and race bias in the prosecution of pregnant women for expos-
ing their unborn children to drugs).
128 Roberts, Black Motherhood, supra note 4, at 939. Roberts notes that, as of 1992, 75%
of the 160 documented prosecutions against pregnant women for using drugs were
brought against women of color. Id. at 938; see also Roberts, supra note 127 (arguing that
the punishment of drug addicts, mostly Black women, who choose to carry their
pregnancies to term, violates their constitutional right to equal protection and privacy re-
garding their reproductive choices).
129 See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 105, at 1221 (examining the negative effects of paternal
alcohol misuse on children); Ruth E. Little & Charles F. Sing, Father's Drinking and Infant
Birth Weight: Report of an Association, 36 TERATOLOGY 59 (1987) (finding a significant link
between paternal drinking prior to conception and decreased infant birth weight); Bonnie
I. Robin-Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled Intervention,
42 STAN. L. Rxv. 745, 803 (1990) (noting the lack of an adequate support system, for exam-
ple, an absent father, is a dominant risk factor for drug-using women who pose a high risk
of child neglect);Jun Zhang et al., A Case-Control Study of Paternal Smoking and Birth Defects,
21 INTLJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 273 (1992) (examining the association between paternal smoking
and birth defects).
130 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Fam. Law § 10-203 (1991) (providing criminal sanctions
for parents who fail to provide support). Before a parent can be convicted of willfully
failing to support his child, paternity must be established. See State v. Rawlings, 381 A.2d
708 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
131 See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (describing federal initiatives in 1980s
to increase child support payments). To counteract some of the more punitive measures
of the welfare reform legislation, see, e.g., infra Part III.B, President Clinton included a
number of provisions in that legislation to enhance child support enforcement. SeePaul K.
Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30
FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996) (examining the sweeping, new child support enforcement legislation
included within the Act).
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attributed to drug use may have other causes. 132 Low birth weights
and growth reductions, which are often linked to the mother's drug
use during pregnancy, may have roots in poverty or the lack of prena-
tal or health care.' 33 As one judge, exceptional for his recognition of
the need to take into account the broader context of mothers' lives,
stated:
It is, after all, the whole life of the pregnant woman which impacts
on the development of the fetus. As opposed to the third-party de-
fendant, it is the mother's every waking and sleeping moment which
... forms the world for the developing fetus. That this is so is not a
pregnant woman's fault: it is a fact of life.' 34
He also recognized the danger of translating myths of motherhood
into judicially defined standards of behavior:
If a legally cognizable duty on the part of mothers were recog-
nized, then a judicially defined standard of conduct would have to
be met. It must be asked, [b]y what judicially defined standard
would a mother have her every act or omission while pregnant sub-
jected to State scrutiny? By what objective standard could ajury be
guided in determining whether a pregnant woman did all that was
necessary in order not to breach a legal duty to not interfere with
her fetus' separate and independent right to be born whole? In
what way would prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs about the re-
productive abilities of women be kept from interfering with ajury's
determination of whether a particular woman was negligent at any
point during her pregnancy?' 35
Most importantly, punishing pregnant women is not the most ef-
fective way to protect their unborn children. What is needed are
more drug treatment centers that serve pregnant women.' 36 The
132 See Dolgin, supra note 105, at 1224-26 (finding that studies have not conclusively
established the extent of the harm that prenatal drug use poses, and that infants do not
always exhibit ill effects).
133 See Katha Pollitt, 'Fetal Rights'. A New Assault on Feminism, THE NATION, Mar. 26,
1990, at 409 (discussing the lack of adequate medical care for poor minority women, sub-
standard living conditions, spousal abuse, and poor diet as factors that have a significant
impact on pregnancy).
134 Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (IMI. 1988).
135 Id.
136 In 1989, the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families surveyed
two-thirds of the major hospitals in fifteen cities and reported that they had no place to
refer pregnant women addicted to drugs for treatment. See Karol L. Kumpfer, Treatment
Programs for Drug-Abusing Women, FUTuRE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1991, at 50, 53. Many drug
treatment programs do not accept pregnant women out of fear of the litigation that would
result if the treatment causes a loss of the pregnancy. See Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy
Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to their
Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 301 (1987-88). In May 1993, the NewYork
Court of Appeals prohibited drug programs from excluding pregnant addicts categorically,
without a showing that the exclusion is medically necessary. Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N.
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523, 525-26 (N.Y. 1993).
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threat of prosecution may deter pregnant women who are substance
abusers from seeking even the limited treatment options that are avail-
able.13 7 Incarceration may lead to further maternal drug use 3 8 and
poor prenatal care.'3 9 Drug treatment centers for pregnant women,
better health care, and improved social services are clearly more effec-
tive in protecting the health of the mother and her child.14°
Finally, as one commentator has suggested, attempting to pro-
hibit any behavior that may potentially harm the fetus leads to a slip-
pery slope of regulation of maternal behavior:
Prosecutions of pregnant women cannot rationally be limited to ille-
gal conduct because many legal behaviors cause damage to develop-
ing babies. Women who are diabetic or obese, women with cancer
or epilepsy who need drugs that could harm the fetus, and women
who are too poor to eat adequately or to get prenatal care could all
be characterized as fetal abusers.141
The laws that attempt to regulate pregnant women by criminalizing
certain conduct during pregnancy fail to take into account the
broader context of women's lives. As a result, these laws both fail to
ensure healthy newborns and punish women for circumstances-pov-
erty, addiction, lack of health care, and a partner's drug abuse-over
which they have little or no control.
b. Criminal Prosecution of Mothers for Child Abuse or Neglect
While prosecuting pregnant women for abuse to fetuses is rela-
tively new, criminal prosecutions of mothers for abuse or neglect of
their children have a long history.142 These criminal prosecutions
often occur at the same time as the civil proceedings brought to re-
137 See Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant Is a Crime, CRIM. JusT. ETHics, Winter-
Spring 1990, at 41, 44-45.
138 See, e.g., Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance
Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1434 (1990);
Andrew H. Malcolm, Explosive Drug Use Creating New Underworld in Prisons, N.Y. TrMEs, Dec.
30, 1989, at Al.
139 See Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of
Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. Rzv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277,
308 & n.209 (1987-88) ("'[I]ncarceration of a pregnant woman is a potential death sen-
tence to her unborn child.'") (quoting Ellen Barry, Director of San Francisco's Legal Serv-
ices for Prisoners with Children).
140 Some states are moving in this direction. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-212
(1997) (creating a treatment program for high-risk pregnant women, and defining "high
risk" as a woman's risk of poor birth outcomes or physical and other disabilities due to
substance abuse during the prenatal period); 325 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/7.3b (West 1993)
(requiring health care providers to refer addicted pregnant persons to the local Infant
Mortality Reduction Network to obtain counseling and treatment).
141 Paltrow, supra note 137, at 42.
142 See GORDON, HEROES OF THERm OWN LivEs, supra note 1, at 27-81 (including a his-
torical review of records of the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren from 1880-1910); see also A. Schwartz & H.L. Hirsh, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Survey of
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move children from their mother's care. These prosecutions proceed
under a variety of statutory and common law grounds.
States base some prosecutions on direct physical abuse of a
child.' 43 Criminal prosecution of women who directly abuse their
children or place them at risk seems an appropriate legal response to
both punish and deter child abuse. Even here, however, women's sta-
tus as mothers makes them more accountable than fathers within the
same legal system.
Although the prevalence of child abuse is well documented,"1
statistics tracking the perpetrators of abuse are difficult to find. Statis-
tics vary on whether men or women abuse children at the same rate or
in the same way.' 45 Accountability for abuse, however, seems to fall
disproportionately on women. Because mothers overwhelmingly are
the custodians and caretakers of their children, 146 they are more likely
either to engage in abuse or to be held responsible for any abuse or
neglect of children in their care and custody. This results from their
visibility to those likely to observe their children and report abuse-
schools, medical providers, and so forth. 147 Studies confirm that the
caretaking parent is more likely to be reported for child abuse. 148 As
one commentator notes:
the Law (United States of America), in CHILD ABUSE 31 (A. Carmi & H. Zimrin eds., 1984)
(examining criminal punishment of child abuse within the last two centuries).
143 Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have child abuse statutes that require
an act of commission, an act that directly inflicts harm on the child. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2301 (23) (1997) ("The term 'abused' ... means a child whose parent, guardian,
or custodian inflicts or fails to make reasonable efforts to prevent the infliction of physical
or mental injury upon the child .... ."); MD. CODE ANN., Fam. Law § 5-701 (b) (1) (1991 &
Supp. 1997) (describing the requisite physical or mental injury of a child by any parent or
other person).
144 In 1995, investigations by CPS agencies in 50 states determined that over one mil-
lion children were victims of substantiated or indicated child abuse and neglect. CPS agen-
cies investigated an estimated two million reports alleging the maltreatment of almost
three million children. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sews., Child Maltreatment 1995:
Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (visited Feb. 3, 1998)
<http://www.calib.com/nccanh/services/statutes>.
145 See GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LrvEs, supra note 1, at 173 (finding mothers
were reported as child abuse perpetrators in 46% of cases and fathers in the remaining
54%); ALENE BYCER RUSSELL & CYNTHIA MOHR TRAINOR, AMERICAN HUmANE ASS'N, TRENDS
IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 25 (1984) (finding that men were
more likely to have perpetrated both major and minor physical abuse, while women were
more likely to be associated with deprivation of necessities).
146 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
147 See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTE SERIES No. 1, REPORTING LAws:
DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996) (compiling state reporting laws).
148 See RUSSELL & TRAINOR, supra note 145, at 25 (analyzing national reports on abuse
and neglect from 1979 to 1982 and finding that the caretaking parent is more likely to
abuse the child); see also GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES, supra note 1, at 173 (stat-
ing that fathers are much more likely to abuse children in proportion to how much time
fathers spend taking care of children).
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[C]hild abuse is a gendered phenomenon, related to the oppres-
sion of women, whether men or women are the culprits, because it
reflects the sexual division of the labo[r] of reproduction ...
[W omen are always implicated because even when men are the cul-
prits, women are usually the primary caretakers who have been, by
definition, in some ways unable to protect the children. When pro-
tective organizations remove children or undertake supervision of
their caretakers, women often suffer greatly, for their maternal work
is usually, trying as it may be, the most pleasurable part of their
lives.' 49
In addition to the fact that their role as caretakers 'of children
makes them more likely either to abuse or neglect their children or be
reported for it, the ideal image of mothers as caretakers may also work
against women when the state makes prosecutorial decisions. As in
the child protection proceedings, the laws governing these proceed-
ings permit broad prosecutorial discretion. 150 Prosecutors exercise
this discretion against a backdrop of stereotypical good and bad
mothers. As two practitioners in this field have noted:
The definition of "bad mothering" applied in prosecution of
child abuse and neglect is a broad one, and few explicit standards
curb the discretion of prosecutors....
Such a broad standard allows and requires prosecutors to de-
fine appropriate parental behavior according to their discretion. As
a result, decisions concerning prosecutions will tend to reflect race,
class, and gender biases of prosecutors who have tended to be
white, middle-class, and male. Mothering is taken out of its context
in abuse prosecution and is judged by ajudiciary that assumes mid-
dle-class, sexist, and racist norms. Mothers-across classes and cul-
tures-are expected to perform in ways that satisfy those norms. 151
c. Criminal Prosecution of Mothers for Failure to Protect
All but twelve states have child abuse laws that punish omis-
sions.152 Under these "failure-to-protect" laws, the caretaking parent's
failure to perform the legal duty of protecting a child against abuse or
neglect takes the place of the criminal act. Some failure-to-protect
statutes require either knowledge of danger to the child or intent to
149 Linda Gordon, Feminism and Social Control The Case of Child Abuse and Neglect, in
WHAT Is FEMINIsM? 63, 69 (Juliet Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., 1986).
150 The District of Columbia's child abuse statute was challenged on vagueness
grounds. See In Re J.A. & L.A., 601 A.2d 69 (D.C. 1991) (challenging the statute on
grounds that it failed to establish what type of spanking constitutes excessive corporal
punishment).
151 Ashe & Cahn, supra note 7, at 98-99 (footnotes omitted).
152 For a summary of failure-to-protect statutes across the country, see V. Pualani Enos,
Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children,
19 HARv. WOMEN's LJ. 229, 236-38 (1996); Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents
Who Fail to Protect, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 359, 365-68 (1987).
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endanger the child.153 Most statutes, however, impose "strict liability"
by imposing criminal liability on caretakers who "permit" or "create" a
substantial risk of injury or neglect without requiring an affirmative
act that violates the duty of care or an intent to harm.154 Nancy Erick-
son divides cases holding mothers criminally liable under these stat-
utes into three categories:
(1) defendant [mother] was present when the abuse took place and
did nothing to prevent the abuse, (2) [the] defendant [mother] left
the child alone with the abuser, knowing that he had in the past
abused the child, and (3) [the] defendant [mother] discovered the
child in an abused state but failed to seek medical attention for the
child.' 55
Criminal prosecution based only upon failure-to-protect statutes
may carry the greatest potential for unfairly punishing mothers. Most
statutes fail to take into account the context within which a mother
exercises her caretaking responsibilities.156 Mothers tried under these
statutes are convicted if their attempts to protect their children are
ineffective, 157 or if fear for their safety or their children's safety effec-
tively prevents intervention. 158
153 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (West Supp. 1997) (subjecting to criminal
liability "[any person who willfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child.., to be
placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of
such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired
.... ); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:8 (1996) (subjecting to criminal liability a person who
purposely violates a duty of care, protection or support); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7114
(West Supp. 1998) (providing criminal penalties for "[a]ny parent or other person who
shall willfully or maliciously... injure, torture, maim, use unreasonable force upon a child
... or ... cause, procure or permit any of said acts to be done .... ").
154 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(c) (Michie Supp. 1981), interpreted in State v.
Lucero, 647 P.2d 406, 408-09 (N.M. 1982) (holding that the mens rea of the defendant
who abuses a child or permits such abuse is not an essential element of the crime of child
abuse).
155 Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge of Bat-
tered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, in IA CURRETr PERSPECrTVEs IN
PsYcHoLoGIcAL, LEGAL, AND ETHicAL ISSUES: CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ABUSE AND ENDAN-
GERMENT 197, 200 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds., 1991).
156 Only three states include affirmative defenses in failure-to-protect prosecutions for
defendants who can prove that interference to protect the child would have resulted in
additional injury to the child or to the defendant. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6(1) (e) (West
1993 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378(2) (West Supp. 1997); OLA.. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 852.1(A) (West Supp. 1998).
157 See Phelps v. State, 439 So. 2d 727, 734 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (convicting a mother
of child abuse, and responding to her claim that she never had an opportunity to leave by
concluding that she never made the opportunity); Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d
311, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding that a mother may still be convicted for endanger-
ing the welfare of her child when her efforts to protect the child are found to be "lame" or
.meager"); see also Enos, supra note 152, at 240-61 (examining the assumptions on which
courts rely when determining the fate of battered women and their children).
158 For more examples of women who have been incarcerated for failing to protect
their children, see Ann Jones, Children ofa Lesser Mom, LEAR's, May 1993, at 30 (including a
retarded woman with an IQ of 61, who was sentenced to five to fifteen years for failing to
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The assumption underlying these cases-that a mother can al-
ways protect her children from a violent partner-is misplaced. A
growing body of literature demonstrates the fallacy of this assumption.
Experts have pointed to a mother's lack of financial resources, 59 a
well grounded fear of increased violence to herself and her chil-
dren, 60 potential criminal liability for leaving with the children,' 6 '
losing custody for leaving without the children, 62 and being killed 163
or seeing her children killed,' M as reasons why many mothers do not
leave abusive relationships. 65
intervene in a beating of her child and failing to leave; a woman who was not even at home
when her boyfriend killed her child; and a woman who, attempting to protect one child,
watched helplessly while her husband beat another).
159 See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOL. L.
REv. 891 (1995) (noting the particular problems of inadequate resources for battered wo-
men of color) ;Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the Welfare Reform
Debate, 19 LAW & POL'Y 205 (1997).
160 See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN K.LL 115-17 (1987); CAROLINE WOLF
HARLow, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FEMALE VIcrIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 5 (1991); Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv.
1, 59 (1991).
161 Women who leave with their children and violate visitation orders may be charged
with criminal contempt under a variety of state statutes or under the federal parental kid-
napping statute. See, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
162 See Mahoney, supra note 160, at 43-49.
163 Nearly 30% of all women murdered by a lone killer are killed by current or former
husbands or boyfriends. See RoNE- BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTzMAN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATEs FROM THE
REDESIGNED SuRVEY 3 (Aug. 1995); see also Mahoney, supra note 160, at 5-6 (describing
increased risk of physical violence for women who separate from abusers).
164 Although mothers are involved in child homicides, studies estimate that they are
responsible for substantially fewer cases than fathers. See U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECr, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECr IN THE UNrrED STATES 13 (1995) (finding most child abuse fatalities
are caused by men-fathers, stepfathers, or boyfriends). Media accounts and public reac-
tion to parental homicides reflect the degree to which society has markedly different ex-
pectations of mothers and fathers. Consider, for example, the case of Mark Clark from
Essex, Maryland who, after his wife left him after repeated abuse and threats, convinced his
wife and three children to go shopping for school supplies. See David Simon et al., A
Loving Father's Tragic Solution, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 18, 1995, at 1A. As the family pulled
into a shopping center, a bomb Mr. Clark had planted in the car exploded and killed the
entire family. See id. The story received limited press in the Baltimore area, and much of it
expressed sympathy for the murdering father. See id. Compare the reaction to Mr. Clark's
acts with the reaction to Susan Smith, the South Carolina woman who confessed to killing
her two young sons. Smith herself contributed to the publicity surrounding the case by
first blaming the deaths of the children on an unknown black assailant. See Sheryl McCar-
thy, We Haven't Heard the Real Story Yet, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1994, at 7. What made the Smith
story so compelling on a national level, however, was its "painful implosion of the myth of
motherhood as sacred and endless self-sacrifice." Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender
in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN LJ. 225,
229 (1996); see also Diana Griego Erwin, Drowning of Sons Wounds the Myth of Motherhood,
SACRAMENTo BEE, Nov. 8, 1994, atA2 (noting the Smith story shattered various myths about
motherhood).
165 Of course, many women do not leave their abusive partners because of a deep
emotional attachment to their partners who are, in many cases, partners of many years and
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Judges and juries applying these statutes also seem to impose a
much higher duty of care on mothers than on fathers. 166 As one com-
mentator recently admonished the bench:
Perhaps, before a judge lectures a desperate, frightened
woman on what it means to be a good mother, he or she should
trade places with her and endure the pain of watching a child's
beating, without the ability to leave or with the knowledge that leav-
ing brings a worse fate. Even good mothers sometimes cannot pro-
tect their children. 167
The criminal prosecutions this Section discusses primarily impact
children by incarcerating their mothers and depriving them of a par-
ent.' 68 Although this outcome may be an appropriate remedy where
the mother has participated in abuse or was actually able to prevent it,
prosecutors and judges must, in determining criminal culpability, go
beyond the narrow stereotypes that define bad mothers. Prosecuting
mothers for abuse is not the most effective way to protect children.
The threat of criminal sanctions might deter mothers and other ob-
servers from taking the positive steps of reporting abuse by fathers and
boyfriends, seeking medical care, or pursuing civil or criminal reme-
dies to stop the abuse. 169 Children of incarcerated mothers, even
those fortunate enough to end up with relatives rather than in foster
care, suffer profoundly. 70 Courts should inflict the loss of a parent
the fathers of their children. See Becker, supra note 99, at 18. Recognizing that battered
women often have strong emotional bonds to their batterers does not require courts to
endorse or excuse behavior that threatens children. Such a recognition, however, would
help courts understand the conditions of mothers' lives, and reach decisions that best pro-
tect children and their nonviolent caretakers. See id. at 22-23.
166 SeeJill Davis, Failure to Protect and Its Impact on Battered Mothers, in NATIONAL COUNCIL
OFJUVENILE & FAMILY COURTJUDGES, COURTS AND COMMUNITIES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE IN
THE FAMILY 6 (1995) (comparing a series of reported cases in which mothers were con-
victed of failure-to-protect crimes or their parental rights were terminated, with State v.
Rundle 500 N.W.2d 916 (Wis. 1993), a case that reversed a father's conviction for aiding
and abetting physical abuse of his child by failing to take any action).
167 Nancy Hollander, 'Bad'Mothers: Modern Day Witches, THE CHAMPION, July 1993, at 3.
168 The number of incarcerated women has increased six-fold in the last ten years. See
id. (noting that some of the increase can be attributed "directly to the epidemic of domes-
tic violence" when women are convicted of child abuse or failing to protect their
children.).
169 See Erickson, supra note 155, at 209. Attorneys representing battered women at a
local, domestic violence legal clinic report that they routinely advise women against alleg-
ing child abuse in petitions for restraining or civil protection orders, if the burden of proof
to obtain the order can be met by referring only to the mother's abuse. Attorneys give this
advice because an allegation of child abuse will trigger an investigation by the local Depart-
ment of Social Services ("DSS"). Past experience of advocates of battered women suggests
that the risk that the DSS will remove the children and refer the mother for criminal
prosecution far outweighs any benefit from potential services that such an agency might
offer a family experiencing violence. See Interview with Dorothy Lennig, Chief Attorney,
House of Ruth Domestic Violence Legal Clinic (July 8, 1997) (notes on file with author).
170 See RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL Via-ims OF THE WAR AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE 21 (1997) (stating the "problem with our child-protective system is that it hurts
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only on children whose parents are violent or unable, even after ap-
propriate intervention, to care for them.
II
THE PRESUMPTION OF EQuALrY. MonTH .s AND
FIRNANCiAr. SUPPORT
When the law moves from issues governing child placement to
regulating the distribution of public or private financial benefits, the
double standard for mothers and fathers is no longer evident. In-
stead, since the 1980s, a presumption of equality has governed laws
regulating child support and public benefits for poor mothers with
children. 171 Here, the law assumes that parents-again, primarily
mothers-caring for infants and small children have equal access to
work opportunities. This assumption is misplaced and harms women.
Mothers' gender and role as caretakers disadvantage them in the
workplace. Although mothers' diminished earning capacity has long
been recognized, statutory and judicial reform has done little to
change the situation. Discrimination against women, particularly
mothers, in the workplace has a long history.172 "Concern" for the
health of mothers-actual or potential-continues to hinder women's
employment opportunities.173 The wage gap for women has im-
proved from sixty cents for every dollar men earned in 1980,174 to
seventy-six cents in 1997.175 Although the gap has narrowed, at least
for middle- and upper-income women, 176 it still exists.
children"); Philip M. Genty, Re-Victimizing the Victims: Domestic Vwlence and the Incarceration of
Women, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 10, 1997, at 82 (noting that incarcerating mothers needlessly sepa-
rates them from their children).
171 Child support and public benefits law are but two examples of laws governing the
allocation of income to mothers that presume equality of opportunity and autonomy of
mothers. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a good case can be made that the laws
governing alimony, and to some extent, the distribution of marital property, are two more
examples. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care
71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 728-29 (1993).
172 In 1908, the Supreme Court upheld protective labor legislation which excluded
women from the workforce, declaring that "as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care
in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
421 (1908).
173 Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Two Legal Constructs of Motherhood: "Protective" Legislation
in Mexico and the United States, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 239, 248-53 (1992) (ana-
lyzing the "new wave" of protective legislation regulating women's employment as part of a
legal strategy to reverse Roe v. Wade).
174 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNTED STATES 1996, at 469 (1996).
175 See Belsky, supra note 42, at 25.
176 See Lynn, supra note 42, at 86 (noting wages of low-income women have remained
stagnant over last twenty years). Not surprisingly, middle- and upper-class white women in
this country also have the greatest opportunities to attain high-ranking jobs. See Cynthia
Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the Difference Model for Women in the Law, 35
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Moreover, mothers' predominant role in child rearing means
that they are particularly disadvantaged in the labor force. Many stud-
ies demonstrate that it is women who sacrifice career advancement for
parental responsibilities. Mothers, not fathers, opt for the "mommy
track" rather than succumbing to the open-ended availability that
most high paying, demanding jobs require. 77 Women necessarily
take time off for childbirth and, more often than fathers, work part
time after their children's birth. 178 Mothers, rather than fathers, take
time off to care for sick children 179 or when there is a lack of child
care.'80 All of these circumstances limit the work choices of mothers
with children at home and disadvantage many mothers in the
workplace.
Despite the disadvantages mothers experience as wage earners,
an examination of child support and welfare laws reveals an underly-
ing policy decision that custodial parents of small children should be
in the workplace rather than at home caring for children. This policy
is based upon a flawed premise of women's economic equality, and
hurts both mothers and their children.
A. Child Support Laws
After a court has decided who shall have custody of the children,
the court must then decide how to divide the obligation to support
the children between the parents. Women who have secured custody
of their children may find themselves facing a challenge to support
them. In addition to the constraints the law places on their ability to
secure a well-paying job in the workplace,' 8 ' current child support
laws undermine custodial mothers in significant ways: they often rele-
gate mothers to poverty, for example, they may include economic
sanctions for mothers who stay home to care for small children.
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 309, 333 (1990); see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: A PROFILE (1995) (revealing that a large wage gap
remains between low-income women and men when comparing poorly educated women
with their male counterparts with the same level of education).
177 Rebecca Korzec, Working on the "Mommy-Track": Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1997); Cindy Skrzycki, Efforts Fail to Advance Women's fobs:
'Glass Ceiling' Intact Despite New Benefits, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1990, at Al.
178 See Karen Rubin, Whose Job Is Child Care?, Ms., Feb. 1987, at 32; see also VICTOR R.
FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALrrY 58-74 (1988) (stating that "marriage and
children severely handicap women's efforts to earn as much as men").
179 SeeJudith Newmark, Sick-Day Duty: Mother Stays Home 85 Percent of the Time, ST. Louis
PoST DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 1996, at 4E.
180 See Carol Kleiman, Child Care a Key Cause of Women LeavingJobs, CH. Tm., Jan. 14,
1991, at C3.
181 See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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The roots of the impoverishment of women through inadequate
child support 8 2 can be traced to the historical reliance on a broad
discretionary standard to decide the amount of support a noncus-
todial parent must pay.183 Although post-divorce child poverty has
made child support an area of increased federal and local regulation,
until the 1990s, a "court's discretion regarding the amount of child
support usually reign[ed] supreme."'8 4
The inadequacy of most states' discretionary standards in setting
initial child support awards took on critical proportions by the early
1980s.18 5 Insufficient child support was a major cause of the spiraling
poverty rate among women and children. Of the 9.4 million custodial
parents in 1987, 41% had no child support award.'8 6 When courts did
award child support, award levels were often inadequate, thrusting
many children and custodial parents into poverty or a seriously dimin-
ished standard of living.'8 7 In 1987, the average child support for the
3.7 million custodial parents who actually received payments was
$2,710 per year.'88 Studies estimating the costs of raising children in
intact households demonstrate the inadequacy of such amounts of
child support.'8 9 The median award comprised only 37% of the esti-
mated average monthly expenditure for children in a middle-income
household and only 55% in a low-income household.' 90 When one
combines the abysmal record of collecting child support in the 1980s
182 A census report suggests that the family income available to children declined by
about 37% following a parental separation (21% when adjusted for family size) and that a
year later, family income was only 69-70% of the level prior to disruption. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FAMILY DISRUPTION AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP: THE
SHORT-RUN PicruRE FOR CHILDREN 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter FAMILY DIsRUPTION].
183 See LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
nON, § 1.01, at 1-3 (1997 Supp.) (describing two factors under preguideline discretionary
standard for setting child support as "ability of the obligor parent to pay and the needs of
the child"); see also CLARK, supra note 18, at 719 ("The amount to be awarded... lies in the
sound discretion of the trial court.").
184 HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 10 (1981).
185 For the source of this discussion, see Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretion-
aiy Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 226-29 (1991).
186 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.
1987, at 1 (1990) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT].
187 See Lucy Marsh Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of
Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the DenverDistrict Court, 57 Deny. U. L.
Rev. 21, 50 (1979).
188 See CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 186, at 1-2.
189 See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Will This Divorced Woman Receive Child
Support?, 25 JUDGES J. 40, 42-43 (1986) (describing the project that examined the child
support implications of various custody arrangements, and finding, among other things,
that the level of support awarded in the cases examined fell "far below the costs of rearing
children estimated by economists."); Karen Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What It Has
Meant Financially for Women in California, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1979, at 10, 13-15 (estimating
that child support awards comprise less than half the actual costs of raising a child).
190 See Seal, supra note 189, at 13-15.
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with the inadequate level of awards, the dimension of this crisis be-
comes clear.191 In addition to the inadequacy of the award itself, the
traditional system of virtually unlimited judicial discretion in this area
led, as it had done in other areas, to "pronounced disparities in award
amounts from court to court, from judge to judge, and from case to
case."192
Congress became concerned with the lack of objective guidelines
for establishing support obligations and the resulting inconsistencies
in awards, as well as the overall problem of inadequate awards. 193 In
response to this crisis in child support, Congress enacted a series of
related statutes addressing the child support problem beginning in
the 1980s.
In 1988, Congress passed the Family Support Act,194 which re-
quires every state to establish presumptive child support guidelines as
a condition for continued federal funding of the state's welfare pro-
gram.195 A number of requirements of this Act strengthened the fed-
eral push for standardized child support decisions. Under this statute,
the child support guidelines that each state adopts must presump-
tively establish the appropriate child support obligation in any child
support proceeding.196 The Act preserves limited judicial discretion
because decisionmakers may make a specific finding that application
of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular
case, as determined under criteria each state establishes.' 97 As a result
of the federal legislation, every state has adopted some type of child
support formula.' 98
191 In 1987, only 50% of the women with child support orders received the full
amount. Almost 25% received partial payments, while the other 25% received nothing.
See CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 186, at 1.
192 Sally F. Goldfarb, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Child Support Guidelines, 13
FAM. L. REP. 3031, 3032 (1987).
193 See H.R. REP. No. 527, at 49 (1983).
194 Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 2346-48 (1988) (codified, as amended, in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
195 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1997) (stating that an approved state plan is a condition for
federal financial assistance); id. § 302.56(a) (requiring that state plans contain child sup-
port guidelines).
196 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2) (1994).
197 Id.
198 SeeJANIcE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CHILD SUP-
PORT GUIDELINES: A COMPENDIUM SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (1990). The
Income Shares Model, which the majority of states have adopted, employs various eco-
nomic studies to identify the percentage of family income the child(ren) would have re-
ceived if the parents lived together. The income of both parents is combined to calculate
the basic child support obligation. See Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support Orders: A Perspec-
tive on Reform, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at 84, 87-88. This basic amount is then
pro-rated between the parents in proportion to their respective incomes. See id. at 87-88.
The noncustodial parent must pay his or her share as child support; the custodial parent
presumably pays his or her share directly to the child(ren). See id. In this model, because
the economic studies of intact families suggest that families spend a decreasing percentage
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The impact of the adoption of child support guidelines on the
economic circumstances of custodial mothers has been mixed. Early
reports indicated that guidelines had improved the lot of custodial
parents, 199 but more recent studies have focused on the increasing
rate of child poverty despite the imposition of guidelines and other
child support reforms of the 1980s.20 0 Recent statistics indicate, for
example, that the number of custodial parents without child support
orders is increasing 20' and that collecting child support from noncus-
todial parents remains difficult. 20 2 Even more surprisingly, the
amount of the average child support order has decreased since 1987.
Custodial parents received an average child support payment of $2650
in 1991 compared to $2710 in 1987.203
For those mothers who are able to obtain and enforce child sup-
port orders, other provisions in state child support guidelines still un-
dermine their efforts to support their children. These provisions may,
in effect, devalue and penalize parents who either stay home or re-
duce their work schedule to care for children. Despite the entry of
huge numbers of women into the workplace, the mother most often
reduces her work schedule or takes time off from work.20 4 The con-
cept of penalizing the parent who has "voluntarily impoverished" him-
self or herself, and has thereby reduced his or her child support
obligation, is well-established in child support law.2 0 5 The courts pe-
of total income on children as income levels increase, the guidelines provide for noncus-
todial parents at higher income levels to pay a declining percentage of income. See id. at
88-89. In addition, most income shares formulas include cost-sharing for certain child-
related expenditures such as child care and extraordinary medical expenses. See id. at 89.
199 See, e.g., Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support Guidelines: Will They Make a Difference? ,
12J. FAM. IssuES 404 (1991) (predicting that award levels would rise upon implementation
of the guidelines); Murphy, supra note 185, at 231-40 ("The consensus ... is that [the]
guidelines are working."); Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on
Award Adequacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAmv. L.Q. 325, 332
(1991) (citing studies showing increased awards after implementation of the guidelines).
200 See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Child Support and Children's Poverty, 28 FAm. L.Q. 475, 479-
81 (1994) (book review)
201 Of the 11.5 million custodial parents in 1992, 50% did not have child support or-
ders. SeeBuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WHO RECEIVES CHILD SUPPORT?,
at I (June 1995) [hereinafter WHO RECEIVEs SUPPORT]. This compares to 41% of custodial
parents without orders in 1987. See CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 186, at 1.
202 In 1991, only 37% of women with child support orders received some or all of the
payments due. Sixty-three percent received nothing as compared to 25% in 1987. SeeWHo
RECEIVES SUPPORT, supra note 201, at 1; CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 186, at 1.
203 See WHO RECEIVES SUPPORT, supra note 201, at 2; CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 186, at
1.
204 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 18, § 17.1, at 720 (noting that "the courts must deter-
mine whether [a parent's] actual earnings demonstrate a good faith choice of career or
whether the parent's earnings are being held at a low level for the purpose of frustrating a
child support order."). For a comprehensive analysis of the statutes and reported cases on
the voluntary impoverishment doctrine, see MORGAN, supra note 183, § 2.04.
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nalize such parents, usually custodial mothers who stay home with
young children, by imputing income to them, basing a child support
order on their capacity to earn rather than their actual income.20 6
When the children under stay-at-home mothers' care are chil-
dren of the child support obligor, statutes and courts have "permit-
ted" mothers to stay at home and care for the children without
penalty only under limited circumstances. This exception to the pre-
sumption of voluntary impoverishment for stay-at-home parents gen-
erally applies only to parents caring for very young children of ages
ranging from six months to six years.20 7 When the children under
stay-at-home mothers' care are children of a subsequent marriage or
relationship, and not the children of the obligor, some states will im-
pute income by statute or case law to a mother caring for those chil-
dren, even if the children are newborns or toddlers.208 The following
case best illustrates the impact of this "child care penalty" on
mothers.20 9 Mary Smith is separated or divorced and is the custodial
parent of three children-ages three, six, and eight-from her former
marriage. The separation or divorce may have occurred under any
206 Although some states' guideline formulas do not look at the income of the custo-
dial parent in making a child support order, most do under the Income Shares Model. See
MUNSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 198.
207 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7) (b) (1) (1997) (applying the exception
where child of the parties is 30 months old or younger); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.212(2) (d) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (applying the exception where child of the mar-
riage is three years old or younger); LA. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (West 1991) (applying
exception where a child of the parties is under the age of five); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw
§ 12-204(b) (2) (ii) (1991 & Supp. 1996) (applying exception where child for whom parties
are jointly responsible is under two years old); ALAsKA RuLEs OF COURT, CR 90.3, Commit-
tee Commentary HIC (applying the exception where child of the parties is under two years
of age); ANN. R. N.C., N.C. CHILD SUPPORT GumIELMqEs, INcoME (3) (applying exception
where child of the marriage is under the age of three).
Some states do not draw a distinction between the parent who stays at home to care
for a child of the child support obligor, and a parent who stays at home to care for a child
of a new partner. Rather, these states merely provide that income will be imputed unless
the parent is staying at home to care for a young child. See, e.g., IDAHO R. Crv. P. (6) (c) (6),
§ 6(4) (c) (1) (providing that for imputed income, a parent is not deemed underemployed
if caring for a child not more than six months of age); IND. CILD SUPP. G. 3, Commentary
2(d) (noting that it is not the intent of the guidelines to force all custodial parents into the
workforce); MAss. CHILD Supp. G. II(H) (forbidding the court from imputing income to a
custodial parent with children who are under the age of six and living in the home).
208 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Spears, 529 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); Canning v.
Juskalian, 597 N.E.2d 1074 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Muller v. Muller, 524 N.W.2d 78 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1994); Bencivenga v. Bencivenga, 603 A.2d 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992);
Guskjolen v. Guskjolen, 499 N.W.2d 126 (N.D. 1993); see also supra note 207 (listing statutes
that protect parents caring for young children of the first relationship, implicitly permit-
ting imputation of income where children cared for are from a subsequent relationship).
209 This case is based on a composite of cases in which the author has provided repre-
sentation in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. Unlike many of the other
areas of law which punish mothers, the child care penalty is more pronounced as the in-
come of the parents increases. The higher the mother's potential income, the greater the
penalty, if her income is imputed to her while she is caring for children at home.
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circumstances-Mary may have initiated the divorce, she and her hus-
band may have reached a mutual decision to end the marriage, or her
husband may have left her for another woman. Assume further that a
Maryland divorce agreement provides that, as is most often the case,
Mary will have physical custody of the children.2 10 Both parties earn
$45,000 a year and, under the governing child support formula, as the
noncustodial parent, Mr. Smith will pay about $870 per month for
child support 2 1'
In Maryland, because Mary's youngest child is not under two, she
must work full-time or be deemed voluntarily impoverished.2 12 This
would result in the court imputing income to Mary in its calculation of
its child support order to the children's father.213 Thus, if Mary de-
cided to work part-time or stay at home to care for the children, Mr.
Smith's child support obligation would be calculated as though Mary
were earning a full-time salary.214 It is irrelevant that Mary's decision
not to work benefits both parties' children and that the deduction of
income from Mary's child support award may seriously affect her abil-
ity to support the children.
If Mary has a child by anyone other than her former husband, she
receives an even more severe financial penalty for staying at home to
care for that child. If she takes any time out of the work force for
pregnancy, delivery, or care of the infant, Maryland will view her as
voluntarily impoverishing herself215 Maryland would impute her full
income to her for purposes of calculating child support for the chil-
dren of her first marriage.216 If she marries the father of the new
210 See WHO RECEIVES SUPPORT, supra note 201, at 1. Eighty-six percent of custodial
parents are mothers (9.9 million out of 11.5 million). See id.
211 Under a typical Income Shares Model guideline, if Mary and John each earn
$45,000 per year, the child support obligation for the three children for each parentwould
be $870.50 per month. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-204(e) (1991 & Supp. 1997). As
the noncustodial parentJohn's share of the support would be reduced to an order for that
amount, and Mary's share would be assumed to be paid in direct support for the child. See
id. § 12-204(k) (2)-(3). Many studies, however, document that the custodial parent's share
of actual support far exceeds the amount designated in the child support formula because
the guidelines underestimate the cost of caring for a child. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Child
Support and Children's Poverty, 28 FAm. L.Q. 475, 479 (1994) (book review).
212 See MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 12-204(b) (ii) (1991 & Supp. 1997) (providing that
the only exception to the voluntary impoverishment rule for healthy adults is for parents
taking care of children of parties to the proceeding who are under the age of two).
213 See id. § 12-204(b).
214 Mary would continue to receive $870.50 a month rather than $1023, the amount
she would be owed if the support were calculated based on her husband's income alone.
See id. § 12-204(e).
215 See id. § 12-204(b) (ii). For a recent case applying the doctrine of voluntary impov-
erishment to a mother in another context in Maryland, see Wagner v. Wagner, 674 A-2d 1,
21-24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (holding that a mother who accepted a below normal
wage for her position had voluntarily impoverished herself).
216 See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-204(b) (ii) (1991 & Supp. 1997).
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infant, she must consequently continue to work or depend upon her
new husband to assist in the support of the children from the first
marriage. If the father of the infant has abandoned her, or she has
chosen not to marry him and cannot collect child support for the new
child,217 the economic consequences are far more severe. Mary faces
the substantial burden of providing care for her newborn and sup-
porting her older children by means of child support calculated
under a formula that assumes she is working full-time. 218
If Mary does not have custody of the children, the economic con-
sequences of starting a new relationship and having children are even
harsher. As the noncustodial parent, she would be subject to a child
support order. If Mary takes any time off from work during a preg-
nancy from a new relationship or during the child's infancy, she re-
mains subject to a continuing obligation to pay $870 per month for
the children from her first marriage, despite her loss of income.219
To the extent she remarries or cohabitates, she may have the assist-
ance of a husband or partner to pay the child support for the children
from her first marriage. If she instead remains single, she may have
the impossible choice of either providing care for her newborn and
risking jail for failing to support her older children, 220 or not taking
any time off for the birth of her newborn.
Thus, under many scenarios, Mary and other divorced mothers
may face harsh economic consequences for divorcing while their chil-
dren are young, particularly if they attempt to start a new family.
Although custodial fathers of young children may also have to work,
the adverse impact falls primarily on mothers because women most
often assume the responsibility of taking care of the children after
divorce. 221
217 There is a high probability that Mary is receiving little or no child support. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text.
218 Again, Mary would continue to receive $870.50 a month rather than $1023 a
month, which is the amount Mr. Smith would have to pay if his income was recognized for
what it is, the sole income available to support the children. See supra note 214.
219 The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994), provides some
protection, but only protects job security, and does not require paid maternity leave.
220 Parents who fail to comply with child support orders are subject to incarceration
under civil and criminal contempt statutes. See, e.g., LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 14-74 (West
1982); McH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.161 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-3 (1994 &
Supp. 1997).
221 SeeJudith Bondjennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman's World: Fathers' Rights to
Child Custody, 43 RuTGERS L. REv. 1141, 1176 (1991) (noting that "mothers obtain sole
custody in ninety percent of the cases"). The predominance of mothers as custodial par-
ents appears to reflect the agreement of divorcing parents rather than a judicial prefer-
ence for mothers. See StephenJ. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal
of Maternal Preference Made a Difference, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 264-65 (1994) (studying custody
decisions covering one jurisdiction from 1970-1993).
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Scholars and policymakers have paid limited attention to the cod-
ification of the policy that is pushing parents of young children into
the workforce.2 22 Lewis Becker's recent article on the voluntary-re-
duction-of-income doctrine contains one of the more comprehensive
analyses of the "child care" penalty.223 In his article, Becker argues for
a factor-based discretionary approach to resolve this issue.224 How-
ever, despite his detailed and thorough analysis of applicable statutes
and judicial decisions, Becker fails to acknowledge that most parents
staying at home to care for children are mothers and most child sup-
port obligors are fathers.225 Although he notes that the resolution of
this issue will have an impact on the important public policy "that
children ought to receive adequate care,"22 6 and that the financial
burdens of child care should be apportioned equitably between the
parents,22 7 he never recognizes that these statutes reflect a public pol-
icy consensus that devalues the work of "mothering." Moreover, in
developing a list of the various competing interests at stake, he never
acknowledges the presumed benefit fathers receive when the mother
cares for the children.228
A 1992 Pennsylvania court decision contains one of the few ex-
plicit acknowledgements of the gendered nature of this issue.2 29 Fo-
cusing on the pressures placed on a mother caring for a newborn
from a second marriage, the court held that a rule imputing income
to a mother in this situation
is another destructive step in a culture which appears bent on de-
stroying family stability. It also will increase the pressure on women
with second families to abort pregnancies and to abandon children,
or to give up on second marriages with children when the stress of
either going to work or forcing the second husband to support her
children by a prior marriage becomes unbearable.23 0
222 See Lewis Becker, Spousal and Child Support and the "Voluntary Reduction of Income"
Doctrine, 29 CoNN. L. Rnv. 647, 648 (1997); Karl A.W. DeMarce, Note, Devaluing Caregiving
in Child Support Calculations: Imputing Income to Custodial Parents Who Stay Home with Children,
61 Mo. L. REv. 429, 429-30 (1996).
223 Becker, supra note 222, at 703-11.
224 Id. at 708, 711 (acknowledging the critiques of reliance on discretion in family law
decisionmaking, but concluding discretion will lead to decisions that are "fair" to fathers,
mothers, and children).
225 Id. at 703-11.
226 Id. at 701.
227 Id. at 652.
228 This is a benefit to fathers because their children will most likely benefit from
home care. See Estin, supra note 171, at 791-802 and studies cited therein.
229 SeeAtkinson v. Atkinson, 616 A.2d 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that the reso-
lution of the issue of whether to impute income to a stay-at-home parent should not turn
on whether the mother is caring for her children of a subsequent marriage, as opposed to
the children of a previous marriage, but rather on the mother's earning capacity).
230 Id. at 24.
19981
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
It is tempting to resort to broad judicial discretion to insure fair-
ness in resolving this issue.231 Prior experience with broad standards
like the best interests of the child, however, suggest problems with this
approach.232 To promote a policy that values the work of child-rear-
ing and protects children, child support laws should, at a minimum,
prohibit imputing income to a parent who is caring for preschool chil-
dren of the obligor.2 33 The question of whether the state should con-
sider caring for children of a second relationship to be voluntary
impoverishment is more complex. Here, the multifactored approach
that looks at the earning capacity of the stay-at-home parent may be
more appropriate. 234 Such an approach provides some protection to
impoverished mothers who may have no source of income other than
child support. This approach recognizes the value of child rearing
while also accepting that, in some circumstances, the benefit to older
children from a parent's income may outweigh the benefit to younger
children of that parent's staying at home.
B. Welfare
In situations where one parent-again overwhelmingly the
mother-is left as the sole provider for her children because of the
other parent's abandonment or disability, she can turn to the state for
231 Some statutes or courts hearing these cases have developed factors to be consid-
ered, such as age and special needs of the child, cost of child care, and earning capacity of
stay-at-home parent, rather than a fixed rule. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30(2) (b) (West
Supp. 1996) (authorizing the court to refuse to impute income to a primary residential
parent, if it finds it necessary for the parent to stay home with the child); 27 S.C. CODE
ANN. REGs. §114-4720 A(5) (1992) (allowing a court to "take into account the presence of
young children or handicapped children who must be cared for by the parent, necessitat-
ing the parent's inability to work"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7) (d) (iv) (1996 & Supp.
1997) (forbidding the court to impute income if"unusual emotional or physical needs of a
child require the custodial parent's presence in the home"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-6-
302(b) (xi) (C) (Michie 1997) (authorizing the court to consider the "presence of children
of the marriage in the parent's home and its impact on the earnings of that parent"); ALa.
R. JUD. ADMiN. 32 (B) (5) (allowing the court to take into account the presence of a young
or physically or mentally disabled child, necessitating the parent's need to stay in the home
and the inability to work); IND. CHILD Supp. G. 3, Commentary 2(d) (noting that the "need
for a custodial parent to contribute to the financial support of a child must be carefully
balanced against the need for the parent's full-time presence in the home"); MoNT. ADMIN.
R. 46.30.1513(2) (d) (iv) (providing that the court shall not impute income if "unusual
emotional and/or physical needs of the child require the custodial parent's presence in
the home"); see also McAlexander v. McAlexander, No. 92 CA 21, 1993 WL 420206, at *5-6
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1993) (refusing to adopt a per se rule on whether declining em-
ployment to care for a newborn child is a voluntary reduction of income, and noting that
the best interests of the children whose support was at issue was the overall determining
factor).
232 See Murphy, supra note 185, at 211-26.
233 A couple of states have reached this conclusion. See supra note 207 (citing Indiana
and Massachusetts statutes).
234 The court in Atkinson, 616 A.2d at 22, takes this approach.
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assistance in providing support for the children. 23 5 Traditionally, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") has been the predom-
inant form of assistance for single mothers and their children.23 6 At
its inception, Congress designed the program to encourage "the care
of dependent children in their own homes."23 7 Thus, in its earliest
form, AFDC and its predecessor programs valued mothers by concep-
tualizing the payments to single mothers as compensation for labor
beneficial to society-raising and caring for children.
Since the adoption of the first welfare statute in 1935, the under-
lying public policy-that children's welfare is tied to the availability of
their mothers as caretakers-has gradually eroded.238 Since the early
1960s, benefits for poor mothers have been linked to the mother's
willingness to work in "appropriate" settings.239 The government ex-
pected black mothers in the South, for example, to work as domestics
or farmhands to justify public support for their fatherless children. 240
By the late 1960s, Congress amended AFDC to provide incentives for
235 Women-typically mothers who are divorced or separated from, or have never
been married to, the fathers of their children-represent almost all of the adult Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") recipients in this country. SeeJeffrey Lehman
& Sheldon Danziger, Ending Welfare, Leaving the Poor to Face New Risk, FoRuM APPLIED RES. &
PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 43-44 n.4 (indicating that of the 90% of families without a
father receiving AFDC, 37% of AFDC recipients were divorced, widowed, or separated, and
53% were never married). A few single fathers received assistance, and a somewhat larger
number of two-parent families satisfied the stringent eligibility requirements for two-parent
families. See id. at 33-34. However, among the roughly 4.8 million families that received
AFDC benefits in a typical month in fiscal year 1993, almost 90% were fatherless. See id.
236 In 1935, Congress created a program called "Aid to Dependent Children." See So-
cial Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1935). In 1962, Congress renamed this welfare
program "Aid to Families with Dependent Children." "Mother's Aid" programs established
by state and local governments from 1910-20 served as models for both of these federal
programs. See GoRDoN, PrrED BUT NOT ENTITLED, supra note 1, at 37. These programs
provided "assistance to 'deserving' poor single mothers with children to defray the costs of
raising children in their own homes and to deter child labor and the institutionalization of
fatherless children." 1d.
237 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
238 See Gary Burtless, The Effect of Reform on Employment, Earnings and Income, in WELFAE
POLC FOR THE 1990's 103, 105-06 (Phoebe H. Cottingham & David T. Ellwood eds., 1989);
see also Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 817
(1994) (exploring the modern view of welfare reform that emphasizes the need for recipi-
ents to become economically self-sufficient). In its original form, Congress limited aid to
widows. See id. at 824. As the typical AFDC mother changed in the 1950s, Congress added
divorced and separated mothers to the entitlement categories. See id. at 825. In the 1960s,
as a result of the civil rights and women's movements, the government extended the pro-
gram to women of color and single women who had never married. See id. By the 1980s, a
majority of AFDC recipients were never-married mothers and their children. See Lehman
& Danziger, supra note 235, at 36.
239 Jeffrey Lehman & Sheldon Danziger, Reflections on Welfare Reform, LAw QUADRANGLE
NoTEs, Winter 1994, at 34, 36-37.
240 See id.
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mothers receiving aid to work and, in some instances, to make partici-
pation in job training a prerequisite for receiving benefits.2 41
In the early 1970s, Congress enacted legislation that required
mothers of school-age children to register for work and training in
order to receive aid.2 42 In the following decade, by enacting the Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988,243 Congress took another significant legisla-
tive step in redefining the goal of welfare from supporting poor
children to creating incentives for poor mothers to obtain employ-
ment outside the home.244 The Family Support Act expanded the
pool of AFDC recipients who must work or accept job training to
render mothers whose children have reached the age of three eligible
for aid.2 45
Thus, for nearly thirty years, the government has imposed some
kind of federal work requirement on welfare recipients. In recent
years, however, both political and public rhetoric have reflected a
broader consensus that poor women should spend their time working
rather than caring for their children. This consensus culminated in
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (the "PRWORA"), 246 which abolished AFDC and replaced it
with a system of block grants that go directly to the states. 247 Under
the PRWORA, the states can fashion welfare plans that require most
recipients to work, and also can impose mandatory maximum time
limits for assistance to needy families.248 President Clinton's remarks
as he signed the bill reflected this view that poor women and children
who receive welfare are no longer among the deserving poor:
"The typical family on welfare today is very different from the one
that welfare was designed to deal with 60 years ago." In contrast to
needy Depression-era Americans, modem Americans who get aid
"are trapped on welfare for a very long time, exiling them from the
entire community of work that gives structure to our lives." 249
The political rhetoric that has accompanied this shift in policy
reflects the widely held view that welfare mothers are the cause of
many social problems. Throughout recent years, key political leaders
and policyworkers have blamed welfare for a range of social problems,
241 Social Security Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 602(A), (C) (1967).
242 See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POV-
ERTY. WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 154 (1991).
243 Pub L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687
(1988)).
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
247 Id.
248 1I
249 Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role, N.Y. TiMEs,
Aug. 23, 1996, at Al.
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from poverty250 and family violence25 1 to racial tension.25 2 Commen-
tators suggest a variety of theories to explain this shift in socioeco-
nomic policy. Politics provided the most obvious and immediate
impetus for the replacement of AFDC with the PRWORA. Viewed in
the context of contemporary presidential politics, the PRWORA rep-
resents a political compromise between a Democratic President and a
Republican Congress, rather than a consensus on public policy built
over time. Although candidate Clinton had promised in 1992 to "end
welfare as we know it," only when the Republicans gained control of
Congress in 1994 was he forced to respond to proposals to dismantle
the AFDC programs.253
Other accounts of this policy shift suggest that it represents more
of a culmination of long-term trends rather than a radical departure
from existing policy. One such long-term trend is society's devaluing
of mothering, the work of caring for children. As Carol Sanger notes
in her thoughtful and comprehensive examination of the law's re-
sponse to mothers' decisions to leave their children:
[U]nlike the early twentieth century when mothering as public ser-
vice was recognized and compensated (however stingily) through
the widespread enactment of mothers' pensions, social consensus
regarding the importance of maternal caretaking and public re-
sponsibility for some of its costs no longer exists.... Current wel-
fare reforms are premised on the belief that a working mother as
role model is more important for poor children than whatever they
might gain from a homebound but publicly supported mother.
2 54
Other commentators have analyzed this shift, which devalues mother-
ing, by contrasting the law's current response to full-time, mostly male
wage earners who are temporarily unemployed due to layoffs with
mothers who are temporarily unemployed and staying at home to care
250 A political consensus among some liberals and most conservatives has emerged
which blames single mothers receiving AFDG for "weakened commitment to competence,
work, and responsible living" which leads to poverty. Lynn, supra note 42, at 84.
251 See Karen Hosler, Dole Draws Fire with Comments on Crime; Candidate Criticized for Ap-
pearing to Link Spousal Abuse, Welfare, BALTIMORE SuN, May 31, 1996, at 8A (quoting 1996
presidential candidate Bob Dole, who blamed welfare programs for increases in domestic
violence); Robert Scheer, Gingrich, Savaging Welfare, Is on a Fool's Errand, LA TiMES, Nov.
28, 1995, at B9 (describing Gingrich's false "depiction of [a slain pregnant woman] as the
product of an immoral welfare culture").
252 See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Pro-
posals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 719 (1992) (noting that Bush and Qpayle blamed the Los Angeles
riots on welfare initiatives); Seth Sutel, Quayle: Welfare to Blame, BOsTON GLOBE, May 14,
1992, at 13; Michael Wines, White House Links Riots to Welfare, N.Y. TimEs, May 5, 1992, at Al.
253 For an analysis of the political context of Clinton's support of the PRWORA, see
Peter Edelman, The Worst ThingBill Clinton Has Done, ATLAmc MoNTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43,
43-45.
254 Sanger, supra note 4, at 498-99.
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for their children.255 Laid-off workers receive unemployment insur-
ance, while mothers staying at home to care for children receive wel-
fare. Despite their similarity as temporary compensation,
unemployment insurance is viewed as "contributory" and "earned,"256
while welfare is viewed as "noncontributory" and "unearned."257
Those "on unemployment" neither suffer the same stigma nor shoul-
der the blame for the variety of social ills that those on welfare
experience.
In her review of the evolution of welfare programs prior to the
PRWORA, Martha Minow argues that recent work requirement "re-
forms" are not departures from longstanding policy, but rather "reit-
erations of longstanding lines of social cleavage."258 Despite the
feverish recent pitch of rhetoric blaming welfare for a wide range of
seemingly unrelated societal problems,2 59 longstanding negative views
in American political discourse about poor people, particularly wo-
men and African Americans, may better explain these reforms.260
The single mother on welfare embodies immorality, deviancy, and the
lack of will that gave rise to today's massive social problems. This cate-
gory of motherhood, whether described as welfare queen or unwed
mother, now symbolizes much of what is wrong with society. As Mi-
now describes it, "lacking ajob means degeneracy; having a child with-
out the ongoing presence of a father means moral deviance; being a
mother in these circumstances means nurturing a next generation of
pathology; and receiving welfare means being a debit to society."261
255 Despite the image of welfare recipients as long-term unemployed women, not only
do fewer than half of the families that received AFDG receive it for more than 36 months,
but most families received aid for no more than two years at a time. See CENaER ON SOC.
WELFARE POLICYAND LAW,, WELFARE MyrHs: FACT OR FICTION?, at 7 (1996). More than two-
thirds of the adults who received AFDG had been employed either while they received aid
or before they applied for it. See id. at 21; see also supra text accompanying notes 239-41
(noting various incentives that AFDC provides to mothers who work).
256 M.M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of "Mother," in MOTHERS IN LAw, supra note 4,
at 73, 90.
257 Id.
258 Minow, supra note 238, at 819.
259 See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text
260 See The Negro Family- The Case for National Action ("The Moynihan Report"),
reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WIuIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE PoLrrIcs
OF CONTROVERSY 39 (1967) (identifying patterns in Black families, including the "destruc-
tive" impact of matriarchy in the Black community); STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE
NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 110-13 (1992) (comparing 1989
media stories blaming African-Americans for their poverty with very similar accounts from
1889).
261 Minow, supra note 238, at 837 (citing Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare
Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-iNG JuSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POwER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALrv 323, 332 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992)); see also HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra
note 90, at 9-10 (noting that, while the historical purpose of AFDC was to permit poor
women to stay home with their children, its focus has always been on regulating mothers
[Vol. 83:688
9]LEGAL IMAGES OF MOTHERHOOD
Against this political and social background, it is not surprising
that Congress, whether by political compromise or broad social con-
sensus, decided to "end welfare as we know it" by moving mothers
from the home to the workplace.2 62 The PRWORA accomplishes this
in a variety of ways, but principally, by changing the overall structure
of the program. The AFDC system had been one of entitlement in
two senses. First, it provided a federally defined guarantee of assist-
ance to families with children who met their state's statutory defini-
tion of need and complied with other conditions of state law.263
Second, it guaranteed states a federal matching share of the money
needed to provide benefits to all qualified families.264 The PRWORA
replaces federal guarantees in both areas with block grants to the
states 1) that permit each state to decide whom to include or exclude
from welfare benefits2 65 and 2) in amounts that will remain fixed, re-
gardless of changing levels of need in the states.2 66
The two PRWORA provisions that most directly regulate mothers'
conduct 1) impose time limits on the receipt of benefits and 2) re-
quire mothers to work as a condition to receiving assistance. 267 The
Act also prescribes a cumulative lifetime limit of five years in which
any individual can receive benefits.2 68 However, states are free to im-
pose shorter time limits.2 69
while virtually ignoring the responsibilities of fathers). But see DAVID ZUCcINO, MYtH OF
THE WELFARE QUEEN (1997) (analyzing the stereotypes and misinformation surrounding
families on welfare by focusing on two mothers on welfare who, despite poverty and lack of
education, engage in activism to help the homeless in Philadelphia).
262 The PRWORA has several other provisions that introduce substantial budget cuts
for benefits to legal immigrants, cuts in food stamps and child nutrition programs, as well
as extensive changes in the federal child support laws. For a critique of these provisions,
see Edelman, supra note 253. For a discussion of how those provisions also indirectly regu-
late mothers' conduct, see PAULA ROBERTS, CENTER FOR LAw & Soc. PoucY, FAMILY LAW
ISSUES AND THE "PERSONAL RESPONSIBILrnY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1996" (1996).
263 42 U.S.C.. § 601 (1995). The PRWORA eliminated individual entitlement to
assistance. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(b) (West Supp. 1997).
264 42 U.S.C.. § 603 (1995).
265 42 U.S.CA § 602(a) (1) (B) (iii) (West Supp. 1997).
266 Id. § 603(a) (1) (A).
267 Id. § 602(a) (1) (A) (iii).
268 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 2112 (1996). However, an exception to the
five-year lifetime limit allows families that have been receiving assistance for five years to
occupy up to 20% of the caseload. See id., 110 Stat. at 2138. Although this provision may
appear to provide the states with the flexibility needed to deal with the most severe hard-
ship cases, 20% may be inadequate, given that about 50% of the pre-PRWORA caseloads
are families that have received assistance for more than five years. See Edelman, supra note
253, at 50.
269 As ofjune, 1997, at least 20 states had opted for shorter time limits for at least part
of their caseloads. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS Assoc. CM. FOR BEST PRACTICES, SUMMARY OF
SELECTED ELEmENrs OF STATE PLANS FOR TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIEs 6-19
(Nov. 20, 1997). The shortest time limit is 12 months, imposed by Texas, with most states
in this group opting for two years. See id.
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The work participation guidelines require all benefit recipients to
work.270 States can exempt from work participation single custodial
parents caring for children under six years old, if the parent can
demonstrate an inability to obtain needed child care.271 Again, states
can toughen these federally imposed work requirements. 2 72
These changes to the conditions for receiving public aid reflect
the general trend in laws governing maternal conduct. When the cus-
tody of their children is challenged, women are expected to meet a
legal standard of an ideal nurturer. At the same time, the state ex-
pects them to perform in the work world as though their child care
responsibilities had never affected their work skills and opportunities.
The presumption of mothers' autonomy and equality as wage
earners is even more damaging for mothers who need welfare. First,
even if every mother on welfare could leave her child care responsibil-
ities to enter the workforce, jobs are generally unavailable to these
mothers. Lack of education, suffering from disabilities, and lack of
skills are often what put them on welfare in the first place.2 78 More-
over, as the country's demand for unskilled workers decreases,274 per-
270 This work requirement will be imposed on a state's caseload over a period of five
years. Twenty-five percent of the caseload-that is, mothers-must be working or in train-
ing in 1997, the first year of implementation. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 607(a) (1).
271 See id. § 607(e) (2). The determination as to whether this and most other excep-
tions under the PRWORA apply to a given applicant is within the discretion of the state.
See id In many states, the worker is vested with exercising this discretion. For a discussion
of the problems that have resulted from this approach, see Barbara Vobejda & Judith
Havemann, In Welfare Decisions, One Size No LongerFits All, WASH. PosrJune 30,1997, at Al.
272 See 42 U.S.CA § 607(b) (5). "[A] State may, at its option, not require an individual
who is a single custodial parent caring for a child who has not attained 12 months of age to
engage in work...." Id. For example, Ohio exempts from work training requirements
only single parents with children under the age of one, instead of the federal requirement
of age three. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.81(B) (6) (a) (Anderson Supp. 1996); see also
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.065 (3) (d) (West Supp. 1998) (exempting from work requirements
"one custodial parent with a child under 3 months of age"); Wis. STAT. A'N. § 49.193(2) (a)
(West 1997) (requiring parents of a child at least one year of age to participate in work
requirements).
273 A Washington State study revealed that 36% of the welfare caseload had untreated
learning disabilities. See Edelman, supra note 253, at 58. Another recent study found that
30% of welfare recipients are women either caring for disabled children or disabled them-
selves. See Pamela Loprest & Gregory Acs, Profile of Disability Among AFDC Families, URB.
INST. PoL'Y & REs. REP., Summer/Fall 1996, at 10, 11. The same study found that 16.6-
20.1% of female welfare recipients have some disability that limits their work, with 8.4-
10.6% having a seriousjob disability that prevents performance of at least one work-related
function. See id. at 11. For a review of the failure of prior federal efforts to move welfare
recipients into the paid workforce, see Minow, supra note 238, at 831-34.
274 See Lynn, supra note 42, at 86-87. Recent reports indicate that for those low-skilled
jobs that exist, unions and other organizations representing unskilled workers are organiz-
ing to prevent displacement of existing workers by welfare recipients. See BrendaJ. Buote,
Hopkins to Retain Unskilled Employees, BALImORE SUN, Mar. 17, 1997, at 1B (attributing ten-
sions among employers, unions, and state welfare agencies to subsidies given to employers
to replace current employees with "welfare-to-work trainees").
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sistent patterns of racial and gender discrimination compound the
problem for welfare recipients.275
While job prospects for the typical welfare recipient were bleak
prior to the PRWORA,2 76 this new legislation offers little in terms of
funding forjob creation, wage subsidies, training, placement, and sup-
port and retention services. 277 As Peter Edelman observed:
[T]he deck is stacked against success, especially in states that have
high concentrations of poverty and large welfare caseloads. The ba-
sic issue is jobs. There simply are not enough jobs now. Four million
adults are receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Half
of them are long-term recipients. In city after city around America
the number of people who will have to find jobs will quickly dwarf
the number of new jobs created in recent years. 278
One need only observe impoverished mothers for a short time to
begin to appreciate the challenges of maintaining employment while
raising children in poverty.279 Lack of transportation makes grocery
shopping, school drop-offs, job training, or other regular commit-
ments away from home a daily challenge. Low income housing often
comes without washing machines or conveniently located laundro-
mats. Tight budgets also mean frequent negotiations to maintain
even irregular telephone and utility service. Without a phone, impov-
erished mothers must travel by public transportation to transact "busi-
ness" with creditors, schools, and local social service agencies in
person.
Having the full responsibility for child rearing makes it extremely
difficult for poor women to enter the job market when their children
275 See Lynn, spra note 42, at 87; see also Teresa L. Amott, Black Women and AFDC:
MakingEntiilement out of Necessity, in WOMEN, THE STATE AND WELFARE 280, 280, 292 (Linda
Gordon ed., 1990) (arguing that welfare should be seen as "a vital source of income" to
single black mothers because race and sex discrimination limit meaningful employment
opportunities for these women); Diana Pearce, Welfare Is Not for Women: Why the War on
Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty, in id. at 265, 268-69 (identifying "[t]he
disadvantaged position of women in the labor market" as one of the key causes of "the
feminization of poverty").
276 For a detailed account of the limited job prospects for a mother on welfare, see
Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. LJ.
1961, 1979-85 (1993).
277 For an account of one state's attempt to find jobs for its new welfare-to-work pro-
gram and the barriers its welfare recipients faced, see Kathy Lally, Reworking Welfare: Mary-
land Recipients Join the Push for Self-Sufficienty, BALTrMORE SUN, Feb. 2, 1997, at IA.
278 Edelman, supra note 253, at 52; see also WiLuAMJuuus WILSON, WHEN WoRK DISA'-
PaRS: THE WORLD OF THE NEw URBAN PooR (1996) (discussing the high rate of inner-city
joblessness).
279 Since 1989, the author has directed the Family Law Clinic at the University of Balti-
more School of Law, in which approximately 20 students each year represent 60 to 80 low-
income clients, primarily women and children, in domestic cases. This experience pro-
vides substantial opportunity for close observation of the challenges facing impoverished
mothers and their children.
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are very young. The chronic shortage of quality, affordable child care
is a problem for all working parents, 280 but presents even greater ob-
stacles for women receiving welfare. 28' Limited transportation and
available resources considerably narrow the child care choices for
both the urban and rural poor.28 2 For the urban poor, the challenge
of child rearing intensifies as children grow older. Keeping children
safe from gangs, drugs, and violence283 requires constant vigilance
that may not comport with a full-time job, particularly when no other
parent lives in the house.
These problems are compounded for women who are welfare re-
cipients as a result of domestic violence.284 The PRWORA gives states
the option of screening all welfare applicants to determine whether
they are victims of domestic violence, and to waive certain welfare pro-
gram requirements for "good cause."285 Although it reflects some
Congressional recognition of the impact of domestic violence on its
victims, the provision may be largely ineffective. First, the Act does
not require states to adopt the provision and many states have not yet
280 See Sandra L. Hofferth, Child Care in the United States Today, FUTURE OF CHILDREN,
Summer/Fall 1996, at 41, 52 ("In 1993, parents... paid amounts ranging from $1.49 ...
for relative care to $2.85 per hour for sitter care (in 1993 dollars). This represents an
increase of about 20% over about [3.5] years... for center-based care, family child care,
and relative care and about a 12% increase for sitter care."). A University of Colorado
study that examined child care centers found that 85% of the centers in the study provided
mediocre or poor quality services. See COST, QUA=rIY, AND CnLD OUTCOMES IN CHILD ARE
CENTERS: TECHNICAL REPORT 320 fig.15.1 (Suzanne W. Helburn ed.,June 1995); Hofferth,
supra, at 66.
281 The PRWORA does include a provision that will increase child care funding. 42
U.S.CAL § 601 (West Supp. 1997). However, the Congressional Budget Office estimates
that the legislation falls more than $13.1 billion short of providing enough funding for the
work requirements to be satisfied over the 1997-2002 period. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM: FEDERAL BUDGETARY ImpLICATIONS OF
THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACr OF 1996, at 12
(1996). Reports from the states on the adequacy of the increased funding for child care
are mixed. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, U.S. Welfare System Dies As State Programs Emerge, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1997, at Al (reporting sharp increases in child care spending in many
states, but noting that shortages still exist, and reporting concerns that increased support
for child care may be short term); Tatiana With Ribadeneira, Welfare Rules Strain Child Care
Programs, Mar. 30, 1997, BOSTON GLOBE, at 7 (describing the shortages in day care in one
Boston neighborhood where substantial numbers of mothers are leaving home to work or
perform community service under new welfare rules).
282 See THERESA FUNIciELLo, TYRANNY OF KINDNESS: DISMANTLING THE WELFARE SYSTEM
TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 10-11 (1993) (describing one woman's struggle to stay off
welfare and maintain ajob with limited resources for child care, appropriate clothing for
work, and other expenses).
283 SeeJAmES GARBARINO ET AL, CHILDREN IN DANGER: COPING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES
OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE 1-4 (1992).
284 For a general discussion of the impact of welfare "reform" on domestic violence
victims, see UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S POVERTY. A SympOSiuM ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE RECEIPT, 19 LAW & POL'Y 117 (1997).
285 42 U.S.C.A. § 608 (a) (7) (C) (i) (allowing a hardship exemption for battered individ-
uals, defined as individuals who have been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty).
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done so. 2 6 Further, the statute leaves it to the states to determine
how to assess who is a victim of domestic violence.287 Caseworkers
exercise this discretion with little or no domestic violence training.288
The cost of conforming to the dual standard of ideal mother and
unencumbered wage earner will be high for welfare-to-work mothers.
If these mothers lack vigilance, and leave children unsupervised and
exposed to street dangers or domestic dangers from violent boy-
friends or husbands, they are at great risk of losing their children to
another relative or the state. A noncustodial father who has had little
contact with his child often looks better to a court than a mother who
has struggled for years with an imperfect record of child rearing.28 9
The current public benefits scheme presents the same double bind
that is so common to the law governing maternal conduct: get ajob,
support yourself, but do not deviate from the ideal mother standard
or you will lose your children.
in
THE BATIERED WOMAN AS "BAD MoTlER"
This Part explores how the conflicting legal images of mother-
hood affect battered mothers. Mothers who are victims of domestic
violence most strikingly feel the impact of the double standard that
laws governing their right to care for their children, on the one hand,
and laws regulating their access to economic support during child
rearing years, on the other, impose on mothers.
A. The Impact of Domestic Violence on Maternal
Responsibilities
The staggering dimensions of family violence 29° are well-docu-
mented. Women 291 and children 292 are overwhelmingly the victims.
The victimized women come from all racial, ethnic, religious, and so-
286 As of December 1997, 23 states and Puerto Rico had adopted some or all provisions
of the Family Violence Option in their welfare plans. See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC.
FUND, SUMMARY OF STATE Aarrivm REGARDING FAMILY VIOLENCE PROVISIONS IN THEIR STATE
WELFARE PLANS (Dec. 9, 1997).
287 42 U.S.CAL § 608(a) (7) (c).
288 See Vobejda & Havemann, supra note 271.
289 See infra text accompanying notes 363-64.
290 For purposes of this Article, family violence includes neglect or abuse (physical,
psychological, or sexual) of one family member or intimate partner by another.
291 See RoNET BACHMAN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A NATIONAL
CRIME VIcrnMzATION SURVEY REPORT 6 (1994) (reporting that between 1987 and 1991 over
90% of the victims of recorded domestic violence were women); BUREAU OFJUSrICE STATIS-
Tics, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATEs 2 (1994) (showing the rate of
victimization by an intimate is ten times greater for women than for men).
292 Family members physically abuse at least 2 million children annually. SeeAMERICAN
MED. Ass'N, FAMILY VIOLENCE: BUILDING A COORDINATED COMMUNITY RESPONSE 1 (1996).
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cioeconomic groups, as well as from all age levels and educational
backgrounds. 293 Battering by a spouse or intimate partner is the sin-
gle largest cause of injury to women in the United States.2 94
Physical abuse within a family very often extends to the chil-
dren.2 95 In a review of medical records, Stark and Flitcraft found that
battered women are six times more likely to have been accused of
child abuse than unbattered women.296 In homes with spousal abuse,
the father or father-figure was three times more likely also to abuse
the children as compared with families without such abuse.297 The
father abused approximately 50% of the abused children in these
homes, the battered woman abused 35% of the abused children, and
others or both the man and woman abused the remaining fifteen
percent.298
In a national random survey, Strauss and Gelles also found a sub-
stantial correlation between wife abuse and child abuse: in homes
where wife abuse was present, both partners were more likely to abuse
their children than if there had been no wife abuse.299 The survey
also found that when wife abuse was severe, 77% of the children had
also -suffered physical abuse at some time during their lives.300
Notwithstanding the clear correlation between maternal abuse
and child abuse, there is little research exploring the depth of this
connection. 301 Existing research rarely goes beyond establishing the
293 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 18-19 (1979).
294 See MARY-LAND ATToRNEY GENERAL'S & LT. GOVERNOR'S FAM. VIOLENCE COUNCIL,
STOP THE VIOLENCE: A CALL TO ACTION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTION PLAN 1 (1996)
[hereinafter STOP THE VIOLENCE].
295 One Colorado study reported that 53% of husbands who battered their wives also
abused their children. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 59 (1984);
see also Liane V. Davis & Bonnie E. Carlson, Observations of Spouse Abuse What Happens to the
Children?, 2J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 278 (1987) (reviewing the literature on children of
battered women, and presenting the results of a study of children in shelters with their
mothers). A study of children in shelters for battered women found higher rates of child
abuse in families where there is wife abuse than in other families. See Women, Violence & the
Law: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth & Fams., 100th Cong. 4 (1987).
296 Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on
Child Abuse, 18 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVS. 97, 102 (1988).
297 See id. at 106.
298 See id.
299 MURRAYA. STRAUSS & RiCHARDJ. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMImIS:
RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 409 (1990).
300 Id. (finding that in families where fathers abused their wives, approximately 50% of
fathers and 27% of mothers surveyed abused their children three or more times a year).
301 As part of the recent exploration of mothers and the law, feminist scholars have
begun exploring the legal system's response to battered mothers and their children. See,
e.g., Appell, supra note 66; Ashe & Cahn, supra note 7; Tonya Plank, How Would the Criminal
Law Treat Sethe? Reflections on Patriarchy, Child Abuse, and the Uses of Narrative to Re-Imagine
Motherhood, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1997); Symposium, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and
the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1995); Symposium on Reconceptualizing Vwlence
Against Women by Intimate Partners: Critical Issues, 58 ALB. L. REv. 957 (1995).
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nexus between the two kinds of abuse30 2 and documenting the harm
to the victims, particularly children who witness domestic violence.303
To begin evaluating the legal system's response to battered
mothers, legal scholars and policymakers need to clarify the ways that
battering actually interferes with a mother's ability to care for her chil-
dren. Further, they need to understand the legal system's current re-
sponse to battered mothers. A brief review of how the battered
mother is likely to fall short of the "ideal mother" standard starts to
identify how the system can move from "mother blaming" to "mother
accountability." Such a shift in approach is crucial to developing ef-
fective strategies for protecting mothers and children.
As discussed earlier, the "good mother" is one who is married,
providing her children with a father who lives in the home and sup-
ports the family.304 Most battered mothers do not fit in this category.
Women are often blamed for staying with their abusers, but when wo-
men who are victims of domestic violence separate from or divorce
their abusive partners, they assume the negative label of "single
mothers. ' 30 5 These separations usually result in economic hardship,
often forcing the mother to go on welfare. 30 6 In addition, a battered
mother seeking to avoid immediate physical danger to herself or seek-
ing long- or short-term medical care might have to violate the legal
302 See, e.g., NATIONAL CTR. ON WOMEN & FAM. LAW, THE EFFEcr OF WOMAN ABUSE ON
CHILDREN 32-34 (1991).
303 A number of studies have reported on the harm to children who witness domestic
violence. For example, one study focused on 25 children who witnessed their mothers
being abused. Jane H. Pfouts et al., Deviant Behaviors of Child Victims and Bystanders in Violent
Families, in ExPLORING THE RELAIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND DELINQUENCY 79-99
(RobertJ. Hunner & Yvonne Elder Walker eds., 1982). Of the 25 children, 53% acted out
with parents, 60% with siblings, 30% with peers, 33% with teachers; 16% had appeared in
juvenile court, 20% were labeled truant, 58% were below average or failing in school;
caseworkers labeled 40% as anxious and 48% as depressed. See id. at 95; see also Randy H.
Magen et al., Evaluation of a Protocol to Identify Battered Women During Investigations of
Child Abuse and Neglect (July 22; 1995) (paper presented at the 4th Int'l Farn. Violence
Res. Conf. at the Univ. of N.H., on file with author).
304 See supra text accompanying note 6.
305 See Lewis Okun, Termination or Resumption of Cohabitation in Woman Battering Relation-
ships: A Statistical Study, in COPING wrrH FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSPEC-
TaIVS 107, 111 (Gerald T. Hotaling et al. eds., 1988) (noting that 43% of the women
studied left abusive relationships); Michael J Strube & Linda S. Barbour, Factors Related to
the Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship, 46J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 837, 840 (1984) (examin-
ing factors related to the decision to leave an abusive relationship and revealing that 70.5%
of battered women eventually left a violent partner).
306 Women who separate from their abusers experience economic hardship in at least
two ways. First, the loss of income from the abuser can be devastating for the mother and
children. Second, the abuser may work in a variety of ways to undermine his former part-
ner's ability to support herself and her children after separation. SeeMeier, supra note 159,
at 206-12 (citing JODY RAPHAEL, PRISONERS OF ABUSE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE
RECEIPT (1996)). Mothers who are victims of domestic violence were extremely dependent
upon AFDC when it was available. See Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Wo-
men's Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FOPDHAm URa. L.J. 1141, 114143 (1995).
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and cultural proscription against mothers leaving their children, even
temporarily.8 0 7 These characteristics of the battered mother-being
single, on welfare, and temporarily separated from her children-may
result in the "bad mother" label, a label that carries with it potential
civil and criminal sanctions from the legal system, even when the chil-
dren have not suffered physical harm.
Many battered women deal with other circumstances that genu-
inely interfere with their children's welfare and that reinforce their
bad mother status. The children of battered women are at a substan-
tially higher risk of direct emotional or physical harm than children
from nonviolent homes.308 The harm these children experience in-
cludes both physical harm and the effects of witnessing violence.30 9
Children also suffer because mothers who are victims of domestic
violence may be physically disabled from injury, sometimes on a regu-
lar basis.310 Finally, battered women may self-medicate these injuries,
abusing drugs or alcohol at higher rates than the general female pop-
ulation, necessarily interfering with their ability to care for their
children.311
307 See Sanger, supra note 4, at 384-438.
308 One expert described the harm in the following manner:.
In the vast majority of families, women are the primary caretakers of
children. Therefore the devastation of their lives caused by their partner's
abuse and coercion affects the children .... Battered women are physically
and emotionally worn down by the abuse. This may interfere with a
woman's capacity to meet her children's needs. The partner's efforts to
isolate the woman may result in the children being denied access to other
family members who could offer support and nurturance to the child.
Battering is a major cause of homelessness. Children suffer physical
and emotional consequences when they are forced to leave their home ....
Children are also damaged when used as a pawn in the abuser's at-
tempt to hurt his partner. Attempts to undermine the woman's authority as
a parent, convince the child that the mother is worthless, initiating custody
battles or violating visitation agreements are common tactics that harm
children.
JANNJAcKSON, INTERVENTION wrrns CHILDREN WHO HAVE WrrNFssED ABusE 3 (1990), quoted
in BEvERLY BALos & MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAw AND VIOLENcE AGAINST WOMEN (1994); see
also Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Understanding
the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1112-14 (1995) (summarizing studies describing both
direct and indirect harm to children living in homes where mothers are victims of domes-
tic violence).
309 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
310 Abuse by husbands or boyfriends is the single largest cause of physical injury to
women in America, more common than burglary, muggings, and other physical crime
combined. See STOP THE VIOLENcE, supra note 294, at 1.
311 See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefini-
tion of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HoFsTRA L. Rxv. 1191, 1221-22 (1993); see also ANTONE
C. FELIX HI & KATHLEEN F. McCARTHY, MAssAcHusErrs DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., AN ANALYSIS
OF CHILD FATALITIES 1992, at 12 (1994) (reporting that of the 67 child fatalities in Massa-
chusetts in 1992, 29 were in families where the mother identified herself as a victim of
domestic violence, and in half of the domestic violence cases, the mother was also reported
to have a substance abuse problem).
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All of these circumstances combine to place battered mothers in
the bad mother category, possibly subjecting them to intense legal
scrutiny and regulation. An examination of the legal system's re-
sponse reveals that intervention may occur simply because of these
mothers' status as single or welfare mothers. Moreover, even where
intervention occurs because the children need protection, the legal
system's punitive response is neither appropriate nor effective for pro-
tecting children of battered mothers.
B. The Legal System's Response When Child and Mother Abuse
Intersect: Case Studies
Courts evaluate the conduct of battered mothers in a variety of
contexts.31 2 A battered mother whose partner has abused her child
may be a defendant in a criminal prosecution for "failure to pro-
tect."313 That same mother may also be a complaining witness herself
in a criminal case against her abuser3 14 or a petitioner seeking a civil
protection order' 315 Finally, she may be a defendant in a civil pro-
ceeding in which the state or the child's father seeks to remove or
place limitations on her ability to care for her children.3 16 In addition
to formal court proceedings, a battered mother may also have involve-
ment with countless law enforcement, court personnel, and social ser-
vice agencies that may not coordinate or share information.317 The
following case studies illustrate how battered mothers fare in these
various settings.
1. Case Study Number 1: Mothers in Juvenile Court3 18
Barbara W., a thirty-year-old African-American mother of two
daughters, was in many ways different from the typical mother who
312 Since 1988, all 50 states have enacted civil and criminal remedies for victims of
family violence. See Meredith Hofford & Richard J. Gable, Significant Interventions: Coordi-
nated Strategies to Deter Family Violence, in FAiMUES IN COURT 89, 91 (Meredith Hofford ed.,
1989).
313 See supra Part I.B.2.c.
314 See, e.g., Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WomEN's LJ. 173 (1997) (describing the role of the criminal law in punishing batterers).
315 See, e.g., JANE C. MURPHY ET AL., INcREASING AccESS TOJUSTICE FOR MARYLAND'S FAm-
iuES 19-23 (1992) (describing the process of obtaining a civil protective order in
Maryland).
316 See Appell, supra note 66, at 581-87; Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. Rv. 1041 (1991).
317 See, e.g., STOP THE VIOLENCE, supra note 294, at 7 (noting.that in Maryland, an
abused mother and child may seek help from the legal system through the police, a court
commissioner, a victim service program, a lay advocate or lawyer, the civil court, the State's
Attorney, the criminal court, Child Protective Services, the juvenile court, the Department
of Social Services, and the Division of Parole and Probation.).
318 This case study is based upon a civil child protection proceeding in the Juvenile
Court in Baltimore, Maryland. As part of a broader study of the legal system's response to
battered mothers, the author interviewed key prosecutors and defense attorneys in
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appears in juvenile court to defend against charges that she abused or
neglected her children.3 19 At the time of her court appearance, Bar-
bara W. "was employed as a teacher's aide in a public school and was
close to earning her college degree." 320 She had recently married and
was living with her new husband and her two daughters, ages four and
one, from previous relationships.321
During the course of Barbara's relationship with her new hus-
band, Jack, his behavior was typical of batterers.3 22 Prior to their mar-
riage, they had a brief but intense courtship.3 23 Jack was attentive and
neither verbally nor physically abusive towards Barbara or the chil-
dren.324 Shortly after they married, he became a different person, ar-
guing often with Barbara and, after a few months, slapping and hitting
her on a regular basis.323 During this early period of the marriage,
Jack occasionally "smack[ed]" the children, but did not physically in-
jure them.3 2 6
Maryland who manage the prosecution of child abuse cases or the defense of parents in
Child in Need of Assistance ("CINA") civil proceedings. For some of the findings from the
first phase of that study, see STOP THE VIOLENCE, supra note 294. This case study and the
two that follow are a result of that research. Because most of the proceedings in both Case
Study Number 1 and Case Study Number 2 are not a matter of public record, the real
names of the parties have been changed. Although the use of first names for clients is not
customary in the author's clinical program, first names have been used here for easy
identification.
319 For characteristics of the typical mother appearing in juvenile court, see supra
notes 86-93 and accompanying text (describing the greater likelihood of state intervention
in families headed by poor, single mothers).
320 See Transcript of Interview by Susan Rodgers with Linda Koban, Chief Attorney for
the Child in Need of Assistance Unit Division of the Office of the Public Defender, State of
Maryland, and Attorney for Barbara W. 1 (Aug. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Transcript of Inter-
view with Linda Koban] (transcript on file with author).
321 See In reA & B, Nos. 89408003, 89408004 at 33-34 (Baltimore City Ct. Sept. 7, 1994)
(names altered to preserve confidentiality) (transcript of hearing, on file with author)
[hereinafter A & B Transcript]; Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320,
at 1.
322 For a description of behavior typical of batterers, see Martha R. Mahoney, Vitimiza-
tion or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLC NATURE OF PRvATE
VIOLENCE: THE DIScOVERY OF ABUSE app. 1 at 88 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds.,
1994) (cataloging, on a "Power and Control Wheel," a list of behaviors indicative of abu-
siveness which include physical, emotional, and sexual abuse). The list of behaviors on the
Power and Control Wheel indicates that abusers frequently use a variety of behavioral strat-
egies along with physical abuse to achieve power and control over family members. See id.
Those tactics include: emotional, economic, and sexual abuse and the use of children,
threats, male privilege, intimidation, and isolation. See id.
323 The parties became involved in November 1993, and were married in February
1994. See A & B Transcript at 32, 34.
324 See id. at 32-33.
325 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1. During the
proceedings, the mother testified that her husband monitored her time (to the point of
making her account for every minute), accused her of having affairs with other men, and
was rude to her friends. See A & B Transcript at 74.
326 In re A & B at 2 (Baltimore City Ct. July 15, 1994) (adjudicatory stipulation) [here-
inafter Adjudicatory Stipulation] (on file with author).
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In a pattern typical of batterers, Jack followed the incidents of
physical abuse with loving behavior, expressing both remorse and a
willingness to change. For her part, Barbara accepted his promises
and hoped that things would get better.327 Following a usual pattern
in battering relationships, the loving contrition phase would be fol-
lowed by a tension building phase in which Jack would be edgy and
likely to engage in verbal abuse with little or no provocation.328 Bar-
bara knew Jack's behavior in this phase meant that physical abuse
would follow unless she was very careful and compliant.3 29 During
this time, she became very tense, feeling both helpless and afraid that
anything she did could result in a new round of physical abuse to-
wards her or possibly the children.330
Following one particular tension building phase, Jack exploded
at his four-year-old stepdaughter, Brooke. After learning that she had
been "bad at day care," he grabbed her, took her out of the living
room (where Barbara was) and into another room, and beat her with
a belt.3 31 Barbara heard her husband yelling and her daughter crying,
but she did not go into the room. 332 According to Barbara, she knew,
from repeated past experience with this cycle of violence, that her
intervention would further enrage her husband, and thus place her
daughters and herself at greater risk of physical injury.3 33
After her husband stormed back into the living room, Barbara
went to her daughter and found her injured as a result of the blows
from her husband's belt.334 Although one-year-old Anna avoided seri-
ous injury during this tirade, her stepfather still slapped her because
"she would n6t stop crying."335 Following the incident, Barbara took
her daughter to her mother's house.3 36 After hearing Barbara's story
and observing her granddaughters, Barbara's mother called the police
and her pastor and then took her granddaughters to the hospital.337
327 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1. Barbara's story
is consistent with research Lenore Walker performed in which she identified the cycle of
violence in relationships involving domestic violence. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFING LOVE
37, 4247 (1989); WALKER, supra note 295, at 95-104. The three stages that cycle within a
battering relationship are a tension-building phase, a period of violent incidents, and a
loving contrition period. SeeWALKER, supra, at 37,4247 (1989); see also MARYANN DurroN,
EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATrERD WOMAN 28-29 (1992) (discussing the cycle of
violence theory); WALKER, supra note 295, at 95-104 (same).
328 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1.
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 See id.
332 See id
333 See id. at 1-2.
334 See id. at 1.
335 Adjudicatory Stipulation, supra note 326, at 2.
336 See id. at 1.
337 See id.
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The hospital staff examined both girls, treated Brooke for her inju-
ries, and filed a report of suspected child abuse with the Baltimore
City Department of Social Services ("DSS").338
After determining that the children could only be protected
through emergency action, the caseworker then filed a petition with
the Juvenile Court seeking to have both of Barbara's children de-
clared "Child in Need of Assistance" ("CINA").339 The petition also
sought to immediately remove the children from the mother's home
and to secure an order granting custody of the children to the Depart-
ment of Social Services.340
The petition named Barbara as a respondent in the proceeding
in Juvenile Court, but listed the children's biological fathers as un-
known.341 Because he had no legal obligation to provide care for the
children, Jack, the stepfather, was not named as a defendant in this
proceeding.342 The petition described Brooke's injuries and stated
that her stepfather had caused these injuries and had also beaten her
in the past.3 43 It also noted that one-year-old Anna had a facial
scratch, scars on her chest, and diaper rash.344 Finally, the petition
alleged that Barbara's mother had "failed to protect" her daughters
from abuse and was in the home during Brooke's recent beating.345
The petition did not include any facts related to Jack's abuse of
Barbara.346
338 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1. See generally MD.
CODE ANN., F m. LAW § 5-704 (1991 & 1997 Supp.) (requiring health practitioners to re-
port suspected child abuse).
339 For the statutory definition of a "child in need of assistance," see MD. CODE ANN.,
CIS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-801(a) (1995 & 1997 Supp.) ("'Child in need of assistance' is a child
who requires the assistance of the court [in part] because... [h]is parents, guardian, or
custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and his
problems .... ").
340 See Petition of DSS, In re A & B (Nos. 89408003, 89408004) (Baltimore City Ct. Mar.
1994) [hereinafter Petition of DSS].
341 Id.
342 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (Md. 1980) ("That the legal duty to
support does not ordinarily encompass a stepchild is beyond doubt."). See generally CLARK,
supra note 18, at 263-64 (explaining that the common law does not impose on stepparents
a duty to support stepchildren absent a voluntary assumption of such a duty).
343 Petition of DSS, supra note 340.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id. While CPS workers in Maryland have started training on domestic violence is-
sues, this lack of attention to potential battering of the mother during child abuse investi-
gations and court proceedings is typical. See, e.g., Dohm, supra note 66, at 7-8 (noting that
"Ij]uvenile court [proceedings] typically fail[ I] to identify domestic violence, advocate on
behalf of the battered mother or hold the abusive partner accountable for his violent be-
havior"). Some states have made more progress in this area. See, e.g., Enos, supra note 152,
at 250 n.137 (describing Massachusetts's experience with training CPS workers in domestic
violence).
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The court held a brief hearing to consider the petition.
Although Barbara was present, she was not represented by counsel.34 7
The caseworker who conducted the initial investigation was the only
witness at the hearing. 348 After the hearing, the court issued an order
for shelter care, authorizing the removal of both children from their
mother's care.34 9 Although the court placed the children in the
grandmother's care, it granted custody of the children to the DSS. 35 0
Barbara was granted supervised visitation two months later.35 1
The stepfather, Jack, was arrested and charged with child
abuse.352 Although Barbara obtained a civil protective order,353 which
prevented Jack from returning to the home, she also lent Jack's
mother money to help her post bail for Jack's release from jail.354
Barbara first had an opportunity to present her side of the case in
juvenile court at the disposition hearing held over eight months after
removal of the children. 355 Barbara and her attorney presented testi-
mony that: (1) the incident involving the beating with the belt was the
first incident in which her husband had physically abused either of
the children;356 (2) she had removed the children as soon as it was
safe to do so; 357 and (3) she had taken all steps to keep the stepfather
away from the children, including obtaining a civil protection or-
der,358 cooperating fully in Jack's criminal prosecution,35 9 and partici-
347 See In re A & B, Nos. 89408003, 89408004 (Baltimore City Ct. Mar. 21, 1994)
(docket entries) (names altered to preserve confidentiality) [hereinafter Docket Entries]
(noting that mother appeared pro se); see also In re A & B (Baltimore City Ct. May 18,
1994) (appearance notice) (indicating that Office of the Public Defender did not enter its
appearance until after date of hearing to consider petition).
348 See Docket Entries, supra note 347 (indicating that (1) a caseworker was present
and filed a petition, subpoena duces tecum, and witness summons for next hearing, and
(2) no other witnesses were present).
349 In re A & B at 1 (Baltimore City C. May 18, 1994) (order granting shelter care).
350 Id.
351 See id.
352 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1.
353 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., F.AM. LAW §§ 4-504 to 4-506 (1991) (providing a procedure
by which victims of family violence may obtain an order that, inter alia, requires the abuser
to stay away from the residence of the victims).
354 See A & B Transcript at 35. When asked why she posted bail, Barbara testified that
she thoughtJack had "changed," and was "ready to make a better life for himself" and "was
really sorry." Id. at 36-37. This response reflects a typical pattern of behavior in couples
experiencing the "loving contrition" of domestic violence. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note
293, at 95-96 (describing loving contritions phase).
355 Fathers also have notice and an opportunity to be heard at this stage, but are most
often absent from these proceedings. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
356 See A & B Transcript at 33-34.
357 See id. at 34.
358 See id. at 99.
359 See i& at 101-02.
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pating in a counseling program for victims of domestic violence at a
local domestic violence program. 360
Counsel represented Brooke's birth father at the hearing. The
attorney's cross-examination of Barbara repeatedly emphasized that
Barbara had stayed in another room while her husband beat her
daughter. 361 On redirect, Barbara testified that she did not go into
the other room because, based on her past experiences with her hus-
band, she was afraid that her intervention would further endanger her
child and herself.3 62
The worker from the DSS also testified, recommending that
Brooke's birth father receive custody of Brooke.363 The worker made
this recommendation without ever visiting the maternal grand-
mother's home to investigate the care that Brooke received, and de-
spite the fact that the birth father had had little or no contact with
Brooke up until this point.3 64 The worker also testified that, in her
opinion, Barbara's three sessions at the House of Ruth did not give
Barbara the ability to adequately provide for her children.365 Despite
Barbara's efforts to keep Jack away from the children, and the fact
that Barbara had no prior history of failing to protect her children or
of abusing or neglecting them, the judge refused to return the chil-
dren to their mother.366 His questions and comments from the bench
focused almost exclusively on the fact that Barbara had contributed
money toward her husband's bail.3 67 The judge commented that, by
taking such action, Barbara had endangered the children and evi-
denced her lack of concern for their welfare. 368
In his decision not to return the children to their mother, the
judge also emphasized the availability of the children's fathers as alter-
native caretakers.369 The judge was impressed with the fact that both
fathers had retained counsel and attended the hearing. 370 He placed
little importance on the mother's testimony indicating that neither
360 See id. at 103-04.
361 See id. at 62.
362 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1-2.
363 See A & B Transcript at 11.
364 See id. at 18-19.
365 See id. at 11-12.
366 The judge stated "[s]he's not exercised good decision-making when it comes to
selecting the men in her life. The last one [that she selected] beat her child while she
cowered in fear in another room. She essentially left this three or four-year-old child de-
fenseless while this brute worked his will." Id. at 240.
367 See Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1.
368 See id.
369 During Barbara's counsel's cross-examination of Brooke's birth father, the judge
stated: "Now the father is right there. He's doing everything he's supposed to do, and
more. He's protective and caring of the child. Shouldn't the Court focus on what he's
doing now?" A & B Transcript at 154.
370 Id.; Transcript of Interview with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 2-3.
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father had played any part in caring for, supporting, or maintaining
regular contact with his daughter since her birth.371 With regard to
the battered child, Barbara testified that Brooke's father never visited
the child after her birth, and regularly ignored Barbara and her
daughters when he saw them in church.3 72
The judge ordered that Barbara and the birth fathers have regu-
lar visitation, and allowed placement to remain with the maternal
grandmother, but the DSS retained custody.373 After over seven more
months of court-ordered classes and evidence of continued separation
from Jack, Barbara finally regained custody of her daughters.3 74
The ultimate result in this case makes sense: the court required a
mother to separate from a husband who hurt her child. However,
what is both typical and disturbing about this case is that at no point-
from the child welfare agency's investigation and removal of the chil-
dren to the restoration of custody over one year later-did anyone ask
whether the husband had physically abused the mother. Despite the
overwhelming evidence that households with abused children are
often households with abused mothers,375 neither the child protective
service worker, nor the lawyers for the children and the DSS, nor the
judge hearing the case ever inquired about the possibility that Barbara
was a victim of domestic violence. Such an inquiry would have pro-
vided the child welfare agency and its lawyers who were evaluating this
case with valuable insights. Perhaps that information might have fo-
cused the energy and limited resources of the child welfare agency on
securing removal of the stepfather, rather than the children, from the
home.376
Even if the agency correctly determined that the girls needed to
be removed, the fact that the mother was a battered spouse would
have provided valuable information for developing the "reunification
plan," which lays out, among other things, the steps that the mother
371 At one point, Barbara's counsel attempted to introduce testimony that Brooke's
father, upon finding out Barbara was pregnant, tried to persuade her to have an abortion,
but the judge found it irrelevant. A & B Transcript at 17.
372 See id. at 166-67.
373 Id. at 241-42.
374 See In re B at 1, No. 89408004 (Baltimore City Ct. Apr. 10, 1995) (stipulation) (indi-
cating that Barbara's older daughter was returned to her on March 13, 1995, and the
younger daughter was returned on April 10, 1995). The DSS continued to monitor Bar-
bara's care of her daughters under an "order of protective supervision" untilJune 13, 1995.
I& The court ordered Barbara to attend both child abuse and domestic violence counsel-
ing, and she began attending domestic violence counseling shortly after her daughter was
beaten. A & B Transcript at 25.
375 See supra notes 295-300 and accompanying text (describing studies finding correla-
tion between child abuse and abuse of mothers).
376 The failure to act to remove the abusive father from the home is unfortunately not
surprising. See supra note 98 (describing the failure of child welfare agencies to use civil
protection orders to remove abusers from the homes of their victims).
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must take to have her children returned to her.37 7 For example, the
plan in this case included parenting classes designed to help abusive
parents to control their violent behavior.3 78 While these classes may
have provided Barbara with some useful insights, counseling for bat-
tered women and children would have more directly addressed the
problem that put Barbara's children at risk: her relationship with an
abusive man.3 79
Another disturbing aspect of this case is that if the children's
grandmother had not been available as a caretaker, this baby and tod-
dler would have been placed either in foster care or with fathers with
whom they had had little contact since birth. Finally, the case starkly
demonstrates the different standards that the legal system imposes on
mothers and fathers. Although the judge condemned Barbara's
choice of husbands and her inability to protect her children from
their stepfather, he ignored both birth fathers' lifelong neglect of
their children.
The judge's failure to consider the circumstances of the mother's
life-particularly her battering and the complex dynamics of her rela-
tionship with her husband-hampered his ability to render an in-
formed decision in this case. As Barbara's attorney pointed out:
When we first came into court the only thing the judge could
really think of to say was that she had given the bail money, that if
she really cared about the safety of her children she would have left
the guy in jail. I thought this was really cruel. That was really the
main reason the judge didn't return the kids to her at that point,
because he said she had really endangered them by taking that ac-
don. I think he wasn't paying attention to the real dynamics. She
was emotionally involved with her husband. I guess it was like the
mother was asking for it in the judge's opinion.
The whole thing goes back to what the judges spoke about in
our training for attorneys doing this work, about what mothers are
supposed to be.
The juvenile courtjudges talk about maternal instinct, the high
standards that mothers are held up to in protecting their kids. You
know just like [mothers] should literally throw [themselves] on the
floor for [their children]. I just don't know how realistic they are.
That is probably the issue that the judges needed to be educated on.
377 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing states' obligations, under 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994), to develop a plan to reunify children with parents after re-
moval for abuse or neglect).
378 See Adjudicatory Stipulation, supra note 326, at 1.
379 Although the stipulation in this case required Barbara to complete counseling at
the House of Ruth, Barbara and her attorney initiated this counseling with no knowledge
by or assistance from the worker developing the reunification plan. See Transcript of Inter-
view with Linda Koban, supra note 320, at 1.
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They should be trained about how the abuse wears [mothers] down.
How frightened you feel. So you can't protect your kids. You have
this so called maternal instinct that could be displaced by fear and
especially when you take into consideration all the other conditions
that these people live under.38 0
2. Case Study Number 2: Mothers as Criminal Defendants38 l
In October 1994, Vanessa M., a twenty-five-year-old resident of
Baltimore, Maryland was arrested and charged with contributing to
child abuse.3 8 2 At the time of her arrest, she was in the hall outside
her apartment with her injured two-year-old daughter, Chelsea.38 3
Chelsea had suffered severe facial injuries (her face was swollen so
much that her eyes were nearly dosed), and a three-inch, third-degree
burn on her thigh.3 8 4 After the police incarcerated Vanessa upon
arrest, Chelsea was taken from her mother's care.3 8 5
In addition to charging the child's mother, the police charged
Vanessa's boyfriend, eighteen-year-old Hank, with child abuse and as-
sault and battery.3 8 6 Although the police officer later testified that she
noticed Vanessa had visible bruises on her face at the time of her
arrest, the police neither conducted an investigation into the cause of
the mother's injuries nor charged Hank with any crime for her
injuries.3 8 7
In February 1995, five months after the arrest, the prosecutor
from the Child Abuse Unit at the Baltimore City State's Attorney's
Office began to prepare the case for trial.388 The prosecution's theory
stated that, although the boyfriend had intentionally inflicted the in-
juries, the mother had failed to intervene or to seek prompt medical
attention after Chelsea had sustained the injuries.3 8 9 According to the
police report, Vanessa did not seek medical attention for Chelsea un-
380 Id. at 1, 4-5.
381 This case study is based upon a criminal prosecution in Baltimore, Maryland. For a
description of the sources upon which the study is based, see supra note 318.
382 See Incident Report Complaint No. 8J-15104, Baltimore, Md. Police Dep't (Oct. 18,
1994) [hereinafter Incident Report] (transcript on file with author). For the text of Mary-
land's child abuse law, see MD. CODE ANN., Ciuxms & PUN. § 35(C) (1996); Palmer v. State,
164 A.2d 467, 474 (Md. 1960) (holding that a mother can be criminally responsible for
failing to protect her child from abuse by a third person).
383 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, Chief Attorney, Child Abuse Prosecu-
tion Unit, State's Attorney's Office in Baltimore, Md. 4 (Aug. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tran-
script of Interview with Julie Drake] (transcript on fie with author).
384 See Incident Report, supra note 382.
385 Vanessa was released after 24 hours, but Chelsea was not returned to her. See Tran-
script of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 2.
386 See Incident Report, supra note 382.
387 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 3. The arresting
officer had been on the force for four years. Id.
388 See id. at 2.
389 See id. at 2-3.
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til more than twenty-four hours after Hank had beaten her.390 More-
over, police andprosecutors assumed that Vanessa had continued to
protect her boyfriend and was not concerned with the child's
welfare.391
The prosecutor first received information raising the possibility
that Vanessa had also been a victim of Hank's abuse when Vanessa's
aunt, who happened to work in the courthouse where the case was
pending, approached the prosecutor during her preparation for
trial.392 Vanessa's aunt described to the prosecutor her suspicion that
Hank had regularly physically abused Vanessa during their relation-
ship.393 She also insisted that the police report, which indicated that
Vanessa had substantially delayed seeking medical help for her daugh-
ters, must have been wrong.394
The prosecutor then approached Vanessa's public defender to
see whether she could provide any information regarding her client's
possible victimization.395 The defense attorney acknowledged that Va-
nessa might be a victim of abuse, but did not offer any further infor-
mation or details about the circumstances surrounding the events
leading to Vanessa's arrest.396 The public defender also refused to
allow the prosecutor to interview Vanessa. 397
Most prosecutors would have ended the investigation and negoti-
ations with the defense at that point.398 However, this prosecutor had
training and knowledge obtained outside her employment about the
links between child abuse and domestic violence, and, therefore, per-
sisted in convincing Vanessa's attorney to focus on domestic violence
as a relevant consideration for both the defense attorney and the pros-
ecutor.399 The prosecutor suggested that if Vanessa sought domestic
violence counseling and testified for the state against Hank, she would
"stet" the case.400
390 Incident Report, supra note 382.
391 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 3.
392 See id.
393 See id.
394 See id.
395 See id.
396 See id.
397 See id.
398 SeeJulie Drake, Remarks at the Governor's Third Conference on Child Abuse &
Neglect: Responding to Change (Apr. 28, 1995) (notes on file with author).
399 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 3-4.
400 See id. at 4. For the statutory provision on a "stet," see MD. CODE ANN., 1 MD. RuL.ES,
R. 4-248(a) (1998). A "stet" disposition indefinitely postpones trial of a charge. The stet-
ted charge may be rescheduled for trial at the request of either party within one year and
thereafter only by order of the court for good cause shown. Id. While Vanessa was charged
with this crime and its disposition would remain on her record, a "stet" means the state
would never prosecute the charges as long as she refrained from involvement in further
criminal activity for a year.
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Once the stet was entered and Vanessa became the state's witness,
the prosecutor was finally able to interview her and ask questions
about her own victimization and how that had affected her ability to
care for her children.40 In the course of this conversation, the prose-
cutor learned that Vanessa had indeed been a victim of domestic vio-
lence over most of her approximately one-year relationship with
Hank.40 2 Hank's physical abuse had in the past left Vanessa with facial
bruises.403
The prosecutor also learned that on the day of Chelsea's beating,
Vanessa had left the apartment to take her older daughter to
school.404 While she was out, Hank had struck Chelsea in the face and
burned her with a hot spatula and multiple cigarettes. 40 5 When Va-
nessa returned and discovered Chelsea's injuries, she told Hank that
she was taking Chelsea to the hospital.40 6 In behavior typical of batter-
ers,407 Hank refused to let her leave. 408 He bolted the door, took out
a knife and held it up to her throat, keeping Vanessa and her daugh-
ter in the apartment for the next twenty-four hours.40 9 When Hank
finally left the apartment, Vanessa ran out and called for help.410 The
police arrived, observed the child's injuries, and subsequently arrested
Vanessa.411
After the prosecutor heard the full story, she realized the inade-
quacy of the legal system's response:
I stetted the case. She became a state's witness at which point [the
boyfriend] pled. He pled guilty to physical child abuse and got a 15
year jail term which mom was real happy with but what upset me
about this case is that when I sat down and talked to [Vanessa] after
I entered stet, the story she told me was horrendous.
... He shouldn't have just pled guilty to physical child abuse. It
wasn't just that she didn't have a chance to seek medical treatment
and this wasn't a simple battery on her. He held her hostage after
he hurt the two year old....
And the bottom line is that [that] man should have been
charged with false imprisonment and assault with a dangerous and
deadly weapon for putting the knife up against her throat. I could
have gotten twice the sentence I did and she would never have to
401 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 4.
402 See id.
403 See id. at 3, 4.
404 See id. at 4.
405 See id.
406 See id.
407 See Mahoney, supra note 322, app. 1 at 88 (setting forth behavior patterns of batter-
ers, including isolation and intimidation).
408 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 4.
409 See id.
410 See id.
411 See id.
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worry about him getting out on parole and coming looking for her
which she is worrying about now. But I wasn't told by the police or
her attorney.41 2
Although the evidence against Vanessa seemed to merit further
investigation and re-evaluation, she was simply arrested and prose-
cuted. Mothers are typically prosecuted under these circumstances. 413
Under current practice in failure-to-protect cases like Vanessa's, prose-
cutors and defense attorneys see little downside risk in failing to ex-
plore the existence of domestic violence and its impact on the
disposition of the mother's case. 4 14 The prosecutor's main objective
in Vanessa's case was to secure a conviction against the real offender,
the boyfriend. 415 Prosecuting Vanessa strengthened the case against
Hank because Vanessa had to tell the story of Hank's beating Chelsea.
The prosecutor in such a situation is likely to be unconcerned with
the mother's potential acquittal because the real threat to public
safety is the violent boyfriend.
From the perspective of Vanessa's defense attorney, her client's
story would provide an effective defense at trial. The goal of the de-
fense is to obtain an acquittal, and the young and overzealous defense
attorney, relatively secure in the knowledge that her client's story will
deliver an acquittal at trial, sees little or no benefit in sharing informa-
tion or cooperating with the prosecutor in the early stages of a case. 416
In most cases, neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney seem
concerned with the impact that criminal charges, pretrial incarcera-
tion, and testifying at trial will have on defendants like Vanessa or on
those defendants' roles as mothers. Children are removed, at least
temporarily, and mothers like Vanessa undergo increased scrutiny in
any future encounters with the child welfare bureaucracy. In addi-
tion, as in the civil child protection case, children, at least temporarily,
lose the parent who has been their principal caretaker.
3. Case Study Number 3: Mothers as Defendants in Divorce and
Custody Proceedings417
Wanda Schoenewetter and Scott Bates were married in a rural
Maryland town in 1981.418 They lived together for six years and had
two children, Clifford and Scott. In 1988, Wanda filed for divorce on
412 Id.
413 See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text and cases cited therein.
414 See Transcript of Interview with Julie Drake, supra note 383, at 3-4.
415 See id. at 3.
416 See id. at 3-4.
417 This case study is based on Schoenewetter v. Bates, No. 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct.
30, 1989) (per curiam). Because the facts in this case are part of a public record, the
names have not been changed.
418 Brief for Appellant at 2, Schoenewetter v. Bates, No. 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct.
30, 1989) [hereinafter Brief].
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the grounds of constructive desertion. 419 At the time of the divorce,
the parties' children were ages ten and eight.
A divorce decree that incorporated terms of a settlement that the
parties had reached was granted in June 1988.420 Among other
things, the parties agreed that the mother "would have custody of the
children and that [the father] would have visitation every other week-
end, alternate major holidays, and [thirty] days each summer."421
Initially, the father visited his children.422 As time progressed, he
stopped going to court-ordered counseling and began to verbally
abuse Wanda and the children.423 Because of this behavior, the
mother ceased communications with him, 424 and he stopped request-
ing visitation.425
The divorce agreement quickly unravelled. At post-divorce hear-
ings that Wanda had brought to enforce the agreement, she testified
about the father's continuous abuse of her and the children through-
out the marriage and following the divorce. 426 She testified that soon
after the divorce, the father broke into her house, chased one child
around the house with a knife, assaulted the child, destroyed and stole
property, and assaulted a police officer.427 The judge denied her re-
quest to call the police officer from the assault incident to testify.428
She also testified that the father harassed her over the telephone, the
children feared the father, and that the father failed to appear for a
visitation during the month prior to the hearing.429 Wanda described
a variety of the father's abusive behaviors, ranging from the annoying
to the life-threatening. 430 She testified that the father threatened to
419 See Complaint for Absolute Divorce at 2, Bates v. Bates, CA No. 87-394 (Md. Cir. Ct.
May 7, 1987). For the relevant statutory provision, see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 7-
103(a) (2) (1991). In order to obtain a divorce on constructive desertion grounds, the par-
ties have to be separated for one year and the moving party must prove that he or she left
the marital residence because the conduct of one spouse made it impossible for the other
spouse to stay in the marital home and to maintain his or her "health, self-respect and
reasonable comfort." Lemley v. Lemley, 649 A.2d 1119, 1127 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
420 Bates (CA No. 87-394) (decree of absolute divorce).
421 Id.
422 See Brief, supra note 418, at 3.
423 See id.
424 See id.
425 See id.
426 See id. at 4.
427 See id.
428 See id.
429 See id
430 See id
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kill her and the children,431 and had hit the minor children.43 2 She
further testified that the Department of Social Services had investi-
gated the father and ordered him to stay away from the children,43 3
and that he had failed to pay child support,43 4 had terminated the
minor children's health insurance, 435 and had made harassing phone
calls.43 6 In a court-ordered psychological assessment of the children
and the parties, the children reported that their father had hit them
and had threatened to place them in a foster home, and that they
were anxious about the father's threats to kill them and their
mother.437 The psychologist recommended that the father be denied
overnight visitation with the children, and that the Department of So-
cial Services terminate his visitation with the children if it ever found
evidence of child abuse.43 8 Cumulatively, the evidence presented a
compelling picture of serious spousal and child abuse.
The father denied the charges of child abuse.43 9 The judge re-
fused Wanda's counsel's request that he interview the children, de-
claring that the children might be brainwashed like "'Manchurian
candidates.' 440 Treating the mother's allegations about the chil-
dren's abuse as untrustworthy, the judge appeared to require no less
than a conviction for child abuse before it would be willing to modify
the visitation order:
I don't think that... the Court really... tends to discount this
child abuse business. I mean, it's almost like one of those things
that becomes vogue today. People startled] a couple years ago,
read about it in a magazine. Yeah, I can't get him, or I can't get her
431 See id. "[H] e called me, and I just hang up on him, because we've had so much
abuse from him, calling up, threatening me, telling me that he's putting you and those f-
ing kids out of the house, and I'm going to fix you, I'm going to get you." Transcript at 16-
17, Bates v. Bates, CA No. 87-394 (Md. Cir. Ct. Apr. 26, 1989) [hereinafter Bates Transcript
II]. "He has told me and he's told them that he will kill them." Id. at 56.
432 See id. at 15. "He chased my oldest son around with a knife, knocked him around,
broke up things in the house, and stole things out of it, and he was arrested then for
assaulting a police officer." Id. at 15.
433 See id. at 54. "He's hurt my kids. Social Services blocked him from seeing the
children, they proved it." Id.
434 See Brief, supra note 418, at 13. "Like the first foreclosure statement, I didn't know
anything..., until he come out [of] the post office, and told me that I'm putting you and
those f-ing kids out, and he's waving the paper." Bates Transcript II, supra note 431, at 23.
435 See Bates Transcript II, supra note 431, at 18. "They are in counseling at school,
Scottie is, but after, in August, I could not afford it anymore, as I said, Mr. Bates cancelled
my children's medical insurance and their life insurance. There's no money coming any-
where." Id.
436 See id. at 16-17, 56. "Everytime that he calls me, I hang up. There is, I've already
had [a] police report filed on phone harrassment [sic] from him." Id. at 17.
437 Report on Well-Being of Parties' Minor Children at 5-7, Bates v. Bates, CA No. 87-
394 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 13, 1988).
438 See id. at 8.
439 See Brief, supra note 418, at 4.
440 Id.
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on anything else, well, I'll charge a little bit of this child abuse, and
get the Department of Social Services people running up and down
the road, and cause a big stink. Bring him up there and we'll have
it.
What happens in 99% of these cases? The State's Attorney gets
up and says Your Honor, we can't prove this case, we [nol] pros.
Well, by that time, all the damage is done anyway.
This is, he was never convicted of child abuse. Child abuse in
Maryland... is a 15 year felony.
That's exactly what it is. The case comes up, it's not proved, it's
thrown out of Court. ... [R] eal child abuse is one of the most horri-
fying crimes that there can be. But, true cases are not... all that
many.44
The court ordered continued visitation.442 Shortly after the
court's order, the children returned from a visit with their father and
told Wanda that he had again abused them and threatened to kill
them.4 3 They told her that he had also threatened to kill her, had
taken them on a hunting trip where he pointed a gun at them, had
squirted them with deer blood, and had driven while intoxicated with
the children in the truck.444 Wanda contacted the local DSS, who told
her there was nothing that the DSS could do. She then left Maryland
in fear for the lives of herself and her children.44 5
After the father discovered her departur6, he filed a Complaint
for Contempt and sought an ex parte order granting him an immedi-
ate change of custody.446 The trial court granted the motion and or-
dered that the father have permanent custody of the minor
children. 44 7 The court also found Wanda in contempt of court and
fined her $20,000, providing that she could purge her contempt by
turning the children over to the father, but freezing distribution of
the proceeds of the sale of her property until she purged her
contempt.4 48
The court based the decision to change the custody of the two
minor children on a single incident of visitation denial. The court
stated:
[I)f a party determines as the Court feels as a matter of fact she [i.e.,
the mother] has determined, that that party is not going to abide by
441 Bates Transcript I, supra note 431, at 47-48 (last omission in original).
442 See id. at 48.
443 Affidavit of Wanda Schoenewetter at 2, Bates (CA No. 87-394) [hereinafter
Schoenewetter Affidavit].
444 Id. at 2-3; Affidavit of Clifford Bates at 9-10, Bates (CA No. 87-394).
445 Schoenewetter Affidavit, supra note 443, at 3 (CA No. 87-394).
446 Complaint to Cite for Contempt and Ex Parte Relief for Immediate Change of
Custody, Bates (CA No. 87-394).
447 Bates, CA No. 87-394 (Jan. 4, 1989) (court order).
448 Id.
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orders of courts insofar as visitation is concerned. That seems to me
[to be] extraordinarily strong evidence that that person is unfit to
have custody. Because it has to be recognized by all parties it seems
to me that ultimately when they're involved in litigation it is indeed
up to the courts to determine in connection with custody and visita-
tion what the nature and extent of those rights are going to be.
And if one party thereafter who has custody says well, I'm simply not
going to abide by it, I'm not going to allow custody, it seems to me
that that gives a court a basis from which it may fairly and rationally
draw the inference that that person should not have custody.4 4 9
The trial court's disposition of Wanda's case demonstrates the
double bind that custody proceedings place on mothers who are vic-
tims of domestic violence and have children at risk of violence.
Choosing to deny the father visitation based on her fear of his violent
behavior, the mother faced the serious and costly ramifications of con-
tempt of court proceedings. In addition, as this case demonstrates,
denial of visitation can lead to loss of custody. If Wanda had granted
the father visitation despite what her children had told her, and this
decision had resulted in injury to them, her failure to protect her chil-
dren could have resulted in criminal prosecution or loss of her chil-
dren to the state. 450
The DSS's refusal to assist Wanda limited her options even more.
The DSS, however, was under no obligation to assist her. The
Supreme Court held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of So-
cial Services45 1 that the state has no affirmative duty to protect an
abused child.4 52 The response of the DSS, coupled with the court's
refusal to fully hear her request to modify the father's visitation, effec-
tively barred Wanda's access to the legal system.
In addition, this case demonstrates Martha Fineman's contention
that mothers are "taken out of contexts."453 The trial judge "classi-
fied" Wanda Schoenewetter as someone who "is not going to abide by
orders of courts," and therefore unfit to have custody of her chil-
dren.454 The court failed to consider the circumstances of her refusal
449 Transcript at 37, Bates v. Bates, CA No. 87-394 (Md. Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 1989) [herein-
after Bates Transcript I].
450 In addition to criminal sanctions, failure to protect a child constitutes grounds for
the initiation of child protection proceedings. See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., CTs. &JuD. PROC.
§ 3-801(e) (1) (1995 & 1997 Supp.) (defining "child in need of assistance," in part, as a
child whose "parents ... are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the
child"). For an application of this definition in the context of a failure-to-protect case, see
Case Study Number 1, supra Part III.B.1. It can even result in termination of parental
rights. See, e.g., MD. CODE AN., FAm. LAw § 5-313 (1991 & Supp. 1997).
451 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
452 Id. at 202-03.
453 FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 4, at 67.
454 Bates Transcript I, supra note 449, at 37.
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to obey the court order, her own victimization, her desire to protect
her children, and the impact of the order on the children.
Finally, this case demonstrates the dual standard that the law im-
poses on mothers and fathers. After withholding court-ordered visita-
tion, this mother was deemed "unfit." At the time the court awarded
the father custody, there was ample evidence in the record of the fa-
ther's violence towards his wife and children, as well as his lack of
commitment to his children's financial security. Despite this behav-
ior, the court was willing to "reward" him with the children in order to
punish the mother for her rebellious refusal to obey the court's visita-
tion order.455
CONCLUSION
The dichotomy that this Article highlights between the law's view
of mother as self-sacrificing nurturer and as equal wage earner resem-
bles the longstanding debate among feminists about "sameness" and
"difference."456 Justification for separate treatment of women based
on their status as mothers reinforces the ideal image of motherhood
that hurts women in child placement decisions and also raises the
specter of a long history of gender discrimination. On the other
hand, ignoring the interrelationship between child rearing responsi-
bilities and economic self-sufficiency leads to public policy that hurts
families, particularly women and children. While feminist theory457
has never adequately resolved the sameness/difference conflict, the
theory offers valuable tools for the task of rethinking the legal image
of motherhood. Its "high valuation of context" 458 pushes advocates,
courts, and scholars away from the law's current narrow stereotypes of
mothers, and forces a broader and more careful consideration of wo-
men as mothers. This Article's analysis of family, criminal, and wel-
fare law has been an attempt to provide such a broader and more
careful consideration. Examining these bodies of law from the per-
455 An appellate court ultimately overturned the trial judge's decision. The appellate
court remanded the case for a rehearing of the custody matter before another judge.
Schoenewetter v. Bates, GA No. 328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 30, 1989). As discussed
above, see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text, even when the losing party has the
resources to successfully appeal an adverse custody ruling, the loss at trial and the appeal
process exact an emotional and financial toll on both mothers and children. In this case,
Wanda Schoenewetter and her children suffered substantially as a result of these proceed-
ings. See Interview with Karen Czapanskiy, Attorney for Wanda Schoenewetter (Aug. 18,
1997) (notes on file with author).
456 For a discussion of different schools of feminist thought that explore the same-
ness/difference debate, see Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L.
REv. 803, 829-41 (1990).
457 I use the term feminist theory to describe liberal, cultural, radical, and post-mod-
ernist feminism. For an excellent account of how these different branches of feminist
theory have considered motherhood, see Ashe & Cahn, supra note 7, at 101-09.
458 Id. at 109.
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spective of mothers illustrates both problems with, and potential
changes in, the legal system's response to mothers as caretakers and
financial supporters of their children.
The child placement cases demonstrate the tendency of the legal
system to conceptualize child placement decisions as mother versus
child. This construct ignores the profound bond-resulting from re-
productive labor, or the emotional bond that primary caretaking cre-
ates, or from both-that most mothers feel for their children.
Recognition of this bond should be-absent clear evidence to the
contrary-a starting point for courts and caseworkers who are often
too quick to view mothers and children as adversaries.
This tendency to cast mother and child as adversaries has a partic-
ular impact on battered mothers and their children. The two systems
responding to these mothers and children-the child welfare bureau-
cracy and the domestic violence service providers-have long viewed
themselves as adversaries. 459 The child welfare system has generally
failed to recognize that the most effective tool to protect children may
not be removing them from their mothers' care. In some situations-
particularly the failure-to-protect cases that this Article examines-
protection of children means addressing a situation that endangers
both mother and child. Furthermore, domestic violence advocates
and the courts hearing domestic violence cases view their primary
roles as protecting the adult victim rather than the children. The
goals of the two systems-child welfare and the elimination of domes-
tic violence-should not, however, be viewed as incompatible. Recent
trends, although still in their infancy, offer reason for hope. Several
initiatives, primarily from the social scientists, indicate that the legal
and social service systems responding to family violence are recogniz-
ing and working out supportive relationships that will benefit both
constituencies.460
459 See, e.g., LAUDAN Y. ARON & KRISTA K. OLSON, EFFORTS BY CnILD WELFARE AGENCIES
TO ADDRESS DOMESIC VIOLENCE: THE EXPERIENCE OF FIVE CommuNrrms (1997); Mary Mc-
Kernan McKay, The Link Between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Assessment and Treatment
Considerations, CHILD WELFARE, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 29, 32-33 (stating that "when agencies
assisting victims of domestic violence interfaced with the child welfare system ... philoso-
phies and values clashed").
460 See, e.g., ARON & OLSON, supra note 459; Jeffrey L. Edleson, Mothers and Children:
Understanding the Links Between Woman Battering and Child Abuse (Mar. 31, 1995)
(presented at the Strategic Planning Workshop on Violence Against Women, National Inst.
ofJustice, in Wash., D.C., on file with author); Susan Schechter, Model Initiatives Linking
Domestic Violence and Child Welfare (June 8-10, 1994) (paper presented at Integrating
Policy and Practice for Families, a conference on Domestic Violence and Child Welfare, in
Racine, Wis., on file with author); Susan Schechter &Jeffrey L. Edleson, In the Best Inter-
est of Women and Children: A Gall for Collaboration Between Child Welfare and Domestic
Violence Constituencies (June 8-10, 1994) (paper presented at Integrating Policy and Prac-
tice for Families, a conference on Domestic Violence and Child Welfare, in Racine, Wis.,
on file with author); Susan Schechter & Anne L. Ganley, Domestic Violence: A National
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The responses of the various lawyers and judges in the three case
studies also illustrate the way in which the "law isolates each woman's
maternal duties from other facets of her life."461' In proceedings to
decide custody between parents, to remove abused and neglected chil-
dren, or to punish their mothers, the failure of lawyers and courts to
inquire into the ways in which abuse of mothers interferes with their
ability to care for their children may hurt the very children that the
state seeks to protect. The exclusion of relevant evidence is a possible
outcome, and placement decisions are often not in the best interests
of the children.
The courts evaluated the mothers in these case studies according
to the ideal mother standard, a standard which is inadequate to fash-
ion appropriate remedies. While Barbara and Vanessa's behavior may
have contributed to injuries that their children suffered, the legal sys-
tem responded only to part of their stories, and, therefore, did little to
change the mother's behavior, or to protect the children. Wanda
Schoenewetter's decision to withhold visitation was evaluated without
proper consideration of the violent and irresponsible actions of her
ex-husband. The trial court's decision, designed to sanction a mother
for violating a court order, ultimately harmed the children whom the
court was entrusted with protecting. Here, too, practitioners and
clinical scholars have begun to develop materials to assist judges and
lawyers involved in child placement disputes. These new materials,
unlike their predecessors, highlight the need to view mothers in a
broader contexL 462
This Article's analysis of child support and welfare law also dem-
onstrates that existing public policies create economic burdens for
many mothers that the courts ignore when evaluating those mothers'
conduct. The case studies of Barbara's and Vanessa's child welfare
and criminal cases reveal that they were punished for staying with vio-
lent partners who were their primary source of economic support. In
the divorce case, Wanda's efforts to collect economic benefits under
her separation agreement ultimately led to court proceedings that re-
moved the children from her custody. Current welfare and child sup-
port law offer little protection for these women.
Curriculum for Family Preservation Practitioners (1995) (presented at the Family Violence
Prevention Fund in S.F., GA, on file with author).
461 Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 4, at 113.
462 In child protection cases, the most recent training materials provide tools for law-
yers and judges to broaden the factual inquiry to more fully consider the circumstances of
the mother and children before the court. See, e.g., KAREN AILEEN HOWZE, MAKING DImR-
ENCES WoRc CULTURAL CONTEXT IN ABUSE AND NEGLECr PRACICE FORJUDGES AND ATrOR-
rNms (1996);JEAN KON PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILM PROTEGTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
ETHICAL AND PRACnCAL DIMENsIoNs (1997).
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Under current welfare law, none of the women could expect sig-
nificant financial support if they needed to rely on public benefits.
The new welfare-to-work model fails to assist women experiencing sys-
tematic, long-term harassment and abuse even though such abuse
dearly interferes with a mother's ability to work. Increased education
of policymakers and their constituents can counteract the impulse to
treat all welfare mothers in the same way. As noted, the federal gov-
ernment is making an effort to encourage states to consider the im-
pact of domestic violence on mothers' ability to support themselves
and their children and to improve child support collection.463 A
number of groups representing mothers and children have organized
to pressure more states to adopt such policies. 464
This Article demonstrates that an adherence to the narrow ste-
reotypes of mothers as caretakers and the illusion of economic equal-
ity harms mothers and children. These conflicting images also impact
fathers by immunizing them from legal responsibility and devaluing
their role in families. The father in Vanessa's criminal case was invisi-
ble and unaccountable for any of the injuries his daughter suffered
while she was in her mother's care. The judges hearing both Bar-
bara's child welfare case and Wanda's divorce and custody case in
some sense "rewarded" the fathers. Ultimately, none of the fathers in
the three case studies appeared to have had a full and meaningful
relationship with their children. For the most part, these fathers es-
caped responsibility for their children's economic, emotional, and
physical well-being.
There are some signs of positive change. Efforts at improving fa-
thers' financial accountability have been the focus of intense federal
scrutiny in the last decade,465 and the most recent signs hint at some
progress. 466 The task of fashioning an appropriate legal response to
enhance fathers' physical and emotional support of their children is
more complex. Fully acknowledging the primacy of mothers' bonds
with their children; as this Article urges courts and policylnakers to
do, may result in child placement policies that reinforce mothers'
dominant role in child rearing. Consistently assuming the role of
caretaker, in turn, reinforces the stereotypes and the potential for
463 See supra note 285 and accompanying text; see also Paul K. Legler, The Coming
Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act; 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 538-61
(1996) (stating that the vision for child enforcement provisions in the PRWORA is that the
payment of child support should be automatic and inescapable).
464 See, e.g., CATHERINE T. KENcNE-Y & KAREN R. BROWN, NOW LEGAL DEFENSE & EDuc.
FuND, REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES: THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON POOR WOMEN 22-23
(1996).
465 See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
466 See, e.g., Ann Marie Rotondo, Comment, HelpingFamilies Help Themselves: Using Child
Support Enforcement to Reform Our Welfare System, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 281, 282-84 (1997).
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sanctions when mothers' actions do not fit the model. This Article
advocates developing policies that strike an appropriate balance be-
tween valuing the work of mothers who have assumed the role of care-
taker and provider, and encouraging, or, in some instances, requiring,
fathers to be active participants in their children's lives from the
beginning.
Again, some evidence of policies that strike this balance do exist.
In the area of child custody, commentators have long urged adoption
of a primary caretaker standard,467 and an increasing number of states
have incorporated this concept into their custody law.468 In addition,
more states are beginning to require that courts consider evidence of
domestic violence when resolving custody and visitation disputes.469
In child protection proceedings, increased efforts to bring fathers into
the process at the earliest possible stage may benefit families. These
programs can only be successful, however, if child welfare personnel
and judges rethink the potential role these fathers can play in their
children's lives. In the past, when fathers could be found and brought
into court, the court viewed them as alternative custodians and, there-
fore, adversaries of the mothers. In order to meaningfully work to-
ward reunification of children with mothers who have been their
long-term custodians, the courts should instead bring fathers in to
participate in counseling and mediation. Such mediation should en-
467 See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MacH. L. REv. 477, 527-38 (19841; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child
Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 168, 180-82 (1984); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Why Mothers Are Losing. A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determina-
tions, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 241-43 (1982). But see Becker, supra note 20 (analyzing
decisions under the primary caretaker standard and finding it hurts mothers).
468 See, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990) ("[T]he golden
thread running through any best interests analysis is the importance ... of [a child's] bond
with the primary parent.. . ."); In reMaxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
(affirming custody award to mother because she was the primary caretaker, although both
parents were fit); In re Boldt, 801 P.2d 874, 875 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming custody
award to mother because she had been the primary caretaker); Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357, 364 (W. Va. 1981) (awarding custody to the mother, who was clearly the pri-
mary caretaker before the proceedings). See generally Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender
Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed? ... Should It?,
8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 84 (1993) (citing a 1982 study of appellate court decisions which
"found the idea of primary caretaker increasingly popular in determining custody
disputes").
469 Approximately 43 states and the District of Columbia have now enacted custody
statutes which permit some form ofjudicial inquiry into the existence of domestic violence.
See The Family Violence Project of the Nat'l Council ofJuvenile and Family CourtJudges,
Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 197, 225-27 (1995). These provisions generally either (1) permit or require courts to
consider the occurrence of domestic violence between parents as one of several factors
relevant to determining the best interests of the child; or (2) create a presumption against
an award of custody to a parent who has demonstrated a pattern of violence. See id. The
majority of states, however, still do not presume that a father who abuses the mother is
unfit. See id.
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courage these fathers to begin or resume regular contact with their
children. This regular contact would improve fathers' relationships
with children and ease the burden on the caretaking mother. Courts
hearing child protection cases should also have the authority to refer
cases to proper proceedings for imposing and enforcing child support
orders. This legal remedy would provide mothers with the economic
support to leave abusive relationships and would otherwise improve
the conditions that precipitated state intervention. Such programs
have begun in very few states470 and they should be expanded.
Many of the suggestions for reforming the legal system's response
to battered mothers apply to mothers in general. The law must recon-
ceptualize mothers or any individual legally responsible for the full-
time care of minor children. Public benefits and child support laws
should both take into account the burdens of rearing small children
and resist the legal fiction of equal opportunity. At the same time,
when the law must evaluate a caretaker, it should apply the same stan-
dard to mothers and fathers. The law cannot expect mothers to be
self-sacrificing perfect nurturers while exacting lesser sanctions on fa-
thers who assume little or no responsibilities for the care and nurtur-
ing of their children.
The rhetoric suggesting that this nation sees our children as its
greatest resource is all around us. Few would disagree that "[n] othing
is more important to our shared future than the well-being of chil-
dren."471 Yet, lawmakers have not accepted the notion that courts
should evaluate the adults who care for these children-at this point
primarily mothers-in a way that accurately accounts for the circum-
stances of their lives. The adherence to stereotypes, whether they re-
flect the nurturing, stay-at-home mother or the child-neglecting, lazy
welfare mother, needs to change. At the same time, policymakers
must rethink laws governing access to financial support-laws that as-
sume that mothers can quickly and easily transform into economically
self-sufficient workers when other support fails.
470 See supra note 77.
471 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAXES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LEssoNs CHILDREN
TEACH Us 318 (1996).
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